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Abstract  
 
Personality disorder has been and continues to be a contested diagnosis. 
Those who attract this form of diagnosis have been particularly vulnerable 
to the effects of stigma and have tended to be excluded from service 
provision. This thesis provides an examination of how recent 
developments in law, policy and practice have impacted upon the status 
of personality disorder as a diagnosis of exclusion in Scotland. The 
theoretical framework that provides this thesis with its structure is 
derived from the post-empiricist approach proposed by Derek Layder. 
This approach seeks to contextualise emergent inductive findings within a 
broader historical and contemporary analysis. In the case of this research 
the broader context consists of the interplay between mental health law, 
policy and practice in the field of mental health and the diagnosis of 
personality disorder more specifically. 
 
The empirical enquiry at the core of this thesis is based upon an analysis 
of the views, beliefs and expectations of front-line staff (psychiatrists and 
social workers qualified as mental health officers) involved in the process 
of assessment and service provision. In addition to front-line staff (n = 
27) a range of key informants who were in a position to shed light on the 
strategic imperatives underpinning recent developments in law and policy 
were also interviewed. This analysis is contextualised within a review of 
key developments in law and policy that have particular significance for 
anyone who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder.  
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Despite the ostensibly inclusive approach towards those who may attract 
a diagnosis of personality disorder evident within the Mental Health (Care 
and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, the reality is a highly selective and 
very limited inclusion of those who attract this form of diagnosis. The 
effective inclusion of those who may attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder has been obstructed by several key impediments: 1: an 
insufficiently robust policy framework to drive forward the process of 
inclusion; 2: residual ambivalence towards the legitimacy of the diagnosis 
of personality disorder itself and the legitimacy of the claims made upon 
services by those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder; 3: 
insufficient and inadequately focused resources; 4: service structures that 
have not been redesigned sufficiently to  engage successfully with service 
users who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder. As a 
consequence of these impediments to inclusion, the majority of those who 
may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder in Scotland are likely to 
continue to face high levels of marginalisation and exclusion.    
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction to Thesis 
 
This thesis is based on an empirical enquiry into key developments 
concerning personality disorder in Scotland following the inclusion of this 
form of diagnosis  as a category of mental disorder within the Mental 
Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003. How the diagnosis of 
personality disorder is understood and the way that the needs of those 
who attract this diagnosis are provided for is of fundamental importance 
to all those who are given this label. The diagnosis of personality disorder 
is distinct from other forms of medical diagnosis, not least because it is a 
diagnosis of who the person is, rather than being something that a person 
has. In this respect the diagnosis of personality disorder, arguably more 
than any other form of medical diagnosis, tends to define how the person 
is seen and how others relate to them (Stalker, Ferguson et al. 2005).  
 
 
Research Questions 
 
The process of enquiry underpinning this thesis seeks to address the 
following five questions:  
 
1. In what ways does the inclusion of personality disorder within 
mental health law in Scotland reflect an acknowledgement of the 
legitimate needs and rights of service users?   
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2. How does the inclusion of personality disorder within mental health 
law fit into a broader range of strategies of control and regulation 
characteristic of an advanced liberal democracy?  
 
3. How has the inclusion of personality disorder influenced the way 
that those who attract this diagnosis are perceived and responded 
to by front-line workers?  
 
4. In what ways has current legislation influenced the availability of 
services for those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder? 
 
5. In what ways has current legislation influenced the ability of those 
who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder to access appropriate 
services? 
 
 
The empirical enquiry at the heart of this thesis involves interviews with 
key informants from the domains of policy and practice. The process of 
enquiry and analysis used throughout the conduct of this research has 
been iterative and reflexive. The methodological approach within which 
this process of enquiry and analysis has been conducted is based upon 
the adaptive model proposed by Derek Layder (1982). 
 
The rationale for conducting this enquiry stems from my own experiences 
as a social work practitioner during the 1990s and early part of the new 
millennium. In keeping with many other practitioners, I observed that 
those who were designated as having a personality disorder were 
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routinely excluded from service provision. This was typically because a 
diagnosis of personality disorder often involves a dual diagnosis, an 
ambiguity that frequently allowed service providers to claim that a 
potential service user was not eligible but should instead be referred to an 
alternative service. Among the most common examples of this form of 
exclusion was that of service users being redirected back and forth 
between mental health and substance misuse services; or alternatively on 
the basis that the nature of the diagnosed disorder meant that the 
potential service user would frequently be regarded as untreatable.  
 
Personality disorder includes a range of specific disorders, as detailed 
within the International Disease Classification of Mental and Behavioural 
Disorders (World Health Organisation 1992) and the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ( American Psychiatric Association 
2000). Throughout this thesis, when reference is made to personality 
disorder, this should be taken to refer to a range of diagnoses rather than 
a singular diagnosis. The diagnosis of personality disorder has always 
been and remains contested. Debate continues as to whether personality 
disorder should be accorded a legitimate place within medicine and 
psychiatry more specifically. Those who criticise the inclusion of 
personality disorder within the classification of psychiatric disorders 
commonly base their objections on the grounds that personality disorder 
represents a particular form of social disapproval masquerading as a 
medical diagnosis.  
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In order to understand the origins of the concept of personality disorder, 
it is necessary to contextualise this within the broader origins and 
development of psychiatry itself. Psychiatry emerged as a specific branch 
of medicine to provide a means of classifying and categorising 
abnormality as part of a broader system of regulation and control 
(Foucault 1965) in an attempt to impose a rational order upon the 
seemingly irrational. According to Foucault this should be understood as 
part of a broader set of concerns following the Enlightenment with its 
characteristic emphasis upon rationality, whereby madness and 
irrationality more generally became objects of fear. Psychiatry carved out 
a specific sphere of influence within which “...the abnormal individual and 
the domain of abnormalities (became) the privileged object of psychiatry” 
(Foucault 2003:323). Given that the classification of abnormality and 
normality are substantially informed by normative judgements (Foucault 
2003), the basis of all psychiatric classifications and diagnoses can be 
contested, a fact which has significant implications for the drafting and 
implementation of law and policy (Pilgrim 2005).  
 
The extent to which personality disorder if it can be regarded as a 
legitimate diagnosis at all, is treatable and if so what form that treatment 
should take, also continues to be deeply contested. One of the defining 
characteristics of personality disorder sets it apart from other forms of 
diagnosis within biomedicine, namely that the diagnosis is inferred from 
behaviours that are taken as evidence of the underlying disorder. 
Reaching a diagnosis of personality disorder therefore rests upon a 
fundamentally tautological process.  
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Personality disorder has been widely acknowledged as historically 
constituting a barrier to those who are so labelled accessing services; the 
effect has all too frequently been that those who attracted a diagnosis of 
personality disorder became routinely excluded from services and as a 
consequence were often left vulnerable, marginalised and isolated 
(Ferguson, Barclay et al. 2003). Famously those who attract this form of 
diagnosis have been described as ‘the patients that psychiatrists love to 
dislike’ (Lewis and Appleby 1988).  
 
Personality disorder was explicitly included within mental health law in 
Scotland for the first time in emergency legislation rushed through the 
newly established Scottish Parliament in 1999 in the form of the (Mental 
Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999). The rationale 
offered by the Scottish Executive was that there was a clear and 
immediate risk to public safety based upon a flaw within the existing 
mental health legislation. The explicit inclusion of personality disorder in 
mental health law in Scotland was therefore driven by concerns centring 
upon perceptions of dangerousness and risk, rather than due to an 
acknowledgement of the right of those who may be given this diagnosis to 
be included within the sphere of service provision. Subsequently the 
publicly stated policy within Scotland was one of inclusion ostensibly 
intended to challenge the status of personality disorder as a diagnosis of 
exclusion; however whether those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder are able to successfully access services, depends critically upon 
practice ‘on the ground’ in the context of the actual policy framework that 
shapes the way services are designed and delivered: the relationship 
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between practice and policy therefore forms a central part of the enquiry 
at the heart of this thesis. 
 
During the late 1990s personality disorder became the subject of a 
particularly contentious debate concerning dangerousness and the merits 
of preventive detention. Within this context, predicated on the concept of 
Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD), the UK Government 
announced its intention to legislate in order to introduce preventive 
detention for those deemed to fall within this new category. In an attempt 
to develop a greater understanding of this development, the author of this 
thesis undertook an MA in Social Policy and Criminology, the focus of 
which specifically concerned these proposals and their implications for 
those who might fall within this new category. The specific enquiry 
presented within this thesis was informed by this earlier research. The 
specific research presented within this thesis was prompted by key 
developments in mental health law in Scotland namely: the enactment of 
emergency legislation in the form of the (Mental Health (Public Safety and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999), which was also the first legislative act of 
the newly devolved parliament,  and the subsequent Mental Health (Care 
and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 that replaced the Mental Health 
(Scotland) Act 1984. 
 
The initial focus of the research reported here was the practical impact of 
the decision to explicitly retain personality disorder within the 2003 Act. 
During the course of conducting the literature review however, another 
equally fundamental issue began to emerge and became central to the 
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empirical enquiry, analysis, findings and conclusions reported within this 
thesis. The specific issue that became problematic for the author 
concerned the rationale for the explicit inclusion of personality disorder 
within mental health law in Scotland. The problem revolved around two 
alternative possibilities namely: 1) that the rationale for the explicit 
inclusion of the diagnosis of personality disorder within the Mental Health 
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, was based on the recognition 
of the historical injustices done to those who had become marginalised 
and excluded as a consequence of having been given a diagnosis of 
personality disorder; 2) that the inclusion of personality disorder 
represents an expansion of the ‘carceral archipelago’ (Foucault 1991) and 
should be understood more broadly in terms of the rationality of 
neoliberal approaches to regulation and control and a preoccupation with 
the management and containment of risk. From this perspective the psy-
disciplines play a crucial role in identifying those individuals who can be 
governed within “the open circuits of community control” (Rose 
1999:261), and those who cannot be managed in this way thereby 
necessitating the management of their behaviours within more closed 
circuits of control such as “psychiatric institutions (to provide for) the 
secure containment of risk” (Rose 1999:261).  
 
The tensions evident within the process of formulating mental health 
legislation and policy can also be understood in terms of the broader 
analysis of welfare provision provided by Offe (1982) as serving the role 
of ameliorating the worst effects of capitalism, while at the same time 
serving the fundamental objective of ensuring that a sufficient supply of 
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labour is available. This same theme has been developed more recently 
by Pilgrim (2012) and will be considered subsequently in the analysis of 
findings. The relevance of the latter point will be given specific 
consideration in the analysis of the development of the policy framework 
for mental health and personality disorder more specifically. 
 
 
The structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis begins with a literature review that is presented in three 
chapters. Together these chapters provide an overview as well as a more 
detailed analysis of the origins and development of personality disorder 
and psychiatric diagnostic classifications more generally.  
 
Chapter 2 contextualises personality disorder in terms of psychiatric 
taxonomies, alternative theoretical explanations for what has come to be 
classified as personality disorder and how the diagnosis of personality 
disorder frequently results in a despoiling of the individual to produce a 
residual ‘spoiled identity’ (Goffman 1963).  
 
Chapter 3 contains an historical and comparative analysis of how the law 
relating to personality disorder has developed and changed in the 
jurisdictions of Scotland and England / Wales. This chapter is used to 
explore many of the contentious issues concerning how personality 
disorder should be framed within the policy and law, most notably 
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concerning whether it should be given any explicit acknowledgement at all 
and if so, in what form.  
 
Chapter 4 concerns more recent developments in Scotland and provides 
the context for the analysis of the current legislative and policy 
framework. This involves an examination of the work and significance of 
the MacLean and Millan Committees, set against the background of a 
policy framework by the UK Government explicitly predicated on 
preventive detention and the belief that dangerousness can in effect be 
diagnosed.  
 
Chapter 5 provides details of the methodology and theoretical 
considerations that have provided the framework for the process of 
enquiry and analysis upon which this thesis is based. This chapter is 
intended to provide the reader with a clear insight into the value 
commitments and theoretical perspectives that have informed and 
structured the design, implementation, analysis, presentation of findings 
and conclusions that constitute this thesis. The findings emerging from 
the empirical enquiry and informed by the preceding literature review are 
presented in three chapters together with key findings.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the emergent themes that centre upon attitudes, 
expectations, service boundaries and the roles played by different 
professionals. The views and perceptions of a range of professionals and 
key informants are explored in order to provide a framework in which to 
understand current practice and its potential impact upon those who 
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attract a diagnosis of personality disorder. Continuing ambivalence both 
towards the diagnosis of personality disorder itself and those to whom 
this diagnosis is given, together with expectations of service users that 
are inherently problematic as well as boundaries between services 
emerged as particularly significant.  
 
Chapter 7 focuses upon how services are structured and resources 
deployed in response to the needs of service users. Specific consideration 
is given to the accessibility of services and the growing tension between 
the public and private provision of services. The potential significance of 
the personality disorder network is discussed. 
 
Chapter 8 contextualises policy and practice within a broader neoliberal 
policy framework and explores the different emphasis that is given to 
personality disorder in its various forms of diagnosis within policy 
frameworks and strategies. The significance of key policy devices such as 
Health Efficiency and Access Times (HEAT targets) are examined within 
this chapter. The omission of personality disorder from the HEAT target 
for waiting times for psychological therapy is identified as having 
particular relevance to the way that resources are allocated and services 
structured.  
 
 
Chapter 9 contains a number of specific conclusions based upon the key 
findings together with the identification of areas that require further 
enquiry. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
The shifting sands of diagnosis – 
Personality disorder and the construction 
of spoiled identities 
 
 
In order to understand how and why a diagnosis of personality disorder 
came to be regarded as so fundamentally problematic by service users 
and clinicians alike, it is necessary to begin by considering the conceptual 
origins and history of the development of this diagnosis within the 
broader context of psychiatric nosology. This chapter will therefore 
explore the origins, development and classification of the diagnosis of 
personality disorder.  
 
The diagnosis of personality disorder has been and remains contentious in 
part as a consequence of the on-going debate regarding its legitimacy and 
diagnostic reliability (Clark, Livesley et al. 1997; Tyrer, Coombs et al. 
2007). The diagnosis of personality disorder has also proved contentious 
due to its historical status as a diagnosis of exclusion. The status of 
personality disorder as a diagnosis of exclusion will be discussed in order 
to contextualise the subsequent review and analysis of the processes of 
policy and legislative reform.  
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The Damning Effects of a Spoiled Identity 
 
As Goffman observed, apparent deviations from what are perceived to be 
normal personality traits are frequently regarded as blemishes of 
character (Goffman 1963). This insight is significant because it may offer 
a partial explanation for the tendency among many professionals to adopt 
a punitive or dismissive attitude towards those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder (Lewis and Appleby 1988; Tredget 2001). Goffman’s 
use of the concept of stigma resonates with Foucault’s analysis of those 
who come to be regarded as monstrous due to their perceived 
abnormalities (Foucault 2003). Goffman contended that:  
 
“By definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not 
quite human.  On this assumption we exercise varieties of 
discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, 
reduce his life chances.  We construct a stigma theory, an ideology 
to explain his inferiority and account for the danger he represents, 
sometimes rationalizing an animosity based on the differences, such 
as those of social class”:15. 
 
The stigma associated with perceived abnormality is evident throughout 
the history of personality disorder from the early descriptions of 
progenitor diagnoses such as moral insanity to the modern construction of 
the concept of the psychopath; this will be explored further under the 
heading: Moral Insanity and the Construction of Personality Disorder.   
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Receiving a diagnosis of a personality disorder has profound implications, 
not least because it is “a very sticky label” (Haigh 2002:1) that carries 
both a high degree of stigma and promotes a sense of hopelessness due 
to historical pessimism regarding its treatability (Nehls 1998; Stalker, 
Ferguson et al. 2005). The problem is further compounded by the fact 
that two very different approaches to the treatment and care of those 
who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder can be identified, such that 
those who are deemed to be ‘risky’, particularly in terms of risk to others 
are likely to be subject to more stringent measures of control, while those 
who are deemed less ‘risky’ may continue to be regarded as a nuisance 
(Kendell 2002) and therefore experience difficulties accessing support.  
One vision of the future suggests that: 
 
“...mental health policies in the 21st century will revolve around 
compulsory treatment and surveillance in the community for those 
deemed high-risk and isolation and invisibility, amounting to 
segregation, for those deemed low risk” (Stalker 2003:221).  
 
Whether or not this prediction is likely to become a reality in Scotland is 
an empirical question requiring further investigation, and as such, it forms 
a key element within the research at the core of this thesis. The outcome 
is of considerable importance given the potential impact of being 
diagnosed with a personality disorder and thereby acquiring a spoiled 
identity.  Given that such a diagnosis renders individuals liable to fall 
within one of two categories: namely that of a potentially inconvenient 
problem or a risk to be managed, it is unsurprising that such a diagnosis 
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causes its own distress: this may in turn compound any other challenges 
experienced in the course of daily life by those who receive such a 
diagnosis (Ferguson, Barclay et al. 2003). 
 
 
Personality Disorder Today-Conceptual Frameworks and 
Contentious Issues 
 
During the time that this research was planned and conducted there were 
two major diagnostic frameworks that provide clinical definitions of 
personality disorder: namely the International Classification of Diseases 
published by the World Health Organisation (ICD-10) and the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual published by the American Psychiatric Association 
(DSM-IV-TR). While acknowledging some overlap between categories, 
both the ICD-10 and DSM-IV-TR utilise categorical diagnostic 
classification systems on the premise that distinct personality disorders 
with discrete clinical syndromes can be identified (Tredget 2001).  An 
alternative approach increasingly favoured by many is that of the 
dimensional model that views personality disorders as:  
 
“maladaptive variants of personality traits that merge imperceptibly 
into normality and into one another” ( American Psychiatric 
Association 2000:689).  
 
This alternative model for understanding personality disorder is not a 
recent development, having been advocated for example by Koch in 
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respect of psychopathic inferiorities (Pichot 1978). The weight of empirical 
evidence suggests that personality may more accurately be understood in 
terms of a continuum, ranging from statistical normality to abnormality 
based upon a dimensional model (Moran 2002; Clark 2006) rather than a 
categorical one. This approach proved to be significant in the debate 
concerning proposed revisions to both systems of diagnostic classification. 
This debate has not abated following the publication of a further iteration 
of the DSM in the form of DSM-V. Advocates of the categorical approach 
maintain however, that it has particular utility for practitioners when 
trying to make decisions regarding treatment.  It has been argued that 
the preference either for a categorical / typological or dimensional 
approach amount to little more than “quasi-ideological preferences” 
(Lenzenweger and Clarkin 2005):12.  
 
The categorical / typological approach has been traditionally preferred 
among psychiatrists, reflecting the origins of psychiatry within medicine. 
This approach is consistent with the traditional role of the medical 
clinician of making specific diagnoses and prescribing specific treatments.  
It should be noted that despite widely reported discussions within the 
DSM 5 Working Group concerning radical revisions to the category of 
personality disorder, that DSM 5 published in May 2013 contains relatively 
limited changes. The main changes are the adoption of a hybrid 
dimensional-categorical model and some changes to categories of specific 
subgroups of personality disorders (Stetka and Correll, 2013). The extent 
to which these will be reflected in further iterations of the ICD remains to 
be seen. ICD 11 is currently scheduled for release in 2015. 
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Despite certain differences in nomenclature e.g. the use of the term 
dissocial personality disorder within The International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD-10) and antisocial personality disorder within The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) and 
differences in the way that borderline personality disorder is included, the 
two taxonomies share a common view regarding personality disorder 
(Moran and Hagell 2001). The commonality between these two systems 
reflects a deliberate attempt to achieve harmonisation between the two 
classification systems ( American Psychiatric Association 2000).   
Personality disorder is defined within ICD-10 as: 
 
“...deeply ingrained and enduring behaviour patterns, manifesting 
as inflexible responses to a broad range of personal and social 
situations. They represent extreme or significant deviations from 
the way in which the average individual in a given culture perceives, 
thinks, feels and, particularly, relates to others. Such behaviour 
patterns tend to be stable and to encompass multiple domains of 
behaviour and psychological functioning. They are frequently, but 
not always, associated with various degrees of subjective distress 
and problems of social performance” (World Health Organisation 
2007).  
 
Both the ICD and DSM taxonomies rely upon trait theory for their basic 
explanatory framework for personality disorder.  Personality traits and 
their relationship to personality have been defined as: 
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“...enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about 
the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of 
social and personal contexts.  Only when personality traits are 
inflexible and maladaptive and cause significant functional 
impairment or subjective distress do they constitute Personality 
Disorders” (American Psychiatric Association 2000:686). 
 
The construction of personality disorder within both taxonomies is based 
upon four criteria (Mombour and Bronisch 1998) namely: 1) that the 
characteristic and enduring patterns of inner experience and behaviour of 
an individual deviate substantially from normal cultural expectations i.e. 
social norms 2) that any deviation must be maladaptive, inflexible or in 
some other sense dysfunctional within the individual’s social environment 
across a range of situations 3) that these deviations must result in 
personal distress or a negative impact upon others within the individual’s 
social environment 4) it is necessary that the deviation is not transient 
but rather that it is enduring (Tyrer 2007). 
 
Various estimates of the prevalence of personality disorder have been 
calculated suggesting that approximately 10% of those within community 
samples exhibit problems that meet the diagnostic criteria for one or 
more personality disorders. The estimates of prevalence within specific 
subpopulations however, perhaps unsurprisingly, yield far higher 
percentages i.e. approximately 30% within primary care, 30% to 40% of 
psychiatric outpatients and 40% to 50% of psychiatric inpatients. Some 
estimates place the rate amongst psychiatric outpatients as in excess of 
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80%, 50% to 78% of adult prisoners, 70% of male mentally disordered 
offenders with an even higher percentage for women within forensic 
psychiatric settings (Alwin, Blackburn et al. 2006). 
 
So-called ‘normal’ personality research, largely conducted within the field 
of psychology, has in contrast traditionally been based upon an 
assumption of a continuum, thereby leading to a preference for 
dimensional models. This reflects the methodology that has underpinned 
the development of clinical psychology, being based upon the extensive 
use of statistical models intended to identify patterns of distribution and 
correlations within and between various hypothesised personality traits. 
This approach has characterised research within the field of psychology 
from its emergence as a distinct field of study, with personality as its 
central organising focus.   
 
The different approaches adopted within psychiatry and psychology to 
understanding personality and the diagnosis of personality disorder more 
specifically, have led to substantial areas of disagreement that are evident 
in debates concerning the legitimacy and utility of the current systems of 
diagnostic classification. This area of disagreement is well illustrated by 
the views expressed by one psychologist at the State Hospital, who in 
response to the consultation exercise undertaken by the McLean 
Committee, offered the view that the methods used by psychologists were 
inherently superior to those typically used within psychiatry because:  
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“They do not require a complex and highly dubious diagnostic 
system…” (McGinley 1999, para 4). 
 
This criticism has been followed more recently by a full-blown assault 
launched by a branch of the British Psychological Society against the 
dominant systems of psychiatric classification including ICD 10 and DSM 5 
(Division of Clinical Psychology 2013). Such debates as this are significant 
precisely because the outcome of the process of diagnosis has direct and 
substantial implications for service users, not least because it is likely to 
influence the treatment options, if any, that are made available to them. 
A diagnosis of personality disorder is predicated upon an assessment of 
who a person is based upon their characteristic traits, rather than how 
they are coping with particular circumstances at a particular time. The 
fact that human behaviour is susceptible to the influence of context 
however creates considerable room for error and misclassification: this is 
typically referred to as the trait-state tension (Casey 1997).  
 
Concerns regarding inconsistencies in the diagnosis of personality 
disorders have led to an increasing emphasis upon maximising inter-rater 
reliability when revisions to the systems of classification have been 
introduced. This has been achieved by increasing the focus upon 
description rather than explanation (Kirk and Kutchins 1992). Despite 
these efforts however, considerable inconsistencies can be identified 
within the overall process of diagnosis, specifically with reference to 
comorbidity (Pincus, Tew et al. 2004). Once again this has substantial 
implications for those who receive a diagnosis of personality disorder, as 
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it implies that the precise combination of diagnoses that an individual is 
likely to receive is fairly arbitrary. The diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder in particular has been identified as subject to a particularly high 
error rate (Pincus, Tew et al. 2004).  This has significant implications for 
the welfare and rights of those who are given such a diagnosis, as the 
recorded diagnosis will inevitably influence what care and treatment plan 
the service user is deemed likely to benefit from. This lack of conceptual 
clarity has also been said to have contributed to the demonisation of 
many of those diagnosed with psychopathic personality disorder 
(Blackburn 2000). 
 
 
Alternative Aetiological Explanations - Some Implications 
 
A range of competing explanations (Alwin, Blackburn et al. 2006) can be 
identified for the origins of personality disorder. The psychodynamic 
perspective based on object relations, emphasises the importance of early 
attachments (Page 2001). Behavioural models focus upon the functions of 
behaviour; therefore their proponents tend to regard concepts such as 
personality disorder and personality traits as unhelpful on the grounds 
that they operate only at the level of description. Cognitive approaches 
focus upon information processing, particularly the role of memory and 
the significance of social learning processes. Personology (Millon and 
Grossman 2005) provides an alternative explanatory framework that 
views behaviours as existing on a continuum of adaptive to maladaptive, 
based on the evolutionary principles of adaptation and natural selection. 
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This approach finds common ground with certain cognitive models in the 
belief that human physiological evolution has not kept pace with social 
change, leading to the retention of information biases that are 
maladaptive in modern human societies (Pretzer and Beck 2005:43). 
 
These latter approaches have much in common with socio-biological 
attempts to integrate genetics and evolutionary theory in order to provide 
a model for understanding psychopathology. One implication of this latter 
approach is that psychopathology should more accurately be viewed as 
adaptive and not pathological at all. While the pathological view regards 
the thought processes and patterns of behaviour associated with the 
diagnosis of psychopathy for example, as clearly psychopathological, this 
alternative view regards psychopathy as an example of “special design” 
(Crawford and Salmon 2002:43) and a legacy of the evolutionary history 
of our species.  From this perspective psychopathy is a behavioural 
strategy based on manipulation, aggression and risk taking intended to 
facilitate social dominance and maximise reproductive success.  This 
proposition is consistent with the observation that by no means all 
psychopaths are criminals but that many are successful in professional 
and business life (Hare 1993). This alternative approach to understanding 
pathology reframes the notion of pathology itself as a particular form of 
social disapproval. What sets this particular form of social disapproval 
apart is that it is accorded legitimacy by being incorporated within and 
expressed through medical terminology. 
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A further approach is based upon conceptualising personality disorder as 
a psychological and behavioural response to trauma, often associated 
with but not limited to early attachment experiences (Johnson 2010). This 
emphasis upon trauma is also strongly reflected within the recent 
statement released by the British Psychological Society referred to 
previously (Division of Clinical Psychology 2013). Some evidence from 
service users themselves suggests a strong correlation between trauma, 
notably abuse, particularly in childhood and a subsequent diagnosis of a 
personality disorder (Stalker, Ferguson et al. 2005).   
 
The approaches favoured by clinicians and policy makers towards those 
who attract this label have very significant implications for service users 
in terms of how their needs are understood and provided for. In light of 
this specific consideration will be given later within this thesis to the 
implications of the increasing prominence being given to a trauma-based 
perspective to understanding personality disorders. 
 
 
Diagnostic Reliability 
 
Personality disorder has been described as: 
 
“...a dustbin category of problematic ‘behaviour’ as judged by 
significant others or staff”” (Pilgrim 2001,:255). 
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This echoes an earlier observation that certain diagnoses of personality 
disorder had become: 
 
“...a psychiatric waste basket for a heterogeneous collection of 
illnesses with etiologies which were not known and with clinical 
pictures which differed in essential elements” (Robins 1967,:951). 
 
Efforts to disaggregate the concept of personality disorder from mental 
illness during the 20th century have been attributed to the continued 
moral and value-laden basis of the construct, and the processes of 
assessing and reaching a diagnosis of personality disorder (Pilgrim 2001).  
The move towards more descriptive approaches found most notably 
within DSM-IV and to a lesser extent within ICD-10, is attributable to 
increasing recognition of the lack of any substantive understanding of the 
aetiology of personality disorder (Kirk and Kutchins 1992).  This trend 
towards a more descriptive approach has led to an increase in the rate of 
comorbid diagnosis within both diagnostic systems; this can be attributed 
to the development process of the ICD-10 diagnostic research criteria: 
namely that they were designed to align with DSM-III-R in order to 
promote and assist in the coordination of research (WHO 1992; Cooper 
2004). One of the costs of efforts to achieve greater alignment was that 
of a shift towards a greater emphasis on description at the expense of 
more clearly delineated concepts. In becoming more descriptive both the 
ICD and DSM systems have become increasingly “atheoretical” during 
their various revisions and have thereby promoted multiple diagnoses 
(Pincus, Tew et al. 2004):18.  This has been described as a:  
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“strategy of diagnosing ‘maximal’ comorbidity” at the potential 
expense of “‘optimal’ comorbidity” (Pincus, Tew et al. 2004):18. 
 
This in effect means that the number and range of diagnoses that are 
being made is perhaps more strongly related to the changes to the 
systems of classification than to the nature of the phenomena 
themselves.  
 
In addition to the debate as to whether a diagnosis of personality disorder 
should be understood in categorical or dimensional terms, another 
fundamental tension concerns one of the basic premises of the diagnosis 
of a personality disorder: namely that it is characterised by enduring 
patterns of behaviour. Emerging research casts doubt on the extent to 
which  the patterns of behaviour underpinning the diagnosis of personality 
disorder are in fact generally stable at all, most notably among those who 
seek treatment (Tyrer, Coombs et al. 2007). The significance of this last 
point can hardly be overstated given that the stability of traits and 
enduring patterns of behaviour are fundamental to how personality 
disorder is conceptualised within the existing systems of classification. 
These shifting sands of diagnostic boundaries are likely to be of on-going 
significance, not least as a result of the revisions to the DSM including the 
lowering of diagnostic thresholds that may also in due course influence 
the ICD  thereby drawing a much larger pool of people into those who 
attract specific psychiatric labels including that of personality disorder 
(Skodol, Bender et al. 2011; Insel, 2013). 
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Evidence of the high level of comorbid diagnosis of personality disorder 
with mental illness (Moran 2002; Clark 2006)  also raises questions 
regarding the extent to which personality disorder should be categorised 
separately from mental illness (Pilgrim 2001).  The implication is that 
personality disorder serves a particular function; namely that of 
separating out those individuals who are considered too problematic for 
professionals to engage with and for whom the prospect of successful 
treatment is deemed to be particularly poor.  Historically, given the strong 
association between personality disorder and the commonly held 
perception that those who attract this diagnosis are likely to be 
unresponsive to treatment, reinforced by stereotypical assumptions 
concerning the challenging behaviour displayed by some of those who 
may attract this diagnosis (Tyrer, Casey et al. 1991), it is perhaps 
unsurprising that personality disorder came to be regarded as a diagnosis 
of exclusion (Ogloff 2006). The perceived ‘failure’ of those with 
personality disorder to comply with the rigours of the sick role (Rush 
2004) and the tendency among some of those with personality disorder to 
act in ways that are “disconfirming of the professional role” (Bowers, 
Carr-Walker et al. 2006:1), may also in part explain the frequently 
punitive and dismissive attitude faced by those who attract this diagnosis 
from professionals: this will be discussed further within the findings of this 
thesis by using the concept of service readiness. These negative and 
punitive attitudes appear to be in part based upon the belief that those 
who have been given a diagnosis of personality disorder are responsible 
for:  
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“...sucking in services in response to a crisis or as ‘abusers’ of 
services rather than ‘users’” (Tredget 2001:349).  
 
This punitive or sometimes ambivalent attitude towards those who attract 
a diagnosis of personality disorder can perhaps also be attributed to 
continuing uncertainty regarding treatment efficacy, notwithstanding 
emerging research findings that give some cause for therapeutic 
optimism. Scepticism concerning treatment efficacy is compounded by a 
lack of consensus concerning the aetiology of this diagnosis. This 
scepticism is particularly evident but not limited to the diagnoses of 
psychopathic and antisocial personality disorders (Dolan and Coid 1993; 
Warren, McGauley et al. 2003). The current lack of consensus concerning 
personality disorder has led some to conclude that this diagnosis is: 
 
“...shrouded in speculation and there is very little research based 
evidence on the subject” (Tredget 2001:354). 
 
Evidence of the reluctance among some professionals to engage with 
those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder, can be found within 
the responses to the consultation exercise undertaken by the MacLean 
Committee; this will be explored further within chapter 4 of this thesis.  A 
specific example of this reticence can be found in a narrowly defeated 
motion at a meeting of the Royal College of Psychiatrists at the turn of 
the millennium, urging that:  
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“...general psychiatrists should abandon treating personality-
disordered patients” (Mann and Moran 2000,:11).  
 
Evidence of therapeutic pessimism, hostility towards and a general 
reluctance to engage with those have received a diagnosis of personality 
disorder has also been identified as a significant problem within specialist 
settings (Tyrer and Simonsen 2003; Bowers, Carr-Walker et al. 2006). 
These tensions may also offer some explanation for the fact that, despite 
the general acceptance among professionals (Ferguson, Barclay et al. 
2003) of the broad categories of personality disorder, fundamental issues 
remain unresolved and form the basis for on-going debate. This debate in 
part concerns how individual categories of personality disorder should be 
defined and the degree of rigidity that ought to exist between them 
(Clark, Liversley et al. 1997). The lack of agreement regarding these 
fundamental issues, together with a lack of agreement regarding the 
aetiology of personality disorder has led to criticisms that: 
 
“Current models and theories of personality and personality 
disorders are mostly based on academic speculations.  They bear 
very little, if any, empirical support” (Tyrer and Simonsen 
2003,:42).  
 
Consequently it has been argued that the diagnosis of personality disorder 
is “fundamentally flawed” (Pilgrim 2001,:253). Evidence of a gender-
based distortion in the assessment of personality disorder has also led to 
suggestions that personality disorders themselves may to some extent:  
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“...represent no more than exaggerated sex-role stereotypes” 
(Moran 2002,:9).  
 
Evidence for this can be found in the relative rates of the diagnosis of 
borderline personality disorder for men and women, such that borderline 
personality disorder has largely become regarded as a disorder of the 
pathological female personality (Nehls 1998).  Research also indicates 
that men are more likely than women to be diagnosed with antisocial 
personality disorder (Alwin, Blackburn et al. 2006). This critique of the 
apparent relationship between diagnosis and sex-role stereotypes has 
been extended to assert that personality disorder does not exist outside 
of professional discourses (Pilgrim 2002).  
 
The adoption of the term ‘disorder’ within DSM-I and its subsequent use 
within revisions to the DSM and also ICD has been viewed by some critics 
as an attempt to sidestep the debate concerning some of these 
fundamental issues (Jablensky 2004). The term disorder itself however:  
 
“...has no clear correspondence with either the concept of disease 
or the concept of syndrome in medical classifications” (Jablensky 
2004,:25).  
 
The use of this term has the effect of encouraging the perception that the 
‘disorders’ contained within ICD-10 and DSM-IV are “quasi-disease 
entities” (Jablensky 2004,:25) ; this results in a significantly increased 
frequency of diagnosed comorbidity due to:   
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“...the fragmentation of psychopathology into a large number of 
‘disorders’, of which many are merely syndromes.  This blurs the 
distinction between true and spurious comorbidity”:25. 
 
This may help to explain why: 
 
“...psychiatric disorders, one way or another, similarly or differently, 
hydra-headed keep appearing” (Ball 1998,:743).  
 
This conceptual confusion therefore implies that the:  
 
“...fundamental assumptions of the dominant diagnostic schemata 
may be incorrect” (Jablensky 2004,:25).  
 
Those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder represent a 
heterogeneous population. The process of classification and diagnosis is 
dependent upon a range of embedded normative value judgments.  This 
inevitably follows from the basic assumptions that underpin the existence 
of the construct of personality disorder; namely that at a certain point 
“quantitative deviations” (Munro and McCulloch 1969:124)  from a 
normative standard are constructed as a disorder of the personality. The 
construct of personality disorder has therefore been called into question 
by the inevitable degree of cultural and social relativism inherent within 
the diagnosis (Pilgrim 2001).   
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Some critics, most notably Pilgrim (2001), have sought to illustrate this 
latter point by making reference to extreme cases, for example how 
opposition to the Nazi regime in Germany and apartheid in South Africa 
should be viewed. How should the concept of personality disorder be 
applied in examples when social norms based upon universal human 
rights are completely inverted as in the above cases? It is a definitional 
necessity that personality disorder, if regarded as having any legitimacy 
at all, must be defined against a perceived standard of normality; this in 
turn means however that the diagnosis is in reality a measure of the 
perceived social ‘distance’ between a given individual and the population 
in which they are situated.  The debate regarding the extent to which 
psychopathology should be regarded as emic, that is culturally specific or 
etic, that is universal also remains contentious.  Proponents of an etic 
interpretation, citing research based on standardised assessment 
instruments, have however countered that apparent cultural differences 
can be understood in terms of differences in the presentation of problems 
but that they are not indicative of any difference in the underlying 
disorders (Cheng 2001). 
The process of diagnosis used within psychiatry, particularly relating to 
categorical systems of classification can be understood as representing an 
extreme example of a power imbalance between clinicians and service 
users: 
 
“I’ll tell you who you are so hop in that box and shut up” (Blomfield 
1998,:745).  
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More benign interpretations however emphasise the pragmatic benefits of 
such an approach: 
 
“...the categorical approach neatly maps onto the decision of 
whether to provide treatment or not to provide treatment... With a 
single categorical diagnosis it does simplify the choice of clinical 
focus and appropriate treatment for that PD” (Thompson and 
MacDonald 2011) . 
 
 
Treatment Efficacy and the Pessimism-Optimism Continuum 
 
The available range of interventions used by clinicians in working with 
those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder in part reflects the 
different views of how psychopathology and personality disorders more 
specifically can be best understood. Partly as a consequence of these 
differences, the available research evidence concerning treatment efficacy 
gives rise to varying degrees of therapeutic optimism and pessimism. 
Advocates of therapeutic optimism generally point to cognitive 
behavioural interventions (Sperry 2006), or the more recent development 
of approaches such as dialectical behaviour therapy: (Bohus, Haaf et al. 
2000; Tredget 2001; Palmer 2002) the latter being a hybrid based on 
cognitive behavioural theory, social learning theory and insights drawn 
from Zen Buddhism. One study conducted in the United Kingdom 
concerning the addition of cognitive behavioural treatment to treatment 
as usual, for those given a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder, 
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found significant reductions in suicidal and self-harming behaviours 
(Davidson, Norrie et al. 2006). As well as the focus upon psychological 
interventions, drug treatment has also been advocated on the basis that it 
can provide an effective means of managing distressing symptoms at 
least as effectively as psychological interventions (Tyrer and Bateman 
2004) and at a potentially lower cost. Growing recognition of the potential 
benefits of treatment, have resulted in the publication of specific 
guidelines for England and Wales concerning antisocial (National Institute 
of Clinical Excellence 2009) (NICE) (guideline 77) and borderline 
personality disorder (guideline 78). These guidelines do however explicitly 
acknowledge significant limitations within the available evidence. 
 
Increased optimism regarding the potential for more positive outcomes, 
has in part provided the rationale for increasing demands to end the 
exclusionary status of personality disorder. The inclusion of personality 
disorders within both the DSM-III and ICD-9, starting in the 1980s, 
provided a platform against which to both conduct further research and 
challenge the acceptance of an overly pessimistic therapeutic outlook 
(Ferguson, Barclay et al. 2003; Lenzenweger and Clarkin 2005). A major 
policy initiative was launched in 2003 by the Department of Health for 
England/Wales (National Institute for Mental Health in England 2003), 
with the express intention of challenging the status of personality disorder 
as a diagnosis of exclusion.  This policy has no specific counterpart in 
Scotland; however it should be noted that personality disorder was 
retained in mental health legislation enacted that same year i.e. the 
(Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003). It should also 
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be noted that borderline personality disorder has been included within the 
matrix of psychological therapies (NHS Education Board for Scotland  
2008) intended to operate in a broadly similar, although less prescriptive 
manner to the NICE guidelines for England and Wales: this specific 
development within Scotland will be discussed more fully in chapter 8 of 
this thesis. The absence of a single clear policy of explicit inclusion within 
Scotland should however be noted, the implications of this will be 
discussed later in this thesis.  
 
Evidence of continuing scepticism regarding the potential efficacy of 
available treatment models can however be readily identified; these are 
most evident in relation to those who attract a diagnosis of psychopathic 
personality disorder.  The MacLean Committee for example sounded a 
distinctively cautious note in asserting that:  
 
“Over the years, there have been many false dawns” (MacLean 
2000) para 11.22. 
 
In summary for those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder, the 
evidence concerning the effectiveness of available interventions in 
alleviating symptoms that are distressing for the individual and or others 
remains ambiguous. The picture that appears to be emerging is that some 
treatments are probably effective for some people some of the time. 
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Moral Insanity and the Construction of Personality Disorder 
 
Moral insanity is often referred to as the original description of the 
psychopathic personality (Berrios 1999); consequently the development 
of moral insanity and its relationship to personality disorder will now be 
given further consideration. 
 
Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) is generally credited with providing the first 
clinical descriptions of what was to become known as moral insanity and 
eventually psychopathy (Fallon, Bluglass et al. 1999; Pilgrim 2001). Pinel 
argued that he had identified a distinctive sub-group of patients who did 
not conform to any existing category.  Pinel coined the term ‘manie sans 
délire’ meaning madness but without delirium (Arrigo and Shipley 2001). 
In his ‘Medico-psychological treatise on mental alienation’ published in 
1809 (Pichot 1978), Pinel provided three case histories concerning 
patients apparently free from any disturbance or defect of their senses 
and understanding, but who were nevertheless dominated by an 
instinctive tendency towards fury (instinct de fureur).  The fundamental 
diagnostic criterion identified by Pinel that was to be of recurring 
significance, was that of affective but not cognitive impairment i.e. 
emotional but not cognitive dysregulation.   
 
Pinel attributed the development of this disorder to both exogenous and 
endogenous factors - a twin focus that was to remain central to on-going 
debate concerning the aetiology and diagnosis of personality disorder.  
Pinel’s work is noteworthy (Rafter 2004) not least because he was among 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                35 | P a g e  
 
the first leading European thinkers to argue that mental disorder, 
whatever its origins, should be regarded as a disease.  This is an example 
of the enlightenment legacy characterised in part by a move away from 
theological explanations for human behaviour, to those based on the 
emerging sciences in the pursuit of explicitly rational explanations for 
observed phenomena.  The tension between theological and scientific 
approaches, was however to remain a significant feature of debates 
regarding both the aetiology and treatment of mental disorder for some 
time. 
 
Benjamin Rush (1745–1813) who is widely regarded as the founder of 
psychiatry within the USA, shared Pinel’s view that moral derangement 
and insanity should be understood as disease processes rather than 
attributable to the punishment of God or demonic possession (Rafter 
2004). As the seminal thinker within North American psychiatry, Rush’s 
ideas were to be of lasting significance, notably his adoption of faculty 
psychology for the explanation for what would come to be known as 
moral insanity (Ellard 1988).  Faculties according to Rush were analogous 
to internal senses.  These senses rather like their external counterparts 
could become impaired or indeed be impaired at birth.  Rush identified 
nine different faculties including the conscience, moral faculty and sense 
of God, thereby reintroducing a theological dimension. In cases of partial 
moral derangement, this was explained in terms of a failure only of the 
moral faculty but the continued functioning of “a sound conscience and 
sense of God” (Rafter 2004,:987). In cases of total moral derangement 
however, both the conscience and sense of God, together with the moral 
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faculty were said to be malfunctioning “...producing people who commit 
crimes repeatedly and without remorse” (Rafter 2004,:988).  
 
Whereas Pinel and Rush appear to have developed their ideas relatively 
independently (Rafter 2004), the work of Esquirol and Prichard was to 
some extent based upon an exchange of ideas (Pichot 1978). Esquirol, a 
student of Pinel who succeeded him as the chief physician of the 
Salpêtriere Hospital in 1811, originated the concept of monomanias, 
published in detail within his treatise of 1838.  Esquirol  argued that even 
amongst those who were insane, that any defect of understanding was 
not the primary cause of behaviour that in the case of the sane would be 
regarded as criminal (Pichot 1978).  Esquirol’s logic is an example of the 
tension that was later to become characteristic of legal debates 
concerning the diagnosis of personality disorder, namely the focus upon 
questions of culpability and diminished responsibility.  This debate in turn 
reflects a fundamental ambivalence about whether or not those with a 
diagnosis of personality disorder should simply be punished for their 
actions or regarded as in need of treatment; this will be discussed in 
detail within the next chapter of this thesis. 
 
Prichard, working in England, developed his concept of moral insanity by 
also drawing upon faculty psychology.  Prichard’s concept of moral 
insanity was published more fully in his treatise of 1835, after he had first 
introduced the concept in his contribution to the Cyclopaedia of Practical 
Medicine in 1832.  Prichard defined the concept as follows: 
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“Moral Insanity, or madness consisting in a morbid perversion of the 
natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits and moral 
dispositions, without any notable lesion of the intellect or knowing 
or reasoning faculties, and particularly without any maniacal 
hallucinations” (Dopson 1949,:228). 
 
The 1837 edition of Prichard’s treatise, dedicated to Esquirol and entitled: 
‘A Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind’, contains 
the same definition of moral insanity as appeared within the Cyclopaedia, 
but with the addition of the words “and natural impulses” after moral 
dispositions (Prichard 1837).  Prichard’s treatise ensured that moral 
insanity became inscribed into medical nosology (Augstein 1996). 
Prichard acknowledged that his own work had been significantly 
influenced by Pinel, also asserting that Esquirol equally acknowledged his 
debt to Pinel (Prichard 1837).  Whilst acknowledging his debt to Pinel 
however, Prichard adopted a more punitive position towards those who 
become classified within this diagnostic grouping.  Prichard emphasised 
that those who were afflicted by moral insanity retained the knowledge of 
right and wrong and should therefore be regarded as culpable for their 
behaviour (Arrigo and Shipley 2001).  
 
Moral insanity is often taken to represent the historical origin of the 
concept of the psychopath (Blair, Jopnes et al. 1995). The clinical 
observations that provided the basis for the articulation of the concept of 
moral insanity were however based on fairly heterogeneous cases, only 
some of which would clearly correspond to the later construct of 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                38 | P a g e  
 
psychopathy (Pichot 1978). The heterogeneity of the cases reported by 
Prichard and the frequency with which his patients recovered, has caused 
some to question whether the common practice of attributing moral 
insanity with being the first description of psychopathic personality 
disorder is in fact appropriate (Whitlock 1982; Berrios 1999).   
Prichard described a form of congenital moral deficiency analogous to a 
congenital deficiency of intelligence.  Prichard suggested that moral 
insanity occurred within the community at a relatively high frequency 
stating:  
 
“There are many individuals living at large, and not entirely 
separated from society, who are affected in a certain degree with 
this modification of insanity” (Prichard 1837,:20).  
 
Prichard’s terminology found a place within the parallel mental health 
legislation passed in the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 and the Mental 
Deficiency and Lunacy (Scotland) Act 1913. The significance of this 
legislation will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. 
Prichard’s terminology also gained favour in the USA and was adopted in 
preference to previous formulations including that of Rush.  Prichard’s 
terminology was ultimately to become “a lightning rod for tensions that 
divided American psychiatry” (Rafter 2004,:995), based in part upon 
personal disagreements between Isaac Ray and John Gray.  Ray was an 
advocate of moral insanity (Stearns 1945) in the terms set out by Rush 
and Pritchard based on distinct faculties. Gray however was among those 
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who argued that emotional madness could not exist in the absence of 
some causal cognitive impairment.   
 
Despite his expressed opposition to such an interpretation, increasing 
opposition to Prichard’s typology also emerged from those concerned that 
moral insanity provided a socially unacceptable defence for criminals.  
This latter issue will be discussed further in the next chapter as it has 
continued to provide a tension within legal frameworks in many 
jurisdictions. The status of the construct moral insanity was however 
ultimately undermined not by these concerns, but rather by the 
ascendancy of theories of mental degeneracy, these will be discussed 
shortly (Rafter 2004).  
 
It has also been suggested that Prichard’s use of the term moral, should 
not be taken as a reference to morality as such but rather to the emotions  
(Ellard 1989) or psychological factors (Fallon, Bluglass et al. 1999).  
Proponents of this view argue that Prichard’s use of the term moral 
followed Esquirol’s use of the term (Prichard 1837) ‘moral alienation’ and 
referred to an emotional disconnectedness with others: this interpretation 
sits within the branch of psychology concerned with affect, namely the 
way in which emotions influence the process of decision-making and 
relating to others (Norman 2004; Bjørnebekk 2008). A counter argument 
has however been advanced based on the premise that Prichard’s concept 
of moral insanity should be understood as having a dual focus upon 
morality in terms of sin (Augstein 1996), as well as a lack of emotional 
attachment. This dual focus can be attributed to Prichard’s acceptance of 
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moral depravity and sin as the fundamental causes of madness (Augstein 
1996).  These tensions within Prichard’s construct of moral insanity can 
be understood by considering the context of its development. The concept 
of moral insanity proposed by Prichard was developed to serve a specific 
function in response to particular concerns, these centred upon the 
perceived increasingly morally irresponsible conduct within certain 
sections of society. The function served by this concept was therefore that 
of providing: 
 
“...a model disease which explained in psychiatric terms the 
despicable moral corruption of his times and, in particular, of the 
affluent, who had the means to indulge in “moral debasement” until 
they went mad” (Augstein 1996,:340). 
 
This observation is of fundamental importance because it highlights the 
origin of the construct of personality disorder in terms of its functional 
purpose, namely that of inscribing within medical discourse concepts 
capable of describing behaviours perceived as leading to or being caused 
by patterns of behaviour - specifically behaviours associated with the 
erosion of normative moral standards. This same process can be observed 
in the emergence and prominence given to diagnoses such as ‘attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder’ (Comstock 2011). The conflation of 
medicine and morality in respect of those classified as having a 
personality disorder, was subsequently compounded by Isaac Ray with his 
concept of moral mania (McCallum 2001) and by Edward Spitzka’s 
description of moral imbecility (McCallum 2001; Rafter 2004).  
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The term moral insanity was subsequently superseded by that of 
psychopathic inferiority; this term provided a broad category that came to 
represent “all personality disorders” (Arrigo and Shipley 2001:331). 
Psychopathic inferiority in keeping with moral insanity also emphasised 
abnormality without insanity (Ellard 1989). Koch’s formulation (Koch 
1891) however did not place particular emphasis upon moral depravity or 
wickedness (Pichot 1978).  
 
The emphasis upon morality was however very much to the fore within 
the doctrine of mental degeneracy developed by Morel (Morel 1857; 
Dowbiggin 1996; Warren and South 2006). Degeneracy was viewed from 
a theological perspective drawing upon the idea of ‘the fall’. Mental 
degeneracy was attributed to the adverse effects of sin upon successive 
generations of humanity.  Morel (Pichot 1978) also embraced Pinel’s 
concept of ‘manie sans délire’ in keeping with Esquirol and Prichard.  
Degeneracy theory was subsequently revised by Magnum (Dowbiggin 
1996), who substituted Darwin’s ideas of heredity in place of theology.  
 
The concept of heritability continued to be given prominence in 
explanations of the development of psychopathology and influenced 
Koch’s notion of psychopathic inferiority introduced in his treatise of 1891 
(Arrigo and Shipley 2001).  Koch’s efforts to promote a congenital 
explanation for the development of psychopathology were ultimately 
stifled by the growing emphasis on the significance of exogenous factors 
that would lead to the emergence of the construct of sociopathy (Arrigo 
and Shipley 2001).  This de-emphasising of congenital factors is  also said 
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to have undermined Koch’s efforts to reduce the social condemnation 
associated with what subsequently become defined as personality 
disorder (Arrigo and Shipley 2001).  The British psychiatrist Henry 
Maudsley among others attempted to maintain a focus upon congenital 
aetiological explanations, arguing that those classified as moral imbeciles 
were incapable of being rehabilitated and that consequently, “it was 
useless to punish those who could not control their actions” (Arrigo and 
Shipley 2001,:332). These tensions concerning the emphasis that should 
be given to moral failings or congenital factors are significant because 
they influence the form of stigma that those who may attract a diagnosis 
of personality disorder are likely to experience. 
 
This pessimistic view of the treatment prospects for this particular group 
was reinforced by Krafft-Ebing (Arrigo and Shipley 2001), who identified a 
group of offences and offenders under the heading of ‘lustmurder’ (Krafft-
Ebing 1886/1997). Krafft-Ebing emphasised the wilful and predatory 
nature of the offences described under this heading detailing examples of 
the most gruesome sexual and violent assaults, together with cruelty to 
animals and acts of cannibalism.  The clinical descriptions provided under 
this heading share many of the similarities with the subsequent 
descriptions of the psychopath, a term coined by Cleckley (Grann, 
Langstrom et al. 1999) in The Mask of Sanity (Cleckley 1941). 
  
Koch’s concept of psychopathic inferiority was utilised by Kraepelin, who 
adopted the term psychopathic states in the fifth edition of his treatise 
published in 1896  (Pichot 1978).  Kraepelin added to Koch’s typology of 
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psychopathic inferiority by identifying additional categories based on “the 
most vicious and wicked of disordered offenders” (Arrigo and Shipley 
2001,:333). For Kraepelin psychopathy was “no longer a quantitative 
description, but a firm category.  Its heredity was beyond doubt” (Ellard 
1989,:127).  This increased emphasis upon wickedness led to 
psychopathy becoming synonymous with moral defectiveness (Ellard 
1989). Kraepelin’s formulations also bore a close resemblance to modern 
constructions of psychopathy as subsequently developed by Cleckley 
(1941) and to antisocial personality disorder as currently formulated 
within the textual notes of DSM-IV-TR and in ICD-10 as dissocial 
personality disorder.  Kraepelin described this group as:  
 
“...the enemies of society… characterised by a blunting of the moral 
elements.  They are often destructive and threatening… there is a 
lack of deep emotional reaction; and of sympathy and affection they 
have little.  They are apt to have been troublesome in school, given 
to truancy and running away.  Early thievery is common among 
them and they commit crimes of various kinds” quoted in (Arrigo 
and Shipley 2001,:334). 
 
Differences in the emphasis that should be placed upon morality in 
understanding psychopathy eventually led to substantially different 
constructions of the psychopath within Europe and North America such 
that: 
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“American psychopaths were wicked, while European psychopaths 
were merely statistically and amorally deviant” (Ellard 1989:129). 
 
Cleckley (1941) provided the basis for “the modern clinical construct of 
psychopathy” (Arrigo and Shipley 2001,:334). The 1976 (5th) edition 
contains the following characteristics of the psychopath: “1. Superficial 
charm and good “intelligence”; 2. Absence of delusions and other signs of 
irrational thinking; 3. Absence of “nervousness” or psychoneurotic 
manifestations; 4. Unreliability; 5. Untruthfulness and insincerity; 6. Lack 
of remorse or shame; 7. Inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour; 8. 
Poor judgment and failure to learn by experience; 9. Pathologic 
egocentricity and incapacity for love; 10. General poverty in major 
affective reactions; 11. Specific loss of insight”. 
 
Cleckley (1976) acknowledged the lineage of his own construct of the 
psychopath, tracing this back to the pioneering work of Pinel. Cleckley 
traced the continued development of the concept through Prichard’s 
formulation of moral insanity and the contribution of Rush to the 
understanding of different degrees of derangement based upon faculty 
psychology.  Cleckley observed that these early commentators 
emphasised both the presence of:  
 
“...serious personality disorder” in the absence of any impaired 
cognitive functioning and also emphasised at the same time that 
personality disorder should be regarded as an illness “to distinguish 
it from ordinary crime or depravity” (Cleckley 1976,:226).  
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Cleckley praised these early attempts to describe personality disorder for 
their clarity, suggesting that this had been progressively lost, hence his 
own efforts to re-establish a clearly delineated construct of psychopathy.  
In the 5th edition of his seminal work published in 1976, Cleckley 
lamented the fact that the passing of faculty psychology into history had 
not prevented its concepts entering “by the backdoor”:227.  The 
fundamental problem with faculty psychology according to Cleckley is that 
it regards linguistic constructions “as if they referred to what can be met 
in experience”:227.  The reality however is that the body, mind, feeling, 
thinking, intellect, moral faculty, personality and character “cannot, 
except in language, be split apart and dealt with as clear-cut 
entities”:228.  Cleckley maintained that the tendency to rely excessively 
upon linguistic constructions, led to “a confusion unparalleled in the whole 
field of psychiatry”:229.  This is in keeping with the views of Ellard (1989) 
previously discussed within this chapter. 
 
Cleckley also identified a tendency to use the category of ‘psychopathic’ 
as a reservoir for any diagnosis or anyone that would not fit into other 
categories; hence the category ‘psychopathic’ became a “veritable 
diagnostic salad of incompatibles”:229.  Echoing Schneider’s 
characterisation of psychopathy as a pathology of the mind (Schneider 
1923), Cleckley holds up the term psychopathic personality itself as a 
prime example of a terminological muddle, given that the literal meaning 
of the term is such that it can apply to all psychiatric disorders. Cleckley 
illustrates this by referring to the typology of psychopathic personalities 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                46 | P a g e  
 
described by Kahn (1931), in which he lists 16 different subdivisions that 
are extremely heterogeneous. 
 
Cleckley maintained that the category anti-social personality within DSM-
II clearly delineated the archetypal psychopath (Cleckley 1976) as 
previously described by himself in contrast to DSM-I, which had used a 
more heterogeneous category of sociopathic personality disturbance, 
antisocial reaction. Others have since argued that subsequent revisions to 
the DSM have led to a progressive reduction in clarity exemplified by the 
increasing conflation of the distinct concepts of antisocial personality 
disorder and psychopathy (Hart and Hare 1997). Among the practical 
implications for those who are given a diagnosis of antisocial personality 
disorder is that inappropriate assessment instruments are more likely to 
be used increasing the risk of erroneous conclusions being reached 
(Warren and South 2006). One of the explanations for the tendency to 
conflate these two different diagnoses is that within DSM-IV-TR, 
psychopathy is conflated with antisocial personality disorder, hence in 
describing antisocial personality disorder it is stated that:  
 
“This pattern has also been referred to as psychopathy, sociopathy, 
or dyssocial personality disorder”:702.  
 
It has been argued that one consequence of this, at least in the USA, has 
been the over-diagnosis of psychopathy as distinct from antisocial 
personality disorder among those being processed through the criminal 
justice system.  This in turn has led to harsher sentences being passed, 
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including the death penalty, on a number of individuals who may well 
have otherwise received lesser sentences.  Part of the rationale for 
harsher sentencing appears to be the perception of hopelessness 
associated with any prospect of positive change among those who have 
been given a diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder (Hare 1996). 
The current situation regarding psychopathic personality disorder in 
particular is therefore one of uncertainty and confusion (Shipley and 
Arrigo 2001). Against the background of a public safety discourse this has 
potentially significant implications for those who receive such a diagnosis 
because: “the constitutional plight of the psychopath is more perilous 
than that of any other mentally ill individual” (Shipley and Arrigo 
2001,:413), in so far as public protection can be used as an argument for 
the suspension of the rights and liberties of those with this diagnosis. This 
has clear parallels with the Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder 
policy that has been developed in England: this will be explored 
subsequently within this thesis. The tendency to conflate the diagnosis of 
antisocial / dissocial and psychopathic personality disorder may shed 
some light on the policy position that has been maintained in Scotland, of 
not admitting those with a primary diagnosis of personality disorder into 
mental health facilities. This will be explored in further detail subsequently 
within this thesis. 
 
The description of the psychopath provided by Cleckley has a deeply 
sinister feel: Cleckley states that the fundamental personality defects: 
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“...of the psychopath are not covered over by peripheral or surface 
functioning suggestive of some eccentricity or peculiarity of 
personality but by a perfect mask of genuine sanity, a flawless 
surface indicative in every respect of robust mental health” 
(Cleckley 1976,:253). 
 
This theme was later to be reiterated by those who wished to challenge 
what they perceived to be construct drift, most notably within subsequent 
revisions of the DSM (Shipley and Arrigo 2001).  In highlighting the need 
for greater conceptual clarity the ‘monstrous’ characteristics of the 
psychopath have often been emphasised.  One such account gives the 
impression of psychopaths as rather like vampires walking among an 
innocent and unsuspecting population, preying upon them at will: 
 
“...psychopaths are social predators who charm, manipulate, and 
ruthlessly plough their way through life, leaving a broad trail of 
broken hearts, shattered expectations, and empty wallets.  
Completely lacking in conscience and in feelings for others, they 
selfishly take what they want and do as they please, violating social 
norms and expectations without the slightest sense of guilt and 
regret” (Hare 1993,:xi). 
 
It has been argued (Hart and Hare 1997) that the constructs of 
psychopathic and antisocial personality disorders, are actually based upon 
two distinct traditions that differ in their approach to the most appropriate 
means of arriving at a diagnosis of personality disorder.  The first 
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approach, is based upon a European and certain North American clinical 
traditions, these are associated with attempts to clearly delineate and 
describe the construct of psychopathy.  This is reflected in the criteria for 
dissocial personality disorder contained within ICD-10 and is consistent 
with the approach taken by Cleckley and proponents of his approach 
including Hart and Hare (Hart and Hare 1997). The second approach is 
characterised as depending to a greater extent upon: 
 
“A focus upon behavioural symptoms… to the exclusion of inferred 
interpersonal and affective symptoms” (Hart and Hare 1997,:23). 
 
This second tradition has influenced the DSM such that matters relating to 
the construct itself have been relegated to the textual notes within DSM-
IV-TR, rather than being expressed within the diagnostic criteria per se. 
Hart and Hare offer a definition of psychopathy that has strong similarities 
with Cleckley’s original formulation: 
 
“Interpersonally, psychopaths are grandiose, arrogant, callous, 
superficial, and manipulative; affectively, they are short tempered , 
unable to form strong emotional bonds with others, and lacking in 
empathy, guilt or remorse; and behaviorally, they are irresponsible, 
impulsive, and prone to violate social and legal norms and 
expectations” (Hart and Hare 1997,:22). 
 
The precise relationship between the constructs of psychopathy and 
antisocial personality disorder is far from clear (Warren and South 2006), 
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despite this however the terms are often used interchangeably. The 
significance of this (Hart and Hare 1997), is that the approach based upon 
behavioural factors may lead to the over diagnosis of psychopathy within 
criminal populations, and under diagnosis in the non-criminal population.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Personality disorder emerged from the concept of moral insanity. Despite 
certain claims to the contrary, it is reasonable to assert, that moral 
insanity was not the first description of psychopathic personality disorder 
but rather that it provided the basis for the development of the diagnostic 
category of psychopathic and other personality disorders. Personality 
disorder, from its earliest origins within moral insanity, has served the 
purpose of providing a mechanism for explaining and categorising 
particular types of behaviour and thought processes; namely those that 
are otherwise inexplicable and that represent a perceived threat to 
normative standards by challenging the boundaries of acceptable 
attitudes and conduct.  The history of the development of the concept of 
personality disorder is characterised by a tension between a focus upon 
moral failings and congenital factors that continues to resonate today, this 
has clear implications for the way that those who may attract this 
diagnosis are perceived. This will be discussed subsequently in the first 
findings chapter i.e. chapter 6. 
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The diagnosis of personality disorder therefore contributes to the 
regulation of the space between the individual and society, by ‘marking 
out’ individuals perceived as representing a particular type of threat to 
the normative social order. Personality disorder therefore serves the 
function of allowing members of the virtuous community (Rose 1999) to 
distance themselves from those perceived as wicked or excessively 
troublesome, by constructing them as inherently ‘defective’, and therefore 
substantially different from the majority of the population: this in turn 
tends to reinforce the excluded and marginalised status of those who 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder. During the 19th century 
faculties were invented to act as causes to explain behaviour without any 
substantive explanation of these faculties in terms of their origin, location 
and qualities (Ellard 1989). More recently the “wheel has turned full 
circle”  (Ellard 1989:129): entities have been transformed into processes 
and faculties have been transformed into factors that are used to map the 
human personality. The current constructions of personality disorder 
within the DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 classification systems can be viewed to 
some extend as a return to the source, reflecting Prichard’s formulation of 
moral insanity. 
 
The absence of robust evidence regarding the aetiology of personality 
disorder means that this diagnosis remains inherently tautological: this 
will inevitably continue to be the case for as long as the diagnosis is 
dependent upon the observation of behaviour that in turn is attributed to 
the presence of a disordered personality. Psychopathy serves as an 
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exemplar of the tautological nature of the diagnosis of personality 
disorder: 
 
“Why has this man done these terrible things?  Because he is a 
psychopath.  And how do you know that he is a psychopath?  
Because he has done these terrible things” (Ellard 1989,:128). 
 
The stigma associated with a diagnosis of personality disorder carries with 
it substantial implications for the welfare and human rights of those who 
receive this label.  This diagnosis superimposes a particular form of 
spoiled identity that has a tendency to lead to the individual being 
perceived in terms of their diagnosis, as distinct from being perceived as 
a particular individual with unique patterns of need.  The incorporation of 
personality disorder into the definition of mental disorder within the 
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, carries with it 
the potential to facilitate appropriate access to services.  The alternative 
possibility however is that this particular measure will simply reinforce the 
previously identified pattern of exclusion, and a tendency for professionals 
to respond to those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder from a 
public protection perspective to the exclusion of the needs of individual 
service users.  Both of these latter possibilities have the potential to 
further subordinate and marginalise the needs of those who have been 
given this form of diagnoses. The contested concepts that underpin the 
modern diagnostic category of personality disorder are of crucial 
importance because of the legacy that those who attract this diagnosis 
are required to inherit. The question of which combination of potential 
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outcomes is most likely to emerge in the longer term can however only be 
answered by means of empirical investigation. This will be discussed in 
the findings section of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: 
 
‘Law, policy and practice: an historical and comparative analysis 
of personality disorder within Scotland and England / Wales’ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical basis for the 
subsequent analysis of recent developments within the three domains of 
policy, law and practice for those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder in Scotland.  An analysis of these developments themselves will 
be provided within the next chapter of this literature review.   
 
The rationale for taking this long view is that “...the past is still active in 
the present” (Ion and Beer 2003:237); consequently an historical and 
comparative analysis is required in order to reveal the range of alternative 
possibilities, interpretations and courses of action open to those 
responsible for formulating policy, drafting legislation and then 
implementing these in practice. The analysis offered within this chapter 
will require consideration of the possible reasons behind the various 
choices that have been made in the process of formulating policy, law and 
practice in respect of those who may attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder.  
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The focus of this analysis will be the neighbouring jurisdictions of Scotland 
and England / Wales.  As demonstrated within the first chapter of this 
literature review, the construct and diagnosis of personality disorder 
emerged largely from concerns about a particular group who would today 
frequently, but not exclusively, be classified along the diagnostic 
continuum of dissocial / antisocial  - psychopathic personality disorder. 
Within the much broader diagnostic category of personality disorder, the 
diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder has historically been the 
main focus for legislators and policymakers due to the administrative 
imperative of maintaining discipline within institutional settings. The 
notoriety that has been, and continues to be, associated with those who 
commit violent crimes who also have been given this diagnosis serves to 
reinforce this focus further (Peachey 2012). The major focus of this 
chapter will therefore be that of a historical and comparative analysis of 
law and practice with what came to be referred to in key documents as 
the psychopathic group. 
 
 
The Contested Territory of Personality Disorder 
 
The status of personality disorder, as with other areas of mental health 
care, is embedded within particular socio-political contexts (Ion and Beer 
2003) that have influenced key developments in terms of the direction 
and content of policy, law and practice. The conceptualisation of any form 
of mental disorder takes place “within the dynamics of a moral order” 
(Pilgrim 2005,:437). In his lectures concerning the Abnormal, Foucault 
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argued that the convergence of psychiatric and juridical discourses 
between the 18th and 19th centuries resulted in “a new moral economy of 
punishment” (Ruddick 2006:55). This process formed the backdrop 
against which mental illness, learning disability and personality disorder 
emerged as distinct medical and legal entities and continue to be of 
significance.  
 
The relationship between medicine and jurisprudence was characterised 
by Foucault as one of struggle and contest, as those within these two 
disciplines vied for supremacy and to demarcate their particular 
professional territory (Foucault 1988; Foucault 2003).  Foucault 
maintained that the discipline of medicine succeeded in redefining how 
crimes committed by individuals should be understood, by shifting the 
focus away from what an individual had actually done to that of what they 
might be liable to do. Foucault maintained that the successful 
development of psychiatry as a discipline, whose members could enjoy 
relatively high status and exercise power, rested largely upon the extent 
that its members were able to persuasively claim the ability to be able to 
predict what individuals might do on the basis of specialised diagnostic 
methods. These tensions have continued to be of significance with regard 
to the status of those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder, 
coming into particularly sharp focus for example in the recent debate 
concerning the relationship between dangerousness and diagnosis. This is 
exemplified by the politically contrived pseudo-diagnosis of Dangerous 
and Severe Personality Disorder (Pilgrim 2007). 
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The issue of dangerousness and risk was of particular significance within 
this territorial dispute between law and medicine, laying the foundation 
for a preoccupation with risk that was to become increasingly significant 
throughout social policy (Webb 2006). The significance of this shift of 
emphasis will be given further consideration in the next chapter.  
According to Foucault,  this shift took place because the emerging 
discipline of psychiatry perceived dangerousness (Foucault 1988) to be an 
effective means of securing a bridgehead on the territory traditionally 
occupied by members of the legal profession.  Foucault maintained that 
particular concepts within psychiatry were developed largely in order to 
assist this emerging discipline to stake claims and therefore to expand its 
field of power. From this perspective psychiatry is deemed to rest upon 
various artifices of discourse.  A specific example cited by Foucault is that 
of the concept of homicidal monomania.  In advancing this particular 
analysis Foucault is asserting a particular type of relationship between 
knowledge and power, such that claims to have privileged knowledge 
should also be viewed as attempts to assert power over individuals and 
groups, including other professions and disciplines (Foucault 1980).   
 
Foucault maintained that once psychiatry had successfully established a 
role for itself within jurisprudence that the concept of homicidal 
monomania was strategically jettisoned having served its purpose, thus 
homicidal monomania: 
 
“came to act as proof that psychiatry had a key role in public 
hygiene.  Now psychiatrists no longer have to show the link 
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between madness and danger, the system of administration 
presupposes it......... There is no longer any need for monomaniacs” 
(Foucault 2003:142). 
 
The association of dangerousness and mental disorder has persisted and 
is one factor that has influenced recent developments within the three 
domains of policy, law and practice.  The precise role of dangerousness in 
influencing key developments within these domains will be discussed 
within the next chapter of this literature review. 
 
The historical development of policy, law and practice in respect of those 
diagnosed as being mentally disordered, has been strongly influenced by 
concerns regarding the threat that they are perceived to represent in 
terms of their inherent dangerousness and their alleged degenerative 
potential for society as a whole.  On occasion these issues became 
conflated such that particular individuals and groups were perceived as 
dangerous because of their degenerative potential.  A further significant 
influence on developments within these three domains can be broadly 
characterised as an administrative or managerial imperative; this is 
clearly evident within a number of reports that will be discussed within 
this chapter.  These themes will now be explored further within the 
following historical and comparative analysis. 
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Key Historical Debates: Evidence from Commissions, Reports and 
Inquiries 
 
The legal status of personality disorder has and continues to be 
contentious. There are two principal explanations for this.  The first 
concerns whether or not it is actually necessary or useful to specifically 
incorporate personality disorder within statute law as a designated 
category. Debate concerning this point tends to centre upon issues of 
control and treatment - most notably the control and treatment of those 
‘diagnosed as dangerous’, exemplified by responses to those who attract 
a diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder.  The second concerns 
the on-going debate involving philosophical and practical questions 
relating to the status of personality disorder within the diagnostic lexicon 
of psychiatry; these have been explored within the first chapter of this 
literature review.  
 
The debate concerning whether or not to include a distinct category of 
personality disorder within the law has been significantly influenced by an 
administrative imperative. In respect of law and policy in the United 
Kingdom historical debates concerning if and how this group should be 
included within mental health legislation can be traced to the deliberations 
of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feebleminded 
(1908) Chaired by Lord Radnor.  This commission considered the merits 
of including a distinctive group within the law for the morally insane, 
which as demonstrated within the previous chapter of this literature 
review, can be understood as referring to what would later become known 
as personality disorder and antisocial / psychopathic personality disorder 
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somewhat more specifically.  The commission rejected the suggestion 
that such a group should be explicitly recognised in law on the basis that 
it would be “scientifically incorrect” (Walker and McCabe 1973:210) to do 
so.  This decision reflected the contested nature of moral insanity. The 
Radnor Commission did however acknowledge the existence of particular 
difficulties associated with a specific subgroup within the prison 
population: this group were regarded as representing a distinct challenge 
to administrators, on the basis that they were highly resistant to the 
deterrent effects of incarceration and tended to undermine efforts to 
maintain good order within institutional settings.  
 
The minutes of evidence given to the Radnor Commission also reveal the 
significance of eugenic anxieties concerning the perceived relationship 
between population degeneration, mental illness and crime.  This echoed 
the previous work of Kraepelin (Hoff 1998) and earlier writers such as 
Morel and Megan.  These general concerns led to a more specific focus on 
women who were perceived to be mentally disordered, on the grounds 
that they represented a special type of threat to society by means of their 
reproductive potential.  The particular focus upon women can also be 
seen as part of a continuation of a more established “discourse of 
bastardy” (Carabine 2000:84) in which the reproductive capacity of 
women, particularly women without the means to provide for their 
children, have been characterised as representing a particularly pernicious 
threat to the social order based upon fears of widespread moral 
corruption.  These concerns were given particular expression within the 
New Poor Law 1834 and the Poor Law (Scotland) Act 1845 (Blaikie 2005). 
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Certain evidence given to the Radnor Commission illustrates the 
convergence of eugenic concerns about population degeneration and 
mental disorder. This is representative of a particular discourse of 
“degenerationism” (Lucklin 2006:237) that constituted a distinct theme 
within the broader discourse of eugenics. Degenerationism was 
particularly concerned with the urban working class, who came to be 
perceived as an inherently problematic population during the mid to late 
19th century.  Within this discourse poor working class women were given 
particular attention as they were deemed to represent a distinct threat 
due to their reproductive potential.  The discourse of degenerationism can 
be seen as part of a wider process of “othering” large sections of the 
population “by marking them as deviant, criminal, psychotic, defective, 
simple, hysterical, diseased, primitive, regressive, or just dangerous” 
(Lucklin 2006:237). Women became a particular focus of attention due to 
the conflation of poverty, madness and danger. 
 
In expressing concerns regarding women from the “defective class” while 
giving evidence to the Radnor Commission (para 754), a Home Office 
Inspector under the Inebriates Acts, namely a Dr Braithwaite provided the 
following observation: 
 
“Being women, and not under control, they go to swell the immoral 
classes” (para 755). 
 
The tendency towards objectification becomes distinctly clear by the use 
of the term “average specimen” (para 792) in describing a person said to 
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be representative of this group.  This exchange also contains an example 
of the common usage at the time of the term moral defective, being used 
to describe a boy of whom it is said: “I do not think we shall ever get him 
to have any sense of right or wrong” (para 816).  The tendency towards 
the objectification and dehumanisation of members of this group or class, 
is highlighted by a comment contained in a reply by a witness in 
describing the so-called morally defective as particularly vulnerable to 
“animal instinct” (para 857). 
 
The minutes of the Royal Commission described above contain clear 
evidence of the established association between dangerousness and so-
called ‘defectives’.  The meaning of dangerous was clarified during the 
course of evidence being taken from the aforementioned Dr Branthwaite, 
during which a question put by a member of the commission described 
the defective class as “dangerous to society” (para 754), both due to their 
tendency towards violence and their reproductive capacity. These 
eugenic-based anxieties influenced policy developments and the drafting 
of legislation in both jurisdictions: this is evident within the parallel Mental 
Health Acts of 1913 enacted for both jurisdictions (Darjee and Crichton 
2003).  
 
The minutes of this Royal Commission contain an expression of eugenic 
anxiety that was exemplified in a publication by the socialist writer Jack 
London in ‘The People of the Abyss’, in which the population of the East 
End of London are described in lurid terms as: 
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“...a fearful slime that quickened the pavement with life… a 
menagerie of garmented bipeds that looked something like humans 
and more like beasts”.   
 
London goes on to say of the people he observed that:  
 
“They reminded me of gorillas.  Their bodies were small, ill-shaped, 
and squat….. They exhibited… an elemental economy of nature, 
such as the caveman must have exhibited”.   
 
London clearly associated his observations of the physical characteristics 
of the people he observed with psychological characteristics such that he 
stated: 
 
“They possess neither conscience nor sentiment and they will kill for 
a half-sovereign, without fear or favour, if they are given but half a 
chance.  They are a new species, a breed of city savages… The slum 
is their jungle and they live and pray in the jungle” (London 1903: 
324-5).  
 
The analysis offered by Jack London of the cause of this apparent 
degeneracy stands in stark contrast however to the moral degeneracy 
arguments being more generally advanced at that time. London argued 
against the notion that this group of the population were inherently 
inferior, asserting instead that their condition could more properly be 
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attributed to their prolonged exploitation and oppression, leading to their 
impoverishment not just financially but physically and intellectually. 
The report of the Royal Commission (Darjee and Crichton 2003) provided 
the basis for the subsequent introduction of parallel legislation in Scotland 
and England / Wales in the form of the Mental Deficiency and Lunacy 
(Scotland) Act 1913 and the Mental Deficiency Act 1913. This legislation 
represents an example of convergence and concordance between the two 
jurisdictions, with both Acts containing the same definitions and 
categories i.e. idiots, imbeciles, feebleminded persons and moral 
imbeciles; the moral imbecile is specified in part 1 of both Acts namely: 
 
“...persons who from an early age display some permanent mental 
defect coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities on which 
punishment has had little effect” (1) (d). 
 
The Mental Deficiency and Lunacy (Scotland) Act 1913 is of particular 
significance therefore because it contains the foundation for the detention 
of those who might later be classified as psychopaths, although this group 
is not explicitly acknowledged (Crichton 2001).  
 
The association of women, immorality, poverty and crime as a threat to 
the social order not only predated legislative reform at the beginning of 
the 20th century but continued to have a strong resonance thereafter.  
Evidence for this can be found in the underclass thesis popularised by 
Charles Murray, in which the association between the purported growing 
and menacing underclass and female reproduction, specifically giving 
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birth to illegitimate (sic) children, are characterised as fuelling violent 
crime.  In purporting to identify the emergence of a British underclass, 
Murray provides two sets of statistical data relating to single motherhood 
and crime, thereby implying a causal relationship between the two 
namely: the number of births to single women as a percentage of the 
total number of births and crimes of violence per 100,000 population 
(Murray 1996). The continuing significance of this perspective can be 
found in recent comments about the threat to the ‘human stock’ as a 
result of too many mothers from poor backgrounds having children (Watt 
2010). 
 
 
The Treatability Criterion - Safeguards and Responsibility 
 
The Radnor Commission recommended the inclusion of an age criterion to 
operate as a constraint on the use of compulsory treatment; this 
recommendation was accepted and incorporated within the two Acts of 
1913. The rationale for this treatability criterion was the belief that those 
aged over 21, were much less likely to be susceptible to and therefore 
benefit from treatment. In the case of Scotland feebleminded persons and 
moral imbeciles over 21 could only be “placed under care as a certified 
mental defective ... by Order of the Sheriff”  (Russell 1946:64). These 
criteria were to remain in force until the introduction of an alternative 
treatability criterion contained within the Mental Health Act 1983 and the 
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, the significance of which will be 
discussed subsequently. 
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Following the legislative concordance achieved within the parallel 
legislation of 1913, divergence if not discordance was to be introduced by 
the Mental Deficiency Act (1927).  This legislation that did not apply to 
Scotland, was passed in response to concerns about a lack of definitional 
clarity within the Mental Deficiency Act (1913): this Act redefined the 
category of the moral imbecile and made it one of the four subcategories 
of mental defective (idiots, imbeciles, feeble minded and moral 
imbeciles). Reference to the ineffectiveness of punishment and deterrence 
was removed such that the new category contained in s. 1 (1) (d) simply 
read: 
 
“Moral defectives, that is to say, persons in whose case there exists 
mental defectiveness coupled with strong vicious or criminal 
propensities and who require care, supervision and control for the 
protection of others”. 
 
The report Protection and Training (Scottish Office, 1928), called for the 
adoption of the approach contained within the Mental Deficiency Act 1927 
on the grounds that this would bring greater clarity to the law in 
Scotland: this recommendation was however not taken up.  The rationale 
behind the recommendation is detailed within this report as follows: 
 
“The moral imbecile of the Act is elusive.  Facts and figures show 
that doctors seldom agree as to who he is and how he should be 
dealt with.  The definition, indeed, is obscure and open to many 
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conflicting interpretations.  Its most serious weakness, however, is 
that it makes difficulties where it was meant to be helpful” (p 29). 
 
The report also highlighted the importance of the question of capacity and 
by implication the diagnosis of personality disorder in stating that: 
 
“By its unhappy use of the word “imbecile”, which suggests a very 
marked defect of intelligence, it hampers the Judge when he has to 
deal with a prisoner who has a pronounced moral defect, though in 
intelligence he may be almost normal.  The definition calls for 
immediate alteration” (p 29). 
 
Evidence of a continuing anxiety based upon eugenic considerations can 
also be found within the same report in the recommendation that certain 
key provisions contained within the Mental Deficiency and Lunacy 
(Scotland) Act 1913 should be retained: 
 
“We were particularly impressed with the necessity of shielding the 
mentally defective girl, sometimes herself handicapped by excessive 
sexual desire, always the easy prey of the unscrupulous and 
unprincipled.  Section 3 (1)  (vi) of the Act provides that a defective 
unmarried woman shall be “subject to be dealt with” if she is in 
receipt of poor relief at any time during her pregnancy or at the 
time of giving birth to a child, but, according to evidence, the sub-
section is not made use of.  Such women who have given birth to 
children in a poorhouse are allowed to leave almost at once.  It is 
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manifest that the sub-section should be enforced with the utmost 
vigilance, in the interests both of the women themselves and of the 
community” (p 35). 
 
Despite minor amendments to the law in Scotland introduced by the 
Mental Deficiency (Scotland) Act 1940, the category of moral imbecile 
retained its place within Scottish legislation until the Mental Health Act 
1960 (Darjee and Crichton 2003). 
 
Concern regarding the administrative difficulties caused by a particular 
subgroup, who would fall within the diagnostic spectrum of dissocial / 
antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy and currently in the case of 
England DSPD, was further identified in the report of the committee on 
the Scottish Lunacy and Mental Deficiency Laws (Russell 1946). This 
report referred to a separate and distinct “class of persons” who were not 
clearly enough demarcated within the existing definitions of feebleminded, 
imbecile, idiot and moral defectives, thereby echoing the views discussed 
above expressed within Protection and Training 1928.  The Russell Report 
described this subgroup as consisting of those: 
 
“...who display distressing symptoms of unstable, disordered 
behaviour, and are regarded as social misfits but whose mental 
capacity and conduct touch only the fringe of insanity or mental 
defectiveness or criminality.  For this type no suitable treatment 
appears to exist and in the great majority of such cases it seems to 
be the view that they are not appropriately certifiable in any sense, 
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nor suitable for prison treatment.  It occasionally happens, 
however, that certain of them are certified as mentally defective or 
insane and are sent to institutions where they prove to be a 
constant source of difficulty and trouble to themselves, to those 
supervising their training, and to their fellow inmates in these 
institutions” (para 426, italics as per the original). 
 
The Russell Report (1946) quoted from the report of the Radnor 
Commission in respect of this particular subgroup describing them as 
being: 
 
“...committed to prison for repeated offences which, being the 
manifestations of a permanent defect of mind, there is no hope of 
repressing, much less stopping, by short, punitive sentences” (para 
obtain 344). 
 
The report contained the recommendation that special provision be made 
for this group in terms of long-term psychological treatment with a view 
to allowing them to be returned to society as useful citizens (Russell 
1946). The ‘problem’ of how to cope with this particular subgroup resulted 
in a boundary dispute between law and medicine, reminiscent of 
Foucault’s observations (Foucault 1988; Foucault 2003) concerning the 
early history of psychiatry. The issue was brought into focus by the 
question of the proper grounds for a finding of diminished responsibility.  
In the case of Carraher, Lord Normand (1946) rebutted what he clearly 
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perceived to be an attempt by the profession of medicine to encroach 
upon the proper territory of the law stating that: 
 
“The Court has a duty to see that trial by judge and jury according 
to law is not subordinated to medical theories; and in this instance 
much of the evidence given by the medical witnesses is, to my 
mind, descriptive rather of a typical criminal than of a person of the 
quality of one the law has hitherto regarded as being possessed of 
diminished responsibility”. 
 
These comments echo the concerns previously identified within the report 
of the Departmental Committee on Persistent Offenders (1932) referred 
to above.  According to Foucault, (Foucault 1988) clear evidence can be 
found for the legitimacy of concerns by the judiciary, regarding the 
aspirations of certain of those within the medical profession to expand 
their sphere of influence and ultimately to usurp certain functions and 
powers of the court. This tension is exemplified by the assertion that 
experts should become the judges of the Judges.  Referring to a meeting 
of the Criminal Anthropology Association (1889) Foucault quotes Pugliese 
as asserting: 
 
“The commission of medical experts to whom the judgment ought 
to be referred should not limit itself to expressing its wishes; on the 
contrary it should render a real decision” (p 145). 
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Continuing tension can be found between the professions of medicine and 
law in the report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953). 
This report contains criticism of the lack of conceptual clarity and 
agreement among psychiatrists regarding the term moral imbecile; the 
problem being that the term implied a degree of impaired intelligence and 
rationality that was generally not found within this particular group.  The 
commission particularly criticised the definition of moral defective, 
referring to English / Welsh legislation in the form of the Mental 
Deficiency Act 1927 as being out of date on the basis that the phrase 
contained within the legislation: “there exists mental defectiveness 
coupled with strong vicious criminal propensities”, should be understood 
explicitly as referring to those liable to attract a diagnosis of psychopathic 
personality disorder stating that: 
 
“Such persons would nowadays usually be regarded as cases of 
psychopathic personality” (para 358). 
 
The phraseology contained within the legislation being referred to, is so 
similar to that contained within the then current Scottish law based upon 
the Mental Deficiency and Lunacy (Scotland) Act 1913, that this criticism 
can be regarded as equally relevant to both jurisdictions. The observation 
made by the commission is also important because it removes any doubt 
that the original phraseology contained within the parallel legislation of 
1913 was attempting, albeit imprecisely to describe those who would 
otherwise probably attract a diagnosis of personality disorder or more 
specifically a diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder. 
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This Royal Commission heard evidence relating to psychopathic 
personality disorder and the lack of definitional clarity.  The report 
contains a conclusion that echoes the criticism made by Lord Normand 
described above: 
 
“There is no generally accepted definition of this term, and no 
consensus of opinion about the scope or the nature of the mental 
condition which it is intended to describe.  It is sometimes used in 
so wide and loose a sense as to justify the observation of an 
American commission that it has “been used for many years as a 
convenient psychiatric waste-basket for cases otherwise difficult to 
classify”.  Even when it is more narrowly and strictly employed, the 
character and conduct of those to whom it is applied, in the courts 
and in penal institutions, are often such that it is natural for the 
layman to feel that they are typical of a confirmed criminal or 
simply of wicked men rather than an indication of mental disease or 
aberration, and to doubt whether the term has any scientific 
validity” (para 393).   
 
The commission’s report also notes that evidence was received from Sir 
David Henderson a leading Scottish psychiatrist: 
 
“...that it was wrong, and indeed a complete travesty of justice, 
that anyone who could be certified under the Mental Deficiency 
Acts-even a comparatively high-grade defective, such as a feeble-
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minded person-should be regarded as fit to plead and to stand his 
trial” (para 342). 
 
This view however was ultimately discounted by the commission on the 
basis that: 
 
“This view was not supported by any other witnesses, and we are 
unable to accept the far-reaching suggestion that every person who 
is certifiable as a mental defective must necessarily be regarded as 
unfit to stand his trial” (para 342). 
 
An example of legislative convergence and concordance between the two 
jurisdictions can be found in the Homicide Act 1957. This Act introduced 
into statute law throughout the United Kingdom the doctrine of 
diminished responsibility that had been previously developed within 
Scotland, as described by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 
(1953).   
 
Within this same year a further significant opportunity for additional 
convergence resulted from the recommendations of The Royal 
Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, 
commonly referred to as the Percy Commission (1957).  This commission 
recommended that three groups of patients be identified within mental 
health legislation, including a distinct group for those who attract a 
diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder.  The rationale for this 
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appears to have been at least in part due the administrative imperative 
described above; the commission therefore recommended: 
 
“...that for these broad administrative purposes three rather than 
two main groups of patients should be recognised………. We consider 
that in the General Administration of hospital and community 
services, and in connection with compulsory powers, the higher-
grade feebleminded and moral defectives and other psychopathic 
patients should be recognised as together constituting one main 
group of mentally disordered patients, the other two groups being 
the mentally ill and the severely sub-normal” (Part 3,para 187). 
 
The commission recommended that three categories should be adopted 
within a new legislative framework namely: 
 
“Mentally ill patients: this would include mental infirmity due to old age 
and would replace the term person of unsound mind, which should no 
longer be used. 
Psychopathic patients, or patients with psychopathic personality: including 
a special subcategory of feebleminded psychopath, for those psychopaths 
suffering from impaired intelligence but who would not fall into the 
category of severely subnormal. 
Severely sub-normal patients, or patients with severely sub-normal 
personality: this was intended to include those previously classified as 
idiots and imbeciles together with some who would also then have been 
labelled feebleminded”. 
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Part of the rationale for the commission’s proposals was that of limiting 
the use of compulsory measures to circumstances in which it was strictly 
necessary (para 135). The Dunlop Committee however subsequently 
made use of this same rationale in its rebuttal of the recommendations of 
this Royal Commission; the significance of this rebuttal will be discussed 
more fully subsequently. 
 
In its report the commission went to some considerable length to 
emphasise the importance of definitional clarity, illustrating this by 
referring to the Statute de Praerogativa Regis, thought to date from the 
14th century containing a crucial distinction between lunatics and idiots: 
 
“This statute asserted the wardship of lunatics and idiots and of 
their property to be a prerogative of the Crown” (p 44). 
 
The distinction was of very great significance to the person concerned 
because the property of lunatics had to be preserved intact in order to be 
returned upon recovery, it being lawful only to deduct from their property 
enough to cover the maintenance of the lunatic and his family until s/he 
had recovered.  In the case of idiots however it was lawful for the Crown 
or the person into whose care the idiot had been entrusted to 
permanently appropriate all of the funds from any estate beyond that 
necessary to pay for the maintenance of the person concerned.   
In its report (Part 3, para 156) the commission refers back to the 
previous Royal Commission report of 1908, which had emphasised the 
need for a particular definition that appears to equate with the diagnosis 
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of personality disorder, or specifically antisocial or psychopathic 
personality disorder: namely one that included those whose intelligence 
was unaffected by their mental abnormality and who represented a 
danger to others. The Royal Commission of 1957 concluded that this 
recommendation had formed the basis for the definition of the Moral 
Imbecile contained within the parallel legislation of 1913. 
 
The report of the Royal Commission published in 1957 contains an 
important distinction between rights and necessity vis-à-vis the protection 
of others, this foreshadowed the form of words subsequently to be used 
within the emergency legislation: the Mental Health (Public Safety and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act (1999) and carried over into the Mental Health 
(Care and Treatment) Act (2003): these two pieces of legislation will be 
discussed within the next chapter of this literature review. In paragraph 
317 (d) of the report of the Royal Commission, the following distinction 
appears concerning the use of compulsory powers to admit a person for 
treatment; that there must be a: 
 
(i) good prospect of benefit to the patient from the treatment 
proposed-an expectation that it will either cure or alleviate his mental 
disorder or strengthen his ability to regulate his social behaviour in 
spite of the underlying disorder, or bring him substantial benefit in the 
form of protection from neglect or exploitation by others; 
or (ii) a strong need to protect others from anti-social behaviour by 
the patient. 
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This second provision amounts to a recommendation in favour of the use 
of compulsory measures even when there is no prospect of direct benefit 
to the patient: this is consistent with the measures introduced within the 
emergency legislation referred to above. 
 
In specifically considering the treatment of those within the so-called 
psychopathic group the Commission however recommended the use of an 
age based criterion to act as a constraint on the use of compulsory 
powers.  This recommendation was based upon evidence heard by the 
commission concerning the relationship between treatment effectiveness 
and age.  The commission recommended that the age of 21 years should 
be established as the cut-off point for the use of compulsory powers, for 
the admission of someone to hospital or guardianship, based upon a 
diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder. This echoed the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1908. An additional 
safeguard was also recommended: namely that any compulsory measures 
should lapse in the case of anyone admitted under the age of 21, when 
they reached the age of 25 if they had not already been discharged: 
 
“Compulsory admission to hospital guardianship for a longer period 
of hospital or community care should be allowed for patients under 
the age of twenty-one at the time of admission if this is necessary 
for the patient’s own welfare or for the protection of others.  The 
compulsory powers should lapse when the patient reaches the age 
of twenty-five if he has not already been discharged, unless 
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admission followed court proceedings or transfer from prison or 
approved school” (Ch 7, para 367,  (ii)). 
 
The next paragraph (iii) introduces an important distinction between 
those who had been convicted of an offence and those who had not. The 
report contains a recommendation that compulsory admission to hospital 
or guardianship should be used for those with a diagnosis of psychopathic 
personality disorder who were over the age of twenty-one and who had 
been convicted of a criminal offence; where the court is satisfied that 
ordinary penal measures alone would not be appropriate, or upon the 
decision of the Home Secretary in the case of transfers from prison. The 
emphasis upon detaining those who attract this form of diagnosis, only if 
they had been convicted of an offence stands in marked contrast to the 
debate that was to emerge towards the end of the 20th century, this will 
be discussed subsequently. 
 
The commission acknowledged what it regarded as a fundamental 
definitional problem taking the form of a tautology, by recognising that: 
 
“The treatment and the use of compulsion must be based on a 
medical diagnosis of the individual patient’s mental condition, not 
merely on evidence of his behaviour.  The difficulty is that with 
patients in the psychopathic group it is their behaviour which 
provides the main evidence of their mental condition” (para 339). 
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The Scottish Rebuttal 
 
The Dunlop Committee having been established to consider the relevance 
of the findings of the Royal Commission of 1957 to the law in Scotland 
delivered a resounding and somewhat contemptuous rejection of the 
commission’s recommendation in favour of explicitly including a distinct 
psychopathic group within mental health law.  The committee gave the 
following reasons for rejecting the incorporation of a specific psychopathic 
group within Scottish legislation, namely that: 
 
(a)” The term psychopathic has already come to have so many 
meanings that it has almost no medical significance.  The 
introduction of yet another meaning would add to the confusion 
already existing” (Dunlop 1958,:para 7). 
 
The committee also argued that the problem of stigma would not be 
satisfactorily addressed by formally recognising this group.  The 
committee did however accept the existence of the so-called psychopathic 
group, choosing instead to emphasise the importance of treatability and 
argued that those who were likely to benefit from psychiatric treatment 
were also likely to fall within the existing legal definitions. This position 
seems to be based implicitly on the idea of comorbidity with the 
personality disorder component being assumed to be untreatable.  The 
committee also appears to have been concerned that the inclusion of the 
so-called psychopathic group would lead to a greater use in compulsion; 
this was felt to be undesirable and contrary to the stated intentions of the 
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Royal Commission itself.  This observation by the committee proved to be 
somewhat prophetic.  Data available for England / Wales indicates that 
following the Mental Health Act 1959, which reflected the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1957, that within the first 
year a 100% increase took place in the number of compulsory admissions 
to hospital. This increase in compulsory admissions was despite the fact 
that the powers within this new Act corresponded closely with those 
contained in its predecessor of 1913. One of the reasons for the increase 
would appear to be that psychiatrists found the definitions within the 
latter piece of legislation easier to satisfy “and certainly this was intended 
where psychopathy was concerned” (Walker and McCabe 1973:73). It is 
noteworthy that no such increase occurred within Scotland following the 
implementation of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960 (Elliott, Timbury 
et al. 1979).  This should not be taken to mean however that within 
Scotland patients with a primary diagnosis of personality disorder were 
not being admitted for treatment; on the contrary clear evidence exists 
that patients with a primary diagnosis of personality disorder were being 
admitted to the State Hospital in the 1960s and 1970s (Darjee and 
Crichton 2003).   
 
 
To name or not to name - the innominate and nominate inclusion 
of personality disorder 
 
The desire for legislative concordance, from certain quarters at least, 
between these two jurisdictions proved to be particularly significant.  The 
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Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960 did not explicitly replicate the Mental 
Health Act 1959 that reflected the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission of 1957 by including a distinct psychopathic group.  However 
the Scottish legislation did incorporate the psychopathic group de facto 
under the grounds for detention within s. 23 (1) (b), thereby establishing 
an approach that would be replicated within the subsequent Mental Health 
(Scotland) Act 1984.  The rationale for the de facto, rather than explicit 
incorporation of the psychopathic group within Scots law, can be found 
within the deliberations of the Scottish Standing Committee (1960) 
established to consider the draft Bill that was subsequently to become the 
1960 Act.  In giving evidence to the committee in respect of the 
psychopathic group the Solicitor-General for Scotland explicitly stated that 
the intention of the draft Bill vis-à-vis the Mental Health Act 1959, was to 
ensure “that the result is almost entirely the same in both cases” (p 368).   
 
It is clear from the minutes of the committee that certain members were 
uncomfortable with what could be perceived as a deception, for example a 
Dr Mabon argued that: “we do not think people should pretend things are 
what they are not” (p 365).  The committee was quite clear that the effect 
of the wording of the draft Bill would be to ensure: “That means in 
practice that there will be a psychopathic group, although we may not call 
it that” Dr Mabon (p 365).  This committee member also highlighted the 
logical flaw of categorising all those who may be diagnosed with 
psychopathy as though they were violent or otherwise dangerous to 
others.  Dr Mabon argued that it was not appropriate to restrict individual 
liberty on the basis of a diagnosis in the absence of the commission of an 
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offence: the doctor illustrated the error of logic in this approach with the 
following example: 
 
“All lemons are yellow, but not all yellow things are lemons”:384.  
 
This was part of a wider argument advanced by this committee member 
against special measures for those within the so-called psychopathic 
group that would have effectively amounted to preventive detention: 
 
“We cannot have a special criminal code for those labelled by the 
medical profession as psychopaths, because they have not 
committed a crime. Nor can it be seriously argued that they are 
bound to do so.  That is the kernel of the argument”:384. 
 
This committee therefore implicitly discussed the question of preventive 
detention specifically with regard to those who would fall within the 
diagnostic circumference of the so-called psychopathic group; this 
foreshadowed the debate that was to take place subsequently concerning 
so-called Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder: this will be 
examined within the next chapter.  An alternative view in favour of 
preventive detention is clearly implied in a question raised by one of the 
committee members a Mr Willis: “Are we to wait until such a person 
commits a serious crime… before we detain him?” (p 377). This 
committee proved to be influential in amending the draft Bill in 
accordance with the argument advanced by another committee member, 
Mr Bruce Millan who maintained that the previous position concerning 
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treatability and compulsion should be retained, asserting that compulsory 
measures should only be used if a disorder: “requires or is susceptible to 
medical treatment” (p 444); the draft Bill was amended accordingly. This 
amendment was to become of great significance as it was carried forward 
into subsequent mental health legislation and further expanded within the 
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984. It would prove to be a foundational 
step on the road that would lead to the landmark ruling in the case of 
Noel Ruddle, this will be subsequently discussed.   
 
The provision allowing for the detention of those caught by the diagnosis 
of psychopathy and who were over the age of 21 and convicted of a 
criminal offence came into effect in both jurisdictions in the Mental Health 
Act 1959 and the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960.  The same specified 
versus unspecified distinction however appears once again. Within the 
1959 Act, part 5, s 60 (1) (a) (i) specifically authorises the detention of 
offenders who meet the criteria for mental illness, psychopathic disorder, 
subnormality or severe subnormality, providing that the court is satisfied 
that the disorder is sufficient to merit the offender’s detention in hospital 
and that this is the most suitable way of disposing of the case. 
The Scottish legislation does not use the term psychopath but clearly 
identifies this group by using the following form of words contained within 
part, 4, s. 55 (1)  
 
“...the court is satisfied... that the offender is suffering from mental 
disorder of a nature or degree which, in the case of a person under 
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twenty-one years of age would warrant his admission to a hospital 
or his reception into guardianship under Part IV this Act”  
 
The reference to a person under 21 years of age is a reference to the 
unspecified psychopathic group embedded within the previous legislation. 
Evidence of this can be found by comparing the two Acts. The definition of 
psychopathic disorder contained within the 1959 Act Part 1, s. 4, (4) is as 
follows: 
 
“...means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not 
involving subnormality of intelligence) which results in abnormally 
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the 
patient, and requires or is susceptible to medical treatment”. 
   
As with the Mental Health Act 1959 the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960 
specifically excluded the admission of those with a diagnosis of 
psychopathy who were over the age of 21.  The term psychopathic was 
not explicitly stated in keeping with the recommendations of the Dunlop 
Committee. 
 
Part 4, s 23 (1)  
 
“A person who is suffering from any mental disorder that requires or 
is susceptible to medical treatment may be admitted to a hospital or 
received into guardianship in pursuance of the appropriate 
application under the following provisions of this Act; but without 
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prejudice to the said provisions so far as relating to emergency 
admission, no person over the age of 21 years shall be admitted or 
received except where the mental disorder for which he suffers- 
(a) is mental deficiency such that he is incapable of living an 
independent life or of guarding himself against serious exploitation; 
or 
(b) is a mental illness other than a persistent disorder which is 
manifested only by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible 
conduct” (My emphasis). 
 
S 23 (1) (b) therefore contains the same phraseology that underpins the 
definition of the psychopathic group used within the Mental Health Act 
1959. It is clear that the same group is being described; although the use 
of the term psychopathy or psychopath has been avoided in the Scottish 
Act. 
 
The significance of the age of 21, also being the age specified within the 
1959 Act i.e. Part 4, s. 26 (2)(a)(ii) based upon the findings of the Percy 
Commission, see above, is documented in clear terms within the minutes 
of the Standing Committee considering the draft Bill that was to become 
the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960. 
 
In other words the 1960 Act contains an unspecified psychopathic group 
subject to the same exclusionary clauses contained within the equivalent 
English legislation that contains a specifically identified psychopathic 
group (Darjee and Crichton 2003). 
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The 1960 Act contains three criteria that must be satisfied to allow for 
compulsory detention. After stating that evidence is required from two 
medical doctors the following criteria are specified within Part 4, s.24 (2): 
 
“(a) a statement of the form of mental disorder from which the 
patient is suffering, being mental illness or mental deficiency or 
both; 
(b) a statement that the said disorder requires or is susceptible to 
medical treatment and is of the nature or degree which warrants 
the patient’s detention in a hospital for such treatment; and 
(c) a statement that the interests of the health or safety of the 
patient or the protection of other persons cannot be secured 
otherwise than by such detention as aforesaid” (My emphasis). 
 
These treatability criteria were to be subsequently strengthened within 
the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 in keeping with the Mental Health 
Act 1983, in part to compensate for the removal of the age exclusionary 
criteria of 21 years. 
 
 
Dangerousness and Diagnosis 
 
The Butler Report (1975) was established to review the law relating to 
mentally abnormal offenders in England and Wales. In keeping with the 
general approach of trying to maintain concordance between the two 
jurisdictions, it is stated that a representative was made available from 
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the Scottish Home and Health Department: “who attended our meetings 
in the role of observer and adviser on Scottish law and practice” (para 
1.2). The significance of public concern regarding the treatment and 
management of those who commit serious offences after being released 
from custody, was acknowledged by this committee as a significant factor 
influencing the political climate in which policy had to be framed. To 
illustrate this specific mention is made of the cases of Graham Young and 
Terence Iliffe, who had committed very grave premeditated offences 
involving multiple victims. Both were originally sentenced to 
imprisonment rather than detention in a Special Hospital because medical 
witnesses concluded that they were not suffering from a medical disorder 
that would be susceptible to treatment, Chapter 4 (4.1).  
 
The committee made use of this example to enter into a sophisticated 
discussion of the concept of dangerousness that bears a close 
resemblance to that contained within the MacLean Committee report; this 
will be discussed in the following chapter: 
 
“Dangerousness depends in the majority of cases not only on the 
personality of the potentially dangerous offender but also on the 
circumstances in which he finds himself.  The practice of referring to 
some individuals as “dangerous” without qualification creates the 
impression that the word refers to a more or less constantly 
exhibited disposition, like left-handedness or restlessness……. the 
individual who spontaneously “looks for a fight” or feels a need to 
inflict pain or who searches for an unknown sexual victim is 
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fortunately rare, although such people undoubtedly exist.  Only this 
last category can justifiably be called “unconditionally dangerous”” 
(Butler 1975, para 4.5). 
 
The committee were therefore taking a strong position against a simplistic 
and essentialist definition of dangerousness. This nuanced approach is 
also exemplified by referring to the “trigger effect” or situational factors 
that are likely to increase the risk of an individual re-offending (Butler 
1975) (4.6). 
 
After hearing evidence regarding how dangerousness might variously be 
understood, the committee decided upon the following definition: 
 
“...to equate dangerousness with a propensity to cause serious 
physical injury or lasting psychological harm” (Butler 1975, para 
4.10)  
 
This is a surprisingly modern definition and consistent with the current 
dual focus upon physical and psychological harm caused by violent and 
sexual offenders in particular (Kemshall 2002; 2004) and is also 
consistent with advice issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Council 
(2004). 
 
The committee also recognised the inherent uncertainty of risk 
assessment processes: 
 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                89 | P a g e  
 
“In deciding what to do about dangerousness the impossibility of 
certain prediction is the central problem” (Butler 1975, para 4.11)  
 
This same paragraph then continues with a discussion of the limitations of 
actuarial approaches, foreshadowing the debate that was later to take 
place concerning dangerous and severe personality disorder and 
preventive detention. The committee highlighted the process by which an 
individual is assigned to a particular probability group, emphasising that it 
is never possible to predict whether an individual will reoffend based on 
their membership of any particular group.  As this discussion continues 
into the next paragraph it has a remarkable resonance with the 
conclusions reached by the MacLean Committee, relating to the process of 
risk assessment and the rationale behind the recommendation in favour 
of the Order of Lifelong Restriction underpinned by the process of 
structured clinical risk assessment: 
 
“Recognising the limitations of objective assessment, is it better to 
rely on a continuing process of treatment and subjective 
assessment in which checks and adjustments are constantly made 
in the light of the developing pattern of behaviour evinced by the 
individual concerned?  Unfortunately, subjective judgment, based 
on however much experience, professional knowledge and available 
information, and exercised however conscientiously, is inescapably 
unreliable” (Butler 1975, para 4.12). 
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The committee then went on to highlight the potential dangers to liberty 
that might follow from an excessive preoccupation with risk (Buchanan 
and Leese 2001; Pilgrim and Rogers 2003). Regarding dangerousness and 
detention: 
 
“In deciding whether society requires more protection, the question 
has to be faced: how many probably safe individuals should 
cautious policy continue to detain in hospital in the hope of 
preventing the release of one who is still potentially dangerous?” 
(Butler 1975, para 4.13). 
 
By way of illustration the committee highlighted the Baxstrom debacle 
that occurred in New York State.  Baxstrom had been found to be insane 
while serving a criminal sentence and was subsequently transferred to a 
State institution for insane criminals.  His sentence expired in December 
1961; however he was detained in the institution that he had been 
transferred to previously under provisions of the Correctional Law.  In 
February 1966 the Supreme Court ruled that the law permitting his 
continued detention was unconstitutional: consequently Baxstrom 
together with all others similarly detained were entitled to be released. 
The scale of the apparent problem was immense given that between 
March and August 1966, 969 patients were transferred from Correction 
Department hospitals to civil hospitals.  The significant point is that 
disaster did not follow: 
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“The receiving hospitals it was said quickly found that the Baxstrom 
cases were indistinguishable from the generality of their patients.  
Yet all these patients had previously been denied transfer by 
experienced psychiatrists from the Department of Mental Hygiene 
on the grounds that they were too disturbed or potentially 
dangerous” (Butler 1975, para 4.14). 
 
By the end of February 1967, 147 patients had been discharged back into 
the community, with only seven being regarded as sufficiently 
problematic to justify judicial commitment to a specialist secure facility.  
By the end of 1967 there was only one record of an arrest of those who 
had been released and that was for a minor theft. Subsequent follow-up 
confirmed the relatively low rate of reoffending amongst this group of 
patients. 
 
The Butler Committee considered many of the same issues that are 
current in the debate regarding so-called dangerous and severe 
personality disorder (DSPD). This was considered in detail by the MacLean 
Committee (MacLean 2000) in focusing on what to do with violent and 
sexual offenders who may also be mentally disordered. This issue will be 
considered in detail within the next chapter. The Butler Committee 
identified three alternative possible strategies (Butler 1975, para 4.36):  
 
“(a) arrangements might be made for identifying dangerous mentally 
disordered prisoners in prison and for determining , towards the end of 
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their sentence, the necessity for their further detention, under new 
statutory provisions, in the interests of public safety; or 
(b) provision might be made to enable the court to impose an 
indeterminate sentence at the outset, where it is likely that the 
offender will pose a continuing threat to society; or 
(c) there could be various arrangements based on combining 
determinate sentences with licensing after normal release at the end of 
the sentence, taking into account remission - as distinct from parole 
licensing before the end of the sentence”. 
 
The Butler Committee came down in favour of the second option rejecting 
the third, apparently on the grounds that it would contravene natural 
justice; although this term is not used: 
 
“The proposal has been rejected by the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee on the grounds that it would be unacceptable for a 
person who had been released after serving a determinate sentence 
imposed by a court to be recalled to prison by administrative action 
and detained there perhaps for the rest of his life.  The committee 
pointed out that there is a significant difference between recall as 
applied in the case of a life sentence prisoner, whose release on 
licence is a benefit not guaranteed by his sentence, and recall of a 
prisoner who has already served the determinate sentence imposed 
at his trial” (Butler 1975, para 4.38). 
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A similar legislative change to that proposed by the Butler Committee was 
ultimately enacted within England via the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This 
Act saw the introduction of indeterminate sentences for offenders meeting 
certain criteria based upon dangerousness. The option that the Butler 
Committee rejected however had certain similarities with the Order of 
Lifelong Restriction introduced within the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 
(2003), this being based upon a punishment element followed by a whole 
life licence.  This provides an example of a divergence of approach in 
pursuit of the same objective within these two jurisdictions. 
 
The Butler Committee recommended that the court should not specify a 
minimum period of detention (para 4.43) but rather that the sentence 
should be reviewed every two years with the continued need for detention 
being determined by the Parole Board. 
 
The issues discussed within the Butler Report continue to have 
considerable resonance with recent debates. Within chapter 5 titled 
‘Psychopaths’ the report begins by focusing on the key question of “what 
to do about the psychopath” (Butler 1975, para 5.1). 
The tautological nature of the construct of psychopathy was recognised by 
the committee as having a bearing not just on the clinical process of 
diagnosis but also on how the law should be framed: this point was 
addressed by the committee in paragraph 5.27 as follows.  The 
committee’s report quotes from a submission received by them and 
contained within the report of a Royal Commission (1957), Cmnd.169, 
para 339: 
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“The treatment and the use of compulsion must be based on a 
medical diagnosis of the individual patient’s mental condition, not 
merely on evidence of his behaviour.  The difficulty is that with 
patients in the psychopathic group it is their behaviour which 
provides the main evidence of their mental condition”. 
 
The Butler Report heard evidence (para 5.19) to the effect that 
psychopathic disorder should be removed from mental health legislation; 
among the arguments advanced in favour of removing this category were 
that of insufficient definitional clarity and lack of agreement among 
psychiatrists regarding diagnosis: the final argument advanced in favour 
of deleting references to psychopathy from mental health legislation 
reads: 
 
“Witnesses also drew attention to the fact that in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland it has not been found necessary to make use of 
this term in legislation” (Butler 1975) (para 5.20) (f). 
 
also: 
 
“… it seems to us that it would not suffice simply to delete 
references to “psychopathic disorder” despite the apparently 
satisfactory experience in Scotland of its omission from the 
corresponding statute: it is one thing to have an Act of Parliament 
which has never included the term, but another to withdraw it after 
it has been in a statute for 16 years” (Butler 1975, para 5.24). 
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This pragmatic response does not appear to be based on a positive view 
of the diagnostic legitimacy or usefulness of the inclusion of the so-called 
psychopathic group; rather it seems to be based on a concern that 
removal of this group would have the potential to bring the law into 
disrepute. The political problem of removing categories already 
established within legislation also specifically informed the thinking of the 
Millan Committee with reference to the explicit inclusion of personality 
disorder. This will be discussed subsequently within this thesis. 
The description of the operational similarity between the legislation in 
Scotland and England / Wales described within the report of the Butler 
Committee is of particular significance, not least because it foreshadowed 
the decision that would later be made in respect of Reid (Reid v Secretary 
of State for Scotland (1998) UKHL 43). This ruling will be discussed 
further subsequently. The effect of this ruling by the House of Lords was 
that the legislation within both jurisdictions i.e. the Mental Health Act 
1983 and Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, in respect of psychopathy 
and the so-called psychopathic group, should be interpreted as having the 
same intention and consequently that it should be equivalent in its effect. 
The Butler Committee discussed the possibility of using the broader term 
personality disorder as a substitute for psychopathic disorder, however 
the committee concluded that: 
 
“It would not be possible to provide a usable definition in the Act for 
“personality disorder” which, as we have indicated, is a group of 
disorders” (para 5.24). 
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The Butler Report also contains an interesting discussion regarding 
treatability and the proper role of medicine vis-à-vis treatment and 
control. The overwhelming weight of evidence received by the committee 
was deeply pessimistic regarding the possibility and efficacy of treatment. 
The committee summarised the weight of evidence that it had received by 
making reference to a statement from one witness that: 
 
“There is no known treatment for the great majority of psychopaths 
and control is all that medicine has to offer” (para 5.34).   
 
This raises the important question of whether or not control alone is an 
ethically legitimate function of medicine.  This is relevant to the inclusion 
of the treatability criterion within the Mental Health Act (Scotland) 1984; 
this was inserted in recognition of the need to differentiate between 
medical interventions based on the possibility of providing some benefit to 
the patient, or at least prevention of further deterioration rather than 
merely containing them. This reflected a position long established in Scots 
law based on the view that:  
 
“Psychiatric detention of the seriously mentally disordered has 
underlying it the compassion and intention that medical treatment 
will relieve the patient’s morbid condition, or at least provide him 
with the care and nursing that the condition requires” (Hunter 1975, 
para 125) . 
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This second aspect of the treatability criteria, namely prevention of 
deterioration, was to prove of critical importance in the landmark cases of 
Reid and Ruddle to be discussed subsequently. Concern about the 
disruptive impact that those within the so-called psychopathic group have 
upon others, whether in hospital or prison, is once again raised within this 
report. This is consistent with the administrative imperative previously 
discussed: 
 
“In prison or hospital they are a source of anxiety to their fellow 
prisoners or patients, as well as to staff.  If they are located with 
the rest of the prison or hospital population they represent an 
unsettling element and the risk of unexpected violence has to be 
accepted and lived with.  If on the other hand they are located 
separately, they make a further demand on scarce accommodation 
and staff, and may present special problems of control.  On any of 
these counts, they are not usually suitably placed in local 
psychiatric hospitals………. These dangerous psychopaths have 
therefore usually been sent to prison” (Butler 1975, para 5.37). 
 
The next paragraph identifies the need for an experimental programme 
and special regime, to some extent thereby anticipating the establishment 
of special facilities to support the Dangerous and Severe Personality 
Disordered agenda advocated by the Department of Health, Home Office 
and HM Prison Service (2004). This document reveals that the 
Government, in respect of England / Wales, continued to use DSPD as a 
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pseudo-diagnosis despite the very widespread criticism that this has 
attracted, this will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
The Hunter Report (1975), that considered the legal framework for crime 
and sentencing in Scotland was published in the same year as the Butler 
Report.  The Hunter report contains an arguably less sophisticated 
definition of dangerousness than appears within the Butler report: 
 
“...dangerousness-defined as the probability that he will inflict 
serious and irremediable personal injury in the future” (Hunter 
1975, para 122). 
 
The previous experience of preventive detention is briefly discussed within 
this committee’s report and has a strong resonance with debates 
concerning the more recent UK Government policy focus upon Dangerous 
Severe Personality Disorder. The following observation is offered with this 
report: 
 
“It has been the experience of other countries...with... preventive 
detention provisions that provisions of this kind catch too many 
people, and not necessarily the right ones” (Hunter 1975, para 
128). 
 
The report of the Hunter Committee also closely resembled the approach 
subsequently adopted by the MacLean Committee, in that it recognised an 
ethical dilemma associated with the preventive suspension of liberty: 
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“Any solution to the problem of how best to protect the public from 
those offenders who, on all the evidence, are very likely indeed, if 
at liberty, to commit further serious crimes of violence, raises 
difficult matters of principle; a careful balance must be struck 
between the rights of the individual offender and the safety of the 
public” (Hunter 1975, para 126). 
 
The report proposed the introduction of: 
 
“...a new court disposal, entitled a public protection order…. which 
would be available, under an extensive range of safeguards, for the 
detention for indeterminate periods of dangerous offenders” (para 
127). 
 
This represents a significant point of concordance between the two 
jurisdictions given that the Butler Report published in the same year also 
favoured indeterminate sentences, the main difference being that the 
minimum age in the Hunter Report was specified as 16 whereas in the 
Butler Report it was 17.  
 
It is clear that the intention of the proposed Public Protection Order was 
to address a perceived shortcoming in the age limit contained within the 
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960 i.e. that so-called psychopaths over 
the age of 21 could not be detained within its provisions, the psychopathic 
group is specifically identified here  thus: 
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“Different provisions apply to the detention of persons who are 21 
years of age than to that of older persons under the Mental Health 
Acts: in practice this could have the result that persons over the 
age of 21 who qualified for a Public Protection Order might, if under 
21, be detainable under the Mental Health Acts.  There is, however, 
some reluctance on the part of mental hospitals to agree to accept 
as patients young persons with psychopathic tendencies who may 
not be susceptible to treatment and who may create especial 
difficulties for the staff.  In any case, not all violence-prone persons 
would be diagnosed as psychopathic.  In view of the present 
inadequacy of the medical resources devoted to the younger age 
group and the existence of very dangerous persons in the 16-21 
age group who would not, in any event, be detainable under the 
Mental Health Acts the Sub-group suggest that the lower age limit 
to be set at 16” (para 133). 
 
The Butler Report favoured indeterminate sentences as did the Hunter 
Report: both reports also recommended that indeterminate sentences 
should not be accompanied by a specified period of determinant detention 
but favoured a two yearly review period.  The Butler Report contains 
similar safeguards to that recommended in the Hunter Report namely 
that: 
 
“...the court is satisfied, on the evidence of two psychiatrists one of 
whom must report orally, that the offender shows or has shown 
evidence of mental disorder but that he cannot be satisfactorily 
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dealt with under the Mental Health Act 1959, whether because his 
disorder is not sufficiently severe or because no suitable hospital 
will receive him or for other reasons, for example, that he is a 
psychopath with dangerous anti-social tendencies” (para 4.42). 
 
Both the Butler and Hunter reports also share the same recommendation 
that release from the proposed new orders i.e. Public Protection Order 
and the Reviewable Sentence should be dependent upon an assessment 
of dangerousness. 
 
 
The Impact of the Carstairs Tragedy 
 
An historical turning point regarding practice within Scotland (Darjee and 
Crichton 2003), can be identified with the escape from Carstairs by 
Thomas McCulloch and Robert Mone. In making their escape McCulloch 
and Mone murdered a fellow patient and nurse, also seriously injuring a 
police officer.  These events, which took place in 1976 and the 
subsequent Reid Report (1977), proved to have a profound effect upon 
the interpretation and application of mental health law within Scotland 
concerning those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder.   
 
The shock caused by these events resulted in a fault line between 
Scotland and the jurisdiction of England / Wales. An examination of the 
report into these tragic events reveals why these murders had such a 
profound impact upon those working within the State Hospital and cast a 
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wider shadow over those with a diagnosis of personality disorder within 
Scotland.  The report reveals that these two patients had been able to 
fashion and assemble an array of weapons. As a consequence of this, the 
courageous endeavours of a nursing officer to prevent their escape ended 
in his murder. The report details how the patient McCulloch was able to 
produce multiple weapons until the attempts by the nursing officer to 
disarm him were ultimately rendered futile; the report reads like a plot 
from a horror film: 
 
“He (MacLellan) could not have known McCulloch had a number of 
weapons and there is a nightmare quality in the way in which 
McCulloch was able to produce one weapon after another and to 
attack MacLellan until the latter was no longer able to defend 
himself” (p 14). 
 
Having escaped from the confines of the State Hospital, Mone and 
McCulloch disguised as nurses, stopped a motorist intending to steal his 
vehicle; they were prevented from doing so by the intervention of a 
passing police car containing two officers who were themselves attacked 
before their vehicle was stolen by the two escapees. 
 
In discussing how these patients prepared for their escape, the report 
identifies a pattern of behaviour that fits the archetypal violent 
psychopath described by Cleckley (Hare 1993): namely that they were 
utterly ruthless and self-serving, being able to deploy the mental skills of 
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calculation and problem solving in formulating a complex plan supported 
by the unreserved willingness to use extreme violence. 
 
Following these events and the publication of the associated report, the 
marginalised status of those with a diagnosis of personality disorder 
increased: the stigma associated with a diagnosis of personality disorder 
produced an increasingly exclusionary effect within Scotland in terms of 
responses from those charged with responsibility for providing mental 
health services. These exclusionary practices appear to have been 
justified by the treatability criteria incorporated within the Mental Health 
(Scotland) Act 1984 (Darjee and Crichton 2003). The treatability criteria 
came to be reinterpreted by psychiatrists within Scotland in such a way as 
to legitimise the exclusion of those with a diagnosis of personality 
disorder from services.  The disparity in the comparative and 
proportionate rates of detention of patients with a principal diagnosis of 
personality disorder in the State Hospital for example, compared with the 
English Special Hospitals, proved to be a consistent feature of medico-
legal practice for the remainder of the 20th century and was acknowledged 
by the MacLean Committee who noted that: 
 
“11.7 The special hospitals in England (broadly equivalent to the 
State Hospital in Scotland) accommodate a much higher 
proportion of patients with a primary diagnosis of personality 
disorder than does the State Hospital. This reflects both differences 
in mental health law (the Mental Health Act 1983 in England has a 
specific category of psychopathic disorder) and a different tradition 
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within the English special hospitals” (MacLean 2000) – my 
emphasis.   
 
There is reason however to believe that the MacLean Committee were 
however not entirely correct to attribute the difference in rates of 
detention to the lack of a specific category within Scots law, given that 
during the 1960s and 1970s those with a diagnosis of personality disorder 
were being admitted to and treated at the State Hospital (Darjee and 
Crichton 2003).  The more substantial reason for the difference between 
these two jurisdictions, in terms of the admission of those with a primary 
diagnosis of personality disorder to special hospitals, is therefore more 
accurately attributed to a change in clinical practice. The explicit 
treatability criterion contained within the Mental Health Act (Scotland) 
1984 appears to have come at an opportune moment within the context 
of this change in practice in Scotland (Darjee and Crichton 2003). 
 
 
Mental health legislation in the 1980s – and the continuation of 
the nominate and innominate distinction between English and 
Scottish legislation 
 
The Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 continued the established pattern 
within Scotland of including a psychopathic group implicitly, as distinct 
from English / Welsh legislation that contained an explicit psychopathic 
group in accordance with established legislative practice within that 
jurisdiction. 
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Part 1, s.1 (2) of the 1984 Act defines mental disorder as “mental illness 
however caused or manifested”, in total three categories were 
incorporated namely mental disorder, mental impairment and severe 
mental impairment. Strong similarities exist between the Scottish and the 
English / Welsh 1983 Act.  Specifically the definitions of mental 
impairment and severe mental impairment are virtually identical. 
The Mental Health Act 1983 contained a separate category concerning 
psychopathic disorder, defined as follows: 
 
“...persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including 
significant impairment of intelligence) which results in abnormally 
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the 
person concerned” Part 1, s.1 (2). 
 
Within the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, the unspecified presence of 
the psychopathic group can be clearly seen within the grounds for 
detention, together with the treatability criterion: Part 4, s.17 (1)(a)(i): 
 
“...in the case where the mental disorder from which he suffers is a 
persistent one manifested only by abnormally aggressive or 
seriously irresponsible conduct, such treatment is likely to alleviate 
or prevent a deterioration of his condition”. 
 
The same treatability criterion for this group is included in the grounds for 
detention within the Mental Health Act 1983 in Part 2 s. 3 (b): 
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“In the case of psychopathic disorder or mental impairment such 
treatment is likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of his 
condition”. 
 
The fact that the treatability criterion contained within both pieces of 
legislation is identical, lends weight to the argument that there was no 
intention by those who drafted the Scottish bill to exclude those with a 
diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder from the terms of the 
legislation within Scotland; nor is there evidence of any intention to 
exclude those with a diagnosis of any other form of personality disorder.  
This was in fact the interpretation subsequently offered by the Mental 
Welfare Commission for Scotland (Dyer 1999) following the ruling in the 
case of Reid (1998). 
 
A significant change in the legal position of those classified as falling 
within the psychopathic group can therefore be identified by comparing 
the 1960 and 1984 Acts. The 1960 Act specifically prohibited the 
admission of the unspecified psychopathic group for anyone over the age 
of 21.  This prohibition was eliminated within the 1984 Act, with the age 
restriction being replaced by an enhanced treatability criterion. Within the 
1984 Act the presence of the unspecified psychopathic group however 
continues to be clearly evident within the grounds for detention within 
s.17 (1)(a)(i). 
 
Despite the greater publicity received by the case of Noel Ruddle, the key 
precedent in determining the meaning and scope of the treatability 
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criteria within the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, was actually 
established in the case of Alexander Reid (Crichton, Darjee et al. 2001). 
In ruling in the case of Reid the House of Lords confirmed that the 1984 
Act did not permit detention without the prospect of benefit to the 
patient, also stressing that the unlabelled subcategory within Scots law 
should be regarded as coterminous with psychopathic disorder. This had 
the effect of meaning that the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 should 
be interpreted in precisely the same way as the Mental Health Act 1983, 
in respect of those falling within this diagnostic category. The House of 
Lords (1999) held that: 
 
“Section 17(1) of the Act of 1984 describes the grounds on which a 
patient may be admitted to a hospital. It says that the ground which 
must be applied, in the case where the mental disorder from which 
the patient suffers is a persistent one manifested only by 
abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct, is that 
medical treatment in a hospital is likely to alleviate or prevent a 
deterioration in his conduct. This provision gives effect to the policy 
that psychopaths should only be detained under compulsory powers 
in a hospital where there is a good prospect that the treatment 
which they will receive there will be of benefit” (my emphasis). 
 
Reid however was not released following this ruling, because the Court 
considered that he might benefit from detention within a secure setting. It 
was the subsequent release of Noel Ruddle that was to set off a train of 
events, leading the Scottish Parliament to rush through emergency 
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legislation to close what became characterised as a legal loophole; this 
will be discussed in greater detail subsequently. 
 
Other landmark events that illustrate the pervasive influence of the 
discourse of risk and dangerousness include the incident that took place 
on New Year’s Day 1993, when Ben Silcock who had been previously 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, managed to enter the lion’s den at London 
zoo. His actions only caused harm to himself and there was no evidence 
that he had been seeking to avoid treatment; on the contrary the 
evidence suggests that his efforts to access treatment had been rebutted. 
Despite these facts, the then Secretary of State for Health pronounced 
the very next day, that it was imperative for the Government to push 
ahead with implementing what were then referred to as Community 
Treatment Orders, intended to ensure that unwilling and reluctant 
patients received the treatment they required not least for the protection 
of others (Jones 1993).  
 
Subsequently in 1996 the murders of Lynn and Megan Russell by Michael 
Stone, served as a further catalyst and justification for efforts that had to 
that point been unsuccessful, to introduce legislation based on media-led 
concerns about the lack of treatment compliance among patients and the 
risk that they represented to the public (Nash 2006). These anxieties 
became inextricably bound up with the contentious concept of Dangerous 
and Severe Personality Disorder; this will be discussed in greater detail in 
the next chapter.  
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As previously indicated, 1999 proved to be a landmark year for mental 
health legislation within Scotland; in making his ruling regarding the 
application for release by Noel Ruddle, Sheriff Douglas Allan observed that 
the lack of benefit or alleviation from symptomatic deterioration, likely to 
result from his continued detention, meant that in effect his detention was 
no different from imprisonment, this being unlawful and in breach of a 
previous ruling by the European Court of Human Rights under the terms 
of terms of Article 5 sub-paragraph 1 (e) of the Convention. In delivering 
his ruling, Sheriff Douglas Allan acknowledged that whilst it was possible 
for the structured environment at the State Hospital to amount to 
treatment due to the potential benefits to some patients, in the case of 
Ruddle: 
 
“...there was no evidence of the applicant’s condition being 
alleviated or prevented from deterioration……. In this regard, his 
present detention seems no different in its effect from that which 
would result where the applicant in prison” (paragraph 10.4) 
 
As a consequence of this the Sheriff ruled: 
 
“...since the medical treatment which the applicant has received 
and is at present receiving has not alleviated or prevented and is 
not likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of his condition, he 
does not meet the “treatability test” and it is not appropriate for 
him to be liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment, 
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nor to remain liable to be recalled to hospital for further treatment” 
(paragraph 10.6).  
 
The successful appeal against his continued detention by Noel Ruddle 
appears to have caught the newly formed Scottish Parliament and its 
Executive by surprise; this despite the fact that the previous ruling in the 
case of Reid, discussed above, meant that such a outcome was only a 
matter of time (Crichton, Darjee et al. 2001).  This ruling did not so much 
act as a tipping point as an explosive trigger resulting in the enactment of 
emergency legislation in the form of the Mental Health (Public Safety and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act (1999), this being the first legislative act of the 
new parliament.  This legislation represented a sea change in favour of an 
explicit policy for mental health law based upon public protection, or 
perhaps ‘politician protection’, over and above considerations of 
treatability that had been given such importance in the drafting of 
previous legislation (Crichton, Darjee et al. 2001).   
 
The Act required the continued detention of a restricted patient in 
hospital, if it was necessary to do so in order to protect the public from 
serious harm “whether for medical treatment or not”. The legislation had 
the effect of requiring a Sheriff to refuse any appeal for discharge of a 
restricted patient in the event that there were serious concerns regarding 
public protection, whether or not the patient actually required treatment 
in hospital (Crichton 2001).  This piece of legislation was controversial, 
not least because it amended the definition of mental illness to include 
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personality disorder, thereby conflating two categories that had 
historically been regarded as fundamentally different. 
 
This legislation was represented by its advocates as closing a loophole; 
however this can be viewed somewhat ironically when it is considered 
that what became characterised as a loophole, had been incorporated 
quite deliberately within the previous legislation as a safeguard (Crichton, 
Darjee et al. 2001). This is further evidence that the discourse of 
dangerousness has come to represent a prism through which law, policy, 
practice and procedures have come to be viewed. According to the 
Scottish Executive it was clearly the intention of Parliament to incorporate 
those with a diagnosis of personality disorder within the previous 
legislative framework NHS MEL (1999)73, in much the same way as the 
corresponding English / Welsh legislation:  
 
“The Act makes clear that the term “mental disorder” in the 1984 
Act includes personality disorder” (paragraph 2). 
 
This interpretation was also supported by the Mental Welfare Commission 
for Scotland, who argued that the misconception regarding the perceived 
exclusion of personality disorder from mental health law in Scotland arose 
as a consequence of the phraseology used within the legislation: 
 
“The problem goes back to the original drafting of the 1984 Mental 
Health Act.  This made it clear that those whose mental disorder 
consisted only of a personality disorder, though that term was not 
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used in the Act, could only be detained in hospital if they were 
considered ‘treatable’ “ (Dyer 1999) paragraph 2. 
 
It is interesting to note that whereas the various reports that have been 
discussed previously referred to psychopathic personality disorder, the 
term used by the Scottish Executive and the commission is that of the 
broader term personality disorder. 
 
These statements go some way to explaining why the position adopted by 
the Dunlop Committee (1958) in rejecting the recommendations of the 
Percy Commission (1957), vis-à-vis the explicit inclusion of the category 
of personality disorder within mental health law, in favour of an unstated 
and implicit recognition ultimately proved to be unsustainable. This was 
not because the logic of the position was necessarily flawed but because 
of the political imperatives characteristic of the risk society (Beck 1992).  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The legal status of the diagnosis of personality disorder, and more 
specifically psychopathy, has proved to be historically contentious. The 
diagnosis of personality disorder has brought into focus and on occasion 
conflict, a number of powerful discourses and professional interests; most 
notably concerning medical and legal constructions of knowledge and 
territorial boundary disputes. Degenerationist-eugenic anxieties regarding 
population deterioration, and the perceived threat to the established 
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social order from an increase in the numbers of those perceived to be 
ungovernable, have proved to be historically significant factors in the 
development of mental health policy and legislation. The administrative 
imperative to maintain order and discipline within institutional settings 
gave rise to particular concerns about those within the so-called 
psychopathic group. 
 
Those who have attracted a diagnosis of psychopathy have been regarded 
to varying degrees as unknowable and perhaps unspeakable, while at the 
same time being regarded as a distinctly recognisable group perceived as 
representing a particular kind of threat, in turn requiring particular kinds 
of legal and administrative responses. These responses have been 
substantially based upon the imperatives of good administration and 
management within prison and hospital settings.  These imperatives 
contributed to policies based upon intensive supervision, segregation and 
exclusion.   
 
A tension between the jurisdictions of Scotland and England / Wales is 
evident regarding whether or not this particular group should be explicitly 
acknowledged within statute law. This tension has given rise to a complex 
interaction between the two jurisdictions, resulting in an apparent pattern 
of divergence and convergence in mental health legislation. This pattern 
emerged within the context of a general preference towards concordance 
in statute law by lawmakers throughout the United Kingdom. The 
apparent historical differences in legislation between the neighbouring 
jurisdictions of Scotland and England / Wales, based on the nominate v 
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innominate inclusion of those with a diagnosis of personality disorder 
have ultimately proved to be largely illusory.   
 
The principal difference between these two jurisdictions arises within the 
domain of practice; most notably in terms of the Scottish State Hospital 
and the English Special Hospitals.  These differences emerged in the mid-
1970s in substantial part as a reaction within Scotland to the murders 
that took place at the State Hospital at that time.  The marginalisation of 
those with a diagnosis of personality disorder from service provision 
increased due to the interpretation by clinicians of the provisions 
contained within the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984.  This resulted in 
significant differences in the proportion of those admitted to the 
respective State Hospital and Special Hospitals with a principal diagnosis 
of personality disorder. The position adopted by clinicians within the State 
Hospital from the mid-1970s onwards, is likely to have influenced practice 
more widely with Scotland due to demographic differences namely 
population size and the consequent smaller number of key personnel 
within Scotland, as compared to England / Wales.  The position adopted 
more recently concerning personality disorder by key personnel at the 
State Hospital supports this conclusion will be discussed in the following 
chapter. As discussed within the previous chapter, personality disorder 
has to different degrees operated as a diagnosis of exclusion within both 
jurisdictions and more widely.  Practice in Scotland has been influenced 
by particular historical events. The difference, at least as concerns the 
impact upon those who received a diagnosis of personality disorder during 
this period, should therefore be understood as a matter of degree within a 
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policy, practice and legal context characterised by segregation, isolation 
and exclusion (National Institute for Mental Health in England 2003). 
 
The landmark case of Noel Ruddle and the discussion surrounding the 
emergency legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament in 1999 heralded 
a change in policy and language, such that the term personality disorder 
became routinely used instead of the much narrower term psychopathy, 
or psychopathic personality disorder. This represents an apparently much 
broader and more inclusive approach towards those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder; albeit fundamentally driven by the 
administrative imperative and concerns about risk discussed above: this is 
exemplified by the decision to amend the definition of mental illness 
contained within the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 based upon the 
reframing of a safeguard as a dangerous loophole. The extent that this 
apparently more inclusive approach has been realised will be discussed 
further in the findings chapters to follow. 
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Chapter 4: 
 
The Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 and 
the Reform of Mental Health Law in Scotland 
Key debates and issues 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will offer an analysis of the key debates and issues 
underpinning the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 
2003. This will involve contextualising changes in legislation, within the 
UK and Scotland more specifically against a background of broader 
developments across a range of other jurisdictions. The process of reform 
in Scotland will be contrasted with that of England and Wales in order to 
emphasise important differences between the two jurisdictions. The work 
of the MacLean and Millan Committees will be specifically considered in 
order to examine the basis upon which mental health law in Scotland 
currently stands. 
 
 
Competing Discourses and the Origins of Current Law and Policy 
in Scotland 
 
Between 2005 and the publication of its report in 2008 the Union 
Européenne des Médecins Spécialistes (UEMS) found that out of 42 
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European states whose policies were examined, that 57% had adopted 
new mental health legislation: within a significant number of these 
jurisdictions a clear shift towards community-based care in policy and law 
was evident (Strachan 2009). 
 
In order to understand the current context in which practitioners work it 
is necessary to move beyond the historical analysis presented in the 
previous chapter, and consider more recent key developments within the 
policy and legal framework. The development of law and policy concerning 
personality disorder has been substantially influenced by three factors 
namely: the growth of a rights-based approach to mental health 
legislation, the influence of what may broadly be termed a service user 
movement and a neoliberal preoccupation with risk and governance 
(Ferguson, Barclay et al. 2003). 
 
Rights-based claims to services have their origins within service user 
advocacy movements and are also deeply embedded within international 
legal frameworks. In the case of the former, organisations such as the 
Scottish Association for Mental Health (Scottish Association for Mental 
Health 2009) established in 1923 and MIND stemming from The National 
Institute for Mental Health, established in 1946, have continued to 
emphasise the importance of the focus upon the rights and entitlements 
of service users (MIND 2011). The right and entitlement to appropriate 
mental health care is however also incorporated into a range of 
international protocols and agreements including those under the 
auspices of the World Health Organisation (1986; 2003; 2005).   
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The need to comply with human rights obligations (The British Institute of 
Human Rights 2006) has been particularly significant in debates 
concerning the reform of mental health legislation (Home Affairs 
Committee 2000) throughout the United Kingdom including Scotland. The 
Human Rights Act 2000 incorporated the European Convention on Human 
Rights into UK law. Within Scots law more specifically the Scotland Act 
(1998) explicitly incorporated the European Convention of human rights 
into Scots law as part of the devolution settlement. Debate concerning the 
nature and limits of the reform of mental health legislation has tended to 
coalesce around the following three human rights: 
 
 the right not to be tortured or treated in an inhuman (World Health 
Organisation 2003) or degrading way; 
 the right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence; and 
 the right to liberty. 
 
The process of reform in Scotland took a significantly different path from 
that of England, such that concerns regarding the potential infringement 
of human rights became far less contentious (Patrick 2006). The reform 
agenda of the UK Government was (Home Office and Dept of Health 
1999) and remains substantially driven by a preoccupation with risk and 
dangerousness (Webb 2006), reflecting a broader shift within policy in 
many of Western jurisdictions (McCallum 2001). Developments in 
Scotland do not reflect quite the same emphasis; nevertheless the 
regulatory framework that has been implemented does reflect the same 
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neoliberal preoccupation with governance and regulation, this will be 
explored within the findings chapters of this thesis. To understand the 
current legal context of the provision of mental health services in 
Scotland, it is necessary to explore the pivotal roles played by the 
MacLean and Millan Committees. 
 
 
The MacLean Committee 
 
The MacLean Committee (MacLean 2000) published its report concerning 
‘Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders’ in 2000.  The work of this 
committee proved to be decisive (Darjee and Crichton 2002) in steering 
the process of legislative reform for Scotland in a somewhat different 
direction to that favoured by the UK Government, which was consistent 
with the expansion of the carceral archipelago (Foucault 1991) that has 
become characteristic of public policy more generally (Rodger 2008).  
Reflecting however the favoured policy framework of the UK Government, 
predicated upon linking dangerous and severe personality disorder 
(DSPD) (Chiswick 1999; Farnham and James 2001), this committee was 
required within its terms of reference to give specific consideration to the 
relationship between personality disorder, risk and dangerousness. In 
effect the committee was invited to accept the rationale underpinning the 
Green Paper ‘Managing Dangerous People with Severe Personality 
Disorder’ (Home Office and Dept of Health 1999), predicated upon the 
assertion that risk and by extension dangerousness could be directly 
inferred from the diagnosis of certain disorders, specifically certain forms 
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of personality disorder. This Green Paper was published in July 1999 and 
the report of the expert committee established to review these proposals, 
the Richardson Committee, was published in November 1999. The 
Richardson Committee emphasised the need for appropriate tests such as 
that of capacity, before compulsory measures could be taken in respect of 
someone with a diagnosis of a mental disorder. This expert committee 
recommended the inclusion of personality disorder within any new 
legislation, arguing that the use of the phrase psychopathic personality 
disorder should be discontinued. This committee acknowledged that the 
inclusion of a capacity test would probably mean that many people who 
are given a diagnosis of personality disorder would be exempted from 
compulsory treatment. The UK Government emphatically rejected the 
proposals of this expert committee, not least because of the emphasis 
placed upon a capacity test and treatability criterion: the UK Government 
regarded these specific proposals to be fundamentally inconsistent with 
its policy objectives as laid out in the Green Paper ( Home Office and Dept 
of Health 1999) referred to above. Giving evidence to the Health Select 
Committee the Home Office Minister Paul Boateng emphasised that: 
 
“I think it is only fair to share with the Committee at the outset that 
the Government’s proposals on dangerous people with severe 
personality disorder are first and foremost a criminal justice 
measure and they should not be confused with the issue of mental 
health and these very important reforms” (Boateng 2000). 
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The minister clarified that mental health legislation needed to be changed, 
in part to ensure that psychiatrists were required to participate in the 
treatment of those with a diagnosis of personality disorder. The 
treatability criterion contained in the Mental Health Act 1983 was 
regarded by the Government as a major obstacle to this. In his response 
to the committee the minister also restated the Government’s 
commitment to preventative detention. 
 
The MacLean Committee considered and rejected the rationale of linking 
diagnosis with risk and dangerousness thereby providing: 
 
“...an alternative perspective on the problem of offenders with 
personality disorder to that of the Home Office and Department of 
Health for England and Wales” (Darjee and Crichton 2002:6). 
 
The committee rejected the attempt to introduce a form of preventive 
detention by further ‘medicalising risk’ stating that: 
 
“... we are not convinced that a medical protocol is the best 
mechanism for dealing with services for, and treatment of, 
offenders with personality disorders” (MacLean 2000:S 2.32) 
 
The committee instead favoured the continuation of the established 
position in Scotland, whereby those with a primary diagnosis of 
personality disorder, are not generally admitted to the State Hospital or 
other psychiatric institutions. To achieve this aim the committee 
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recommended the introduction of an Order of Lifelong Restriction to allow 
for the supervision and where necessary constraint of the freedom of an 
individual throughout the entirety of their life: 
 
“In those high-risk offenders where the mental disorder is solely 
one of personality disorder we anticipate that the sentence will 
normally be an OLR rather than a psychiatric disposal” (MacLean 
2000:S 7.4)  
 
The UK Government conceded at an early stage, that its proposals for 
preventive detention were not evidence based, claiming however that the 
situation was too dire to wait for an evidence-base to be developed ( 
Home Office and Dept of Health 1999). The MacLean Committee rejected 
this rationale, highlighting the specific lack of an evidence-base as a 
reason for not proceeding along this particular legislative pathway.  
Referring to their terms of reference the committee noted: 
 
“The remit therefore carries the implication that the presence of a 
personality disorder is a potentially important component in those 
who commit serious violent or sexual offences.  We do not think this 
implication should be over-stated.  Our approach to the problem of 
serious violent and sexual offenders has consistently been governed 
by the identification and management of the risk they present to 
society rather than by the presence or absence of any particular 
psychological or medical condition” (MacLean 2000: S 10.2). 
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The recommendations of the MacLean Committee were of particular 
significance not least because the Millan Committee that had been 
established to review the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, was required 
as part of its remit to take cognisance of any recommendations made by 
the MacLean Committee in respect of offenders with a diagnosis of 
personality disorder.  Freed from the conceptual muddle of the preventive 
detention / DSPD policy framework, the Millan Committee were able to 
make recommendations that would be out of step with the reform agenda 
of the then UK Government. The consequence was that the process of 
reform in Scotland was significantly less contentious (Darjee and Crichton 
2004), thereby enabling new legislation to be drafted and enacted 
significantly more quickly than in England and Wales (Barber, Brown et al. 
2009). 
 
 
The Millan Committee 
 
The Millan Committee was established in December 1998 by the Minister 
for Health at the Scottish Office.  The committee presented its final 
recommendations in a report published in January 2001 (Millan 2001).  
The Scottish Executive accepted the recommendations (Brankin 2004) of 
both the Millan and MacLean Committees. These recommendations were 
incorporated within the programme for Government published in January 
2001 (The Scottish Executive 2001).  In October 2001 the Scottish 
Executive published a more detailed policy statement (Department of 
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Health and Community Care 2001), providing the basis for the draft Bill 
and the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003. 
 
The Millan Committee adopted a consensual approach to the development 
of its recommendations: after an initial consultation exercise the 
committee issued a second consultation exercise inviting comment on its 
detailed recommendations.  This process meant that the committee’s final 
recommendations “reflected a broad consensus among key stakeholders” 
(Brankin 2004).  
 
The work of the Millan Committee represented the first substantive review 
of mental health legislation in Scotland since introduction of the Mental 
Health (Scotland) Act 1960. The committee adopted a principle based 
approach from the outset, arguing that any new legislation “should be 
based on principles stated on the face of the Act itself” (Millan 2001:xv). 
The committee further stated that the need for a fundamental review of 
mental health legislation in Scotland arose substantially due to the 
emphasis under the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 upon hospital 
based treatment.  The committee noted that in the period between 31st of 
March 1986 and the same period in March 2000 that the number of 
general psychiatric inpatient beds within Scotland had reduced from 
12,191 to 3,835 reflecting a general shift to a more community orientated 
approach to meeting the needs of service users.  The committee were 
therefore of the view that legislation and practice had become out of 
alignment in this crucial respect. 
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The committee acknowledged the differences between the Mental Health 
Act 1983 and the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 in terms of 
personality disorder and more specifically psychopathic personality 
disorder.  The committee noted that section 17 of the Scottish legislation 
did include psychopathic disorder by implication; whereas it was explicitly 
incorporated within the English legislation.  The committee noted that the 
position in Scots law had been amended by the Mental Health (Public 
Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999, such that personality disorder 
was explicitly brought within the definition of mental illness.  Despite 
acknowledging some advantages of reverting to the position prior to 
1999, the committee acknowledged that:  
 
“...it would not be realistic to ignore the fact that the 1999 Act has 
given new emphasis to the question of personality disorder”:44. 
 
The committee acknowledged that explicitly including personality disorder 
within mental health law in Scotland was not entirely consistent with 
practice among Scottish psychiatrists.  In an oblique reference to the UK 
Government’s proposals in respect of Dangerous and Severe Personality 
Disorder, the committee noted that:  
 
“... the problem cases in future are not, in practice, likely to be 
those with a sole diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder...” 
(Millan 2001:44) .   
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On-going differences of opinion among psychiatrists, concerning those 
with a diagnosis of antisocial / psychopathic personality disorder in 
different jurisdictions, were also noted in the literature review conducted 
as part of the work of the Millan Committee. The views of the Irish 
Division of the Royal College of Psychiatrists for example were 
highlighted, these being based upon a position opposite that of English 
law such that:  
 
“...most of those with a psychopathic personality disorder should be 
excluded (from admission to hospital settings)” (Atkinson and 
Patterson 2001:24). 
 
With specific reference to whether or not compulsory measures should be 
available for those with a diagnosis of personality disorder the committee 
observed that:  
 
“Few, if any, Scottish psychiatrists are likely to recommend 
compulsory measures in such cases” (Millan 2001:44).  
 
The committee however took the pragmatic view that personality disorder 
should not be excluded from the realm of compulsory treatment, as the 
effect of excluding the use of compulsory measures in respect of 
personality disorder, would be likely to result in excessive legal debate 
concerning whether or not any given individual should fall within the legal 
category of having a mental illness or personality disorder. The committee 
therefore favoured the inclusion of personality disorder within the sphere 
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of compulsory measures, believing that the rights of patients would be 
adequately protected by the specific tests also recommended by the 
committee concerning impaired judgement, risk and benefit from 
treatment.  
 
These tests were intended to replace the treatability test that had been 
included in the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 and Mental Health Act 
1983 to safeguard against the detention of those with a diagnosis of 
personality disorder who were not likely to benefit from treatment and to 
preclude preventive detention. As discussed in the previous chapter the 
treatability test was at the centre of legal debate in the cases of Reid and 
Ruddle - prompting the political crisis that led to the Mental Health (Public 
Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999. The committee took the view 
that the application of a treatability test to one group of patients only i.e. 
those with a diagnosis of personality disorder, could no longer be justified 
on the grounds that it was too arbitrary: instead they recommended a 
broader range of tests that should be applied in respect of mental illness, 
learning disabilities and personality disorder. This is consistent with the 
position advocated by the World Health Organisation that mental health 
legislation should not be predicated on concerns regarding dangerousness 
but rather that of:  
 
“...promoting the rights of persons with mental disorders as people 
and citizens” (World Health Organisation 2005:1). 
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In direct contradiction to the UK Government’s preference for preventive 
detention and in keeping with the guidelines provided by the World Health 
Organisation, the committee emphasised that although the so-called 
treatability test was no longer fit for purpose, that:  
 
“...the underlying aim of the test, to avoid the Act being a vehicle 
for preventive detention, is an important one”:63. 
 
The committee acknowledged the debate concerning the nature and 
status of personality disorder and took this into account in reaching a 
view about whether to recommend its explicit inclusion in mental health 
legislation.  The committee noted that while personality disorder did not 
feature significantly in Scotland, in terms of detention and the use of 
compulsory measures, that it did represent an important element of 
health care, most notably regarding the obligations of local authorities 
and the Mental Welfare Commission. The working assumption was 
therefore that those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder would 
be likely to receive services primarily on a voluntary basis as informal 
patients. 
 
In keeping with the Millan Committee the Mental Welfare Commission also 
supported the inclusion of personality disorder as part of a tripartite 
definition of mental disorder (Health Committee 2002), in the context of a 
principle- based approach intended to provide adequate safeguards 
against the improper use of mental health legislation.  
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The principles (Lyons 2008) embodied in the Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 are –  
 
any person discharging functions under the 2003 Act shall have regard to: 
 the past and present wishes and feelings of the patient 
 the views of relevant others (named person, carer, guardian or 
welfare attorney) 
 the participation of the patient 
 information and support for the patient 
 the range of options available 
 the provision of maximum benefit 
 non-discrimination 
 respect for diversity 
 minimum restriction of freedom 
 the needs of carers 
 information for carers 
 the provision of appropriate services 
 
The principles as presented within the report of the Millan Committee 
(Millan 2001) are subdivided into four categories namely Justice, 
Autonomy, Beneficence and Non-malfeasance. This explicitly follows the 
so-called four principles approach (Beauchamp and Childress 2009) that 
has become increasingly influential in the sphere of bioethics. 
There is general agreement (Patrick 2006) that the principles contained 
within the Act substantially reflect the Millan Principles. The decision by 
the Millan Committee to explicitly include the four principles of autonomy, 
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justice, beneficence and non-malfeasance was endorsed by the Union 
Européenne des Médecins Spécialistes (2008) in its report concerning the 
future of legislation in Europe in respect of compulsory treatment for 
those diagnosed with a mental disorder (Strachan 2009). 
The Millan Committee recommended that the concept of mental disorder, 
subdivided into the three categories of mental illness, learning disability 
and personality disorder should provide the overarching framework of a 
new mental health Act for Scotland. 
 
As part of the literature review underpinning this thesis, a request was 
made and granted, for access to be given to the responses to the second 
consultation exercise. An analysis of these responses was conducted 
focusing upon: 1) the specific principles recommended for inclusion within 
a new Act; 2) the proposed definition of mental disorder; 3) the specific 
inclusion of personality disorder within the definition of mental disorder: 
the analysis of these responses will now be discussed. 
 
 
Responses to the Second Consultation Exercise 
 
This analysis has particular relevance to the first research question that 
focuses upon the ways in which the inclusion of personality disorder in 
Scots law might reflect an acknowledgement of the legitimate needs and 
rights of service users.  
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Overall the responses to this consultation exercise were welcoming of the 
recommendations of the Millan Committee; this suggests that there was 
fairly widespread acknowledgement of the legitimate needs and rights of 
those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder to appropriate 
services. There were however some concerns expressed regarding the 
practicality of including the principle of reciprocity.  The Association of 
Directors of Social Work and the British Medical Association in particular 
raised concerns about this specific issue.  These concerns were also 
echoed by the Royal College of Physicians Edinburgh.  Perhaps 
surprisingly the Royal College of Psychiatrists offered no comment in 
respect of the specific principles, although they did offer favourable 
comments to the Health Committee considering the subsequent draft Bill 
(Health Committee 2002). The Greater Glasgow Health Board strongly 
welcomed the inclusion of reciprocity, whereas The Greater Glasgow 
Primary Care NHS Trust made no substantial comment.   
 
Organisations representing and advocating on behalf of service users 
generally expressed strong support for the inclusion of the principles 
including reciprocity.  The National Schizophrenia Fellowship however 
expressed some concern that the principle of reciprocity could be 
perversely used to deny service users access to services, on the grounds 
that the services available were not of a sufficiently high standard.  In 
contrast to the position adopted by the Association of Directors of Social 
Work, Renfrewshire Council very strongly supported the inclusion of the 
principle of reciprocity.  The Law Society of Scotland endorsed the 
principles and specifically welcomed the inclusion of reciprocity. 
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The use of the umbrella term ‘mental disorder’ was not endorsed as 
widely as the specific principles.  Notably the Law Society of Scotland 
argued that the term mental disorder should not feature within any new 
legislation but rather that a functional approach should be adopted.  The 
Law Society of Scotland argued in favour of a broad approach to a 
definition that would not have the effect of excluding people who might 
potentially benefit from the provisions of the Act. The British Association 
of Social Workers favoured an emphasis on capacity rather than the use 
of specific categories.  The Association of Directors of Social Work broadly 
welcomed the term mental disorder but expressed specific reservations 
concerning the explicit inclusion of learning disability and personality 
disorder as categories of mental disorder.   
 
A number of organisations representing and advocating on behalf of 
service users strongly objected to the use of the term mental disorder; 
this included ENABLE Scotland who also objected to the inclusion of 
learning disabilities as a specific category. People First argued that 
learning disability should not be included but rather that separate 
legislation should be enacted to provide for this group of service users.  
The Scottish Association for Mental Health strongly objected to the 
inclusion of the term mental disorder, arguing that it was not capable of 
proper definition, arguing instead in keeping with the Law Society for 
Scotland that the concept of capacity should provide the basis for a 
definition.  Once again, somewhat surprisingly, the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists offered no specific comment regarding how mental disorder 
should be defined and whether or not this term should be used at all; this 
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is perhaps suggestive of the recognition that the law may not be the most 
effective means of achieving real change and that attitudes, values and 
practices are perhaps ultimately more important (Pilgrim, 2012). 
 
With regard to the specific inclusion of personality disorder as a named 
subcategory of mental disorder, a broad range of views was expressed by 
respondents.  The Association of Directors of Social Work observed that 
the diagnosis of personality disorder was inherently problematic, 
expressing concern that this diagnosis was open to abuse.  This 
respondent also noted however that it was a matter of fact that those 
with personality disorder represented a very significant proportion of 
mental health service users.  Glasgow City Council argued that if 
personality disorder were to be included, that an explicit treatability test 
should be retained in keeping with the Mental Health (Scotland) 1984.  
The Greater Glasgow Health Board broadly welcomed the proposals but 
cautioned that health care agencies should not become embroiled in social 
control.  The Greater Glasgow Primary Care NHS Trust emphasised that 
those who experience difficulties associated with a diagnosis of 
personality disorder should be free to seek assistance on a voluntary 
basis, noting also that they should be liable to detention if necessary. This 
response is interesting, not least because it underscores the very 
significant difference between being granted permission to seek services, 
as distinct from having a right to services! Renfrewshire Council 
expressed the view that on balance personality disorder should be 
specifically included; concerns were however noted regarding the 
potential for a diagnosis of personality disorder to be used as an 
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illegitimate means of social control.  Organisations representing and 
advocating on behalf of service users, expressed favourable views 
concerning the inclusion of personality disorder. The response of the 
Consultation and Advocacy Promotion Service for example, welcomed the 
specific inclusion of personality disorder, based on the assumption that 
this would increase the rights of service users to receive an appropriate 
service. 
 
The contention that the Millan Committee succeeded in adopting a 
consensual process appears to be well supported by the responses to the 
consultation exercise. The Millan Committee specifically highlighted the 
change in practice within Scotland as elsewhere within the United 
Kingdom, following the NHS and Community Care Act 1990: this heralded 
a move away from institutional to community-based care towards care 
delivered in the community. As indicated previously this change in 
emphasis and practice was identified by the Millan Committee as a 
significant factor in the need for new mental health legislation. The 
importance of this trend had been noted previously by the Scottish Affairs 
Committee in two separate reports (1995; 1997). 
 
In response to the 1995 report by the Scottish Affairs Committee, the 
Scottish Office made an undertaking to develop a strategy document 
concerning the delivery of local mental health services; this resulted in 
the publication of A Framework for Mental Health Services in Scotland 
(Scottish Office and Dept of Health 1997). This important framework 
notably omitted any reference to personality disorder, instead focusing on 
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the more traditional concern for those with severe and enduring mental 
health problems by specifically referring to:  
 
“...the service needs of people with severe and/or enduring mental 
health problems, including those with dementia” (Scottish Office 
and Dept of Health 1997:para 6). 
 
 
Ruddle’s Law 
 
As noted previously the ruling in respect of Noel Ruddle in August 1999, 
triggered the emergency legislation widely referred to as Ruddle’s law, 
namely the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 
1999 enacted in September of that same year. In the period between the 
publication of the MacLean Report in June 2000 and the Millan Report in 
2001, the Scottish Executive stated its commitment to accelerate the 
implementation of the framework for mental health (Scottish Executive 
Health Dept 2000). This commitment was further restated in the 
programme for Government published by the Scottish Executive (2001). 
Later that same year the Scottish Executive published Renewing Mental 
Health Law (Dept of Health and Community Care 2001) in keeping with 
the commitment to implement reforms based on the Millan Report made 
in the programme for Government. This included a commitment to retain 
the probability of benefit as one of the criteria to be satisfied in respect of 
compulsory measures, in marked contrast to the legislation eventually 
enacted in England and Wales (Barber, Brown et al. 2009) in which the 
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notion of probability is replaced by the notion of mere intention (Mental 
Health Act 2007). Changes to mental health law in Scotland were 
underpinned by a national programme for improving mental health and 
well-being (Scottish Executive Health Dept 2003) that ran between 2001 
and 2006: this sought to  increase the profile of mental health issues, 
challenge stigma and reduce the incidence of suicide. The draft mental 
health Bill was published in 2002 and subsequently received Royal assent 
as the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003. 
 
In contrast to subsequent developments in England and Wales (M.H.A. 
2007), the Scottish legislation retains a number of key features 
incorporated within the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984. This includes 
the probability of benefit in respect of the use of compulsory treatment 
and also the retention of specific exclusionary criteria.  In keeping with 
the draft Bill for England and Wales (Dept of Health. 2002), these 
exclusionary criteria were however omitted from the draft Bill (Scottish 
Executive. 2002) for Scotland: this was in direct contrast to the stated 
intention to include them in Renewing Mental Health Law (Scottish 
Exective. 2001). These fundamentally important criteria were only 
reinserted as a result of lobbying from organisations such as the Mental 
Welfare Commission (Health Committee 2002). The Scottish draft Bill did 
however retain the principle of benefit, whereas this was omitted from the 
draft bill for England and Wales. 
 
These exclusionary criteria are intended to prevent behaviours that may 
result in social, legal and moral sanction being inappropriately defined as 
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constituting a mental disorder. The specific exclusionary criteria are those 
of: sexual orientation, sexual deviancy, transsexualism, transvestism, 
dependency on, or use of, alcohol or drugs, behaviour that causes, or is 
likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any other person and 
acting as no prudent person would act (Guthrie 2011). This contrasts with 
subsequent developments in England and Wales, where the Mental Health 
Act 2007 that replaced the Mental Health Act 1983 despite widespread 
objections, contains only one exclusionary criteria namely: dependence on 
alcohol or drugs (Barber, Brown et al. 2009). 
 
The debate concerning the merits of including personality disorder within 
mental health legislation is on-going (World Health Organisation 2005). 
Where personality disorder is incorporated within mental health legislation 
there is a particular need to ensure: “substantial legal provisions to 
prevent misuse” (World Health Organisation 2005):21. With specific 
reference to the inclusion of personality disorder in mental health 
legislation, the World Health Organisation cautions that this diagnosis has 
historically been used to control the behaviour of vulnerable groups: 
notably women who are deemed to be breaking social, cultural and 
religious mores, political dissidents and minority groups. 
 
The first research question concerns the ways in which the inclusion of 
personality disorder within mental health law in Scotland reflects an 
acknowledgement of the legitimate needs and rights of service users. This 
theme is explored most notably within chapter 3, this chapter contains an 
analysis of how this group of service users has been viewed historically, 
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thereby providing a backcloth for the analysis of contemporary policy and 
practice discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 provide an 
important part of the contextual analysis described in more detail within 
chapter 5 where methodological issues are discussed more fully.  The 
second research question concerns personality disorder within the broader 
context of neoliberal strategies of regulation and control. This question is 
explored more fully in chapter 8; however chapter 3 contains the 
historical ground work necessary to understand the contemporary context 
of regulation and control: key concepts include the administrative 
imperative and emphasis upon those who fall within this diagnostic 
category being viewed as a problem population to be managed.  The third 
research question concerns how the inclusion of personality disorder is 
perceived and responded to by front-line workers. Much of the ground 
work for the contextual analysis of the emergent empirical findings that 
address this question are set forth in the second chapter that examines 
personality disorder as a diagnosis cloaked in misunderstandings and 
embedded moral interpretations of conduct.  The fourth question concerns 
the relationship between current legislation and the availability of 
services. The background to this is covered within chapter 4, where the 
key debates and policy issues that provide the backcloth against which 
the emerging findings can be understood and analysed are mapped out. 
The fifth research question concerns the ways in which current legislation 
has influenced the ability of those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder to actually access appropriate services. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 all 
play a role in providing a contextual framework that can help to explain 
the emergent empirical findings in respect of this particular question. The 
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process of providing a contextual framework through which to understand 
and interpret the emergent findings presented in the later chapters of this 
thesis, was based upon the meticulous historical and comparative analysis 
that is presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4. This study exemplifies the 
process of theorising and contextualising data described by Layder, most 
clearly within his critique of grounded theory (Layder, 1982). This 
theoretical framework is explained more fully within chapter 5 where 
methods are specifically addressed. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The process of reform that paved the way for the Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003; can be understood as part of a broader 
shift in many jurisdictions from care and treatment for those diagnosed 
with a mental disorder being provided within institutional settings, 
towards a greater focus on care and treatment being provided in the 
community. In parallel with this there has been increasing emphasis upon 
the rights of service users as citizens  (World Health Organisation 2005).  
 
The process of reform in Scotland should be understood in the context of 
the broader reform agenda of the UK Government; this is evidenced by 
the similarities in the draft Scottish Bill with that of proposals for England 
/ Wales in respect of the exclusionary criteria. As noted above these 
exclusionary criteria for the use of compulsion were only reinstated as a 
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consequence of lobbying during the passage of the Bill through the 
Scottish Parliament. 
 
The extent that the explicit inclusion of personality disorder within the 
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 can be 
understood as a positive preference, as distinct from reflecting a range of 
political imperatives will be further explored within the findings chapters 
of this thesis. Emergency legislation in the form of the Mental Health 
(Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999 was a response to the 
successful appeal against detention by Noel Ruddle. The enactment of this 
emergency legislation was consistent with the emphasis being given to 
personality and dangerousness by the UK Government. In other respects 
however developments in Scotland have diverged significantly from those 
in England and Wales. The MacLean Committee was instrumental in 
rejecting the attempt by the UK Government ( Home Office and 
Department Of Health 1999) to conflate personality disorder, risk and 
dangerousness. The retention of the key test of benefit with a criterion of 
likelihood rather than mere intention, together with the retention of more 
specific exclusionary criteria, represent major points of departure between 
the two legislative jurisdictions.  
 
The Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003,  is 
consistent with international protocols and the principles of good practice 
advocated by the World Health Organisation (2003). The 2003 Act is 
predicated upon several fundamental assumptions including: that mental 
health legislation should be broad-based and inclusive; that a strong 
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emphasis should be maintained on the need for clear safeguards in 
respect of the use of compulsion and that services should be delivered in 
a manner that meets the needs of service users rather than institutional 
priorities. This legislation represents a point of departure from the 
position that has developed in England and Wales where there is less 
emphasis in the legislation concerning safeguards, thereby reflecting the 
policy agenda of the UK Government predicated on preventive detention ( 
Home Office and Department Of Health 1999), albeit in a more limited 
form. The Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 has 
rightly become widely regarded as: “an example of progressive, humane 
legislation” (Ward and Patrick 2007).  
 
The inclusion of the diagnosis of personality disorder within this legislation 
potentially opens a gateway for those who attract this diagnosis to seek 
access to services. The assumption contained within the report of the 
Millan Committee that those who attract this diagnosis would be likely to 
receive services on an informal / voluntary basis, however means that the 
obligation upon statutory services to become accessible to this potential 
group of service users remains less clearly defined. This might be 
considered somewhat paradoxical in that inclusion without compulsion 
may mean that access to services is far harder to achieve; whereas 
inclusion based on compulsion has been rejected for this group of service 
users on the basis that it would very largely be inappropriate and 
potentially oppressive. The extent that the presumption in favour of 
informal / voluntary treatment has impacted upon access to and the 
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provision of services will be discussed within the findings chapters that 
follow. 
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Chapter 5: 
Methodology and Theoretical Considerations 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of the theoretical 
considerations and value commitments that have underpinned and driven 
this research forward, together with the methods by which the research 
has been designed, implemented and analysis conducted. Before 
providing details of the design, implementation and analysis of my 
empirical research, consideration will first be given to two specific areas. 
The first concerns the value commitments of the researcher and an 
acknowledgement of how they have influenced the entire process from 
the literature review through to the empirical research and analysis of 
findings. The second concerns the importance of the insights provided by 
Layder (1982; 1989) regarding the relationship between social theory and 
the conduct of empirical research: the implications of these insights will 
be discussed in terms of their influence upon the design, conduct and 
analysis of the empirical research that is central to this thesis.  
 
The broad value position underpinning this research is consistent with a 
critical approach to psychiatry, rather than one of anti-psychiatry. The 
basic assumption underpinning critical psychiatry (Newness, Holmes et al. 
1999;  Thomas and Bracken 2004) is a scepticism concerning the 
predominant reliance upon biological medicine to provide an explanatory 
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framework for the relationship between mental phenomena and 
behaviour; the emphasis instead being placed upon causal explanations 
rooted in the social, economic, cultural and political spheres (Critical 
Psychiatry Network 2010).  
 
 
Personality disorder - definitions and application within this 
research 
 
The diagnostic category personality disorder represents an example of 
how processes of classification can result in potentially divergent 
approaches to understanding the same phenomena.  In accordance with 
the DSM and ICD personality disorder has come to be understood as: 
 
“...long-standing and maladaptive patterns of perceiving and 
responding to other people and to stressful circumstances (National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence 2007).  
 
The DSM and ICD: 
 
“Both require an individual to have an enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behaviour that deviates markedly from the 
expectations of their culture, is pervasive and inflexible across a 
range of situations, leads to significant distress or impairment, is 
stable and of long duration (with onset in childhood, adolescence or 
early adulthood), and cannot be explained as a manifestation or 
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consequence of other mental disorders, substance use, or organic 
brain disease, injury or dysfunction” (National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence 2007).  
 
As highlighted within the earlier literature review the concept of 
personality disorder is inherently tautological. As part of a broader 
discursive formation constituted by the psy-disciplines (Rose 1999a), the 
identification of specific patterns of perception and conduct are used to 
deduce the existence of a disorder of the personality; the disorder of the 
personality in turn is then used to: 
 
“...personify the particular forms of knowledge which the discourse 
produces” (Hall 2001:80). 
 
This self-referential process has particular implications when a diagnosis 
becomes inherently stigmatising: the diagnosis of personality disorder 
being a case in point (Ferguson, Barclay et al. 2003).  This has been 
discussed within the previous literature review in terms of a spoiled 
identity (Goffman 1963).  An alternative approach to understanding these 
patterns of behaviour that is finding increasing acceptance is that of 
trauma: from this perspective personality disorder can be thought of as 
akin to post-traumatic stress disorder (Castillo 2003). Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the increasing emphasis on social 
perspectives in mental health (Tew 2004). The notion of trauma may 
invoke a very different and potentially less stigmatising response to that 
of having a disordered and therefore ‘faulty’ personality.  Significantly a 
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trauma-based approach explicitly acknowledges the aetiology of 
personality disorder in exogenous factors i.e. external trauma, thereby 
potentially reducing the tendency to perceive the problem as endogenous, 
implying that the individual is in some sense ‘faulty’. Whatever the 
subjective reality experienced by those who may attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder, or indeed any other diagnostic label, the process of 
classification is necessarily socially constructed. As indicated in the 
quotation above from NICE, the diagnosis of personality disorder is based 
upon cultural norms: this is necessarily so because the implicit concept at 
work here is that of social functioning, this having a strongly normative 
dimension and based on cultural and historical contingencies. This is 
illustrated very well by the historical analysis of the development of 
manners and changing expectations of behaviour within social situations 
(Elias 1978).  
 
In keeping with the above, this research has not sought to establish 
whether or not personality disorder ‘exists’ in any objective sense; rather 
the starting point is the acceptance of the subjective distress and 
suffering typically experienced by those who may attract such a 
diagnosis.  Equally this research has not sought to elicit the views of 
respondents concerning how personality disorder should be understood 
ontologically; rather the focus is upon how the respondents have sought 
to engage with those who may attract such a diagnosis. This research 
incorporates an analysis of policy that follows from the views expressed 
by the research participants and the analysis of published policy and 
strategy documents.  
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Theoretical Considerations and Value Commitments 
 
The focus of this research concerns those who may attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder following the decision to include personality disorder 
within the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003. The 
purpose of this research has been to explore the nature and extent of the 
inclusion of those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder 
within current mental health law in Scotland. The process of enquiry has 
been driven by three primary areas of concern namely: the extent of 
inclusion, alternative explanations for inclusion and the potential 
consequences of inclusion for those who may attract this diagnosis. The 
research questions have been framed and reflexively reframed during the 
course of this enquiry in order to focus as clearly as possible upon this 
triad of concerns. 
 
The process of enquiry and observation can never be one that is value 
free, even if that were considered desirable (Morris 2006): it is of 
particular importance therefore that the researcher is self-aware and 
openly acknowledges the value position that underpins the process of 
inquiry.  
 
The current emphasis upon evidence-based practice can result in the 
objectification of the lives of service users, at the expense of a richer and 
deeper understanding of their lived experience. Such an approach can 
result in social work practitioners and researchers putting on “a 
metaphorical white coat” (Butler 2003:22) and paying inadequate 
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attention to the details of the context in which thoughts, behaviours and 
actions are situated. The alternative more politically engaged approach 
acknowledges that social work practice and research is a moral endeavour 
that is ultimately not conducted to generate objective truths; rather its 
purpose is to provide greater understanding of the relationship between 
seemingly individual actions and choices, within the broader social and 
political context in which they are embedded (Butler 2002). This approach 
to constructing knowledge is intended to be fundamentally emancipatory 
in its orientation. From this perspective social work practice and research 
should be:  
 
“...partisan, critical, counter-hegemenic and value driven” (Butler 
2003:22). 
 
This research is based upon a decision by the researcher to reject the 
politically neutral and amoral approach to research engendered by the 
current focus upon evidence-based practice (Butler 2003). This research 
is underpinned instead by a fundamental belief that the end goal of 
research should be primarily emancipatory (Beresford 2001), and that 
researchers should seek to promote the interests and well-being of 
service users at all times. This means that the research should seek to 
shine a light upon structures and processes that potentially disadvantage 
service users in making legitimate claims upon services. This approach 
builds upon Husband’s notion of the morally active practitioner (Husband 
1995) by extending this to the field of social work research (McLauchlin 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                149 | P a g e  
 
2009). This approach draws upon an existentialist tradition (Hugman 
2003) such that taking:  
 
“...a moral stance means to take responsibility for the Other; to act 
on the assumption that the well-being of the Other is a precious 
thing calling for my effort to preserve and enhance it, that whatever 
I do or do not do affects it... it does not depend on what the Other 
is, or does” (Bauman 1994:19). 
 
The subjective experience attested to by many service users of 
marginalisation and exclusion, has been supported by numerous 
investigations (Ferguson, Barclay et al. 2003; Castillo 2003) that have 
provided confirmation of the objective reality of this lived experience: this 
reality formed part of the fundamental rationale for the development of 
the research proposal underpinning this thesis.  
 
The analytical method employed in undertaking this research falls within 
the interpretivist paradigm. The importance of acknowledging the social 
nature of human behaviour and decision-making has long been 
acknowledged within the social sciences, one of the most notable 
examples being Weber’s employment of the concept of verstehen (Weber 
1968; Hughes 1993). Crucially from an interpretivist perspective there 
can be no process of observation and therefore research that is 
independent of theory, rather researchers whether they choose to believe 
so or not, are necessarily active participants in constructing narratives to 
describe and explain phenomena. This principle holds equally for 
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phenomena that are more obviously social typically concerning attitudes 
and behaviours, or seemingly based upon scientific laws e.g. Newtonian 
physics. This is because the knowledge base that any explanation may be 
derived from is necessarily imbued with ideas and themes that are to 
some extent socially and historically contingent (Hughes 1993). On the 
one hand this means that positivist assumptions of objectivity are illusory 
but also that the atheoretical approach advocated within certain versions 
of grounded theory is also equally unattainable (Layder 1982). The 
essential point that Layder seeks to make is that the analysis of emergent 
findings must take account of a range of evidence from other sources, so 
that the analysis is informed by an understanding of the broader social 
and political context. The contextualisation of the process of analysis is 
required if a balanced and coherent analysis of explanatory value is to be 
produced. The dynamic relationship between values, knowledge and 
power is captured well by Foucault’s notion of ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 
1980); for Foucault truth much as the individual is an effect of power:  
 
“...produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint” (Foucault 
1980:131).  
 
This process of constraint is derived from the struggle to position certain 
forms of knowledge as valid, and for individuals by virtue of their status 
e.g. doctor or lawyer to be designated as legitimate bearers of this 
knowledge. 
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This research is specifically informed by Derek Layder’s adaptive theory 
(Layder 1982; Layder 1989). While accepting the principal criticisms of 
positivism offered by proponents of grounded theory, Layder argues that 
a purely inductive method as advocated within strong versions of 
grounded theory, whereby meanings are said to effectively reveal 
themselves, is both unattainable and inherently undesirable. The 
alternative model proposed by Layder is based upon the explicit 
recognition of the necessity of prior theorisation to provide a context in 
which research can be planned, conducted and to some extent analysed. 
Crucially however the attitude of the researcher must be one in which 
prior theorisations do not have an overly privileged status; rather they 
should serve as a vehicle for helping to explore empirical data rather than 
corralling it within predefined categories.  This means that the research 
process should be reflexive and based upon an iterative process of 
constant comparison (Glaser and Strauss 1967), allowing themes to 
emerge from the data rather than being constrained as described above.  
Layder (1982) argues that this inductive process of constant comparison:  
 
“...does not automatically vitiate the use of rationalistic... forms of 
theorizing”:103. 
 
Layder instead argues that the process of constant comparison is 
positively aided by being contextualised within an acknowledged 
theoretical framework. Layder does not therefore seek to define himself in 
opposition to empiricism; rather he asserts that his position can best be 
described as post-empiricist. This approach embraces practices such as 
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purposive or theoretical sampling, in which potential research participants 
are identified by a process that involves some degree of prior 
theorisation.  
 
In keeping with grounded theoretical approaches, the adaptive model 
proposed by Layder also emphasises that the research design must to 
some extent be on-going and itself emerge as part of the process of 
inquiry and exploration.  As an alternative to ‘groundedness’, Layder 
proposes the idea of ‘substantive embeddedness’ (Layder 1982), in an 
attempt to overcome what he regards as a false opposition between 
induction and logico-deductive methods:  
 
“...embeddedness involves the possibility of using first-hand field 
research methods in conjunction with rational and discursive modes 
of theoretical knowledge”:112.  
 
The  rationale behind this attempt to bridge the gap between these 
approaches that are often positioned oppositionally is that it allows for the 
acknowledgement of the objective conditions that fundamentally shape 
the context in which the process of empirical fieldwork takes place e.g. 
power relations based on variables such as class, gender, race and so 
forth, while at the same time allowing meanings to emerge out of the 
data in a way that gives genuine expression to the views and perceptions 
of those who are the focus of the research.  
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The aspiration behind this approach is that knowledge and theory are 
produced as a result of:  
 
“...the outcome of a dialectical interplay between relatively 
autonomous and prior, theoretical knowledge about the objective 
features of social life (particularly structures of power and 
domination), and the regulatory activities of field research” (Layder 
1982:112).  
 
Layder seeks to differentiate substantive embeddedness from 
groundedness, by emphasising that the researcher should not regard the 
commonsense perceptions of research participants as privileged in a way 
that means they simply have to be accepted without further analysis. The 
limitations of an exclusive emphasis upon the empirical identification of 
the views and beliefs of research participants characteristic of early 
versions of grounded theory, has been widely acknowledged such that it 
has become commonplace to move the focus of research “beyond the 
knowing subject” (Clarke 2009:200). Layder seeks to capture the 
relationship between objective conditions / structures and subjective 
experience through the concept of “contexts of enactment” (Layder 
1982:117). In adopting this perspective Layder takes his lead from the 
dramaturgical approach previously explored by Goffman (1959) whereby 
social actors are said to relate to each other and make decisions in much 
the same way that actors perform roles on stage.  Individual 
performances are the result of both objective conditions such as how the 
performance is staged, the individual characteristics of the actors 
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including differences in role perception and the response of those who are 
observing: most notably the audience, critics and those who the 
performers may regard themselves as more directly accountable to such 
as the director.  
 
The crucial point that Layder is making here is that researchers may well 
have knowledge of contextual factors that inevitably impact upon the 
perception of research participants in ways that they may not always, and 
in some cases, almost certainly could not be aware of (Gallagher 2008). It 
should be noted that the contextualisation of perception applies to all 
research participants as well as the researcher.  The perceptions and 
decision-making processes of professionals, such as social workers, 
researchers and medics, are also susceptible to forces that shape the 
context and environment in which they work, for example the pervasive 
marketing techniques of pharmaceutical companies (Smith 2005).  
The approach underpinning substantive embeddedness is therefore one 
that emphasises the:  
 
“...interplay...between revelation and pre-givenness in the 
generation of theory” (Layder 1982:113).  
 
One of the implications of adopting this approach is that researchers must 
be aware of objective structures that are likely to have a significant 
impact upon individual perception and the attribution of meanings, 
including power differentials between different groups of professionals or 
the significance of status hierarchies within professional groupings. This 
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approach therefore emphasises the interconnections between objective 
conditions and subjective experience. Such an approach is therefore in no 
way anti-empirical; rather the fundamental assertion is that the context in 
which the process of empirical inquiry is conducted must be acknowledged 
if a thorough analysis is to be undertaken.   
 
As outlined above Layder’s characterisation of human interaction follows 
Goffman’s seminal work on how people seek to create and manage their 
identities while interacting with others (Goffman 1959). Goffman 
observed that the etymology of the word person is that of a mask and 
argued that our use of the word person represents: 
 
“...a recognition of the fact that everyone is always and 
everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a role...It is in these 
roles that we know each other; it is in these roles that we know 
ourselves” (Goffman 1959:30). 
 
This analysis of social life has particular significance for those who may 
for a variety of reasons find it more difficult to manage the dramatic 
encounters that form the basis of social interactions. Goffman 
subsequently explored this in greater detail in his analysis of the effects of 
stigma upon human identity and social interactions (Goffman 1963). 
These ideas are used within this thesis to analyse the specific problems 
faced by those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder arising 
from implicit expectations of service readiness (Vale, Watts et al. 2009) a 
concept that will be defined and explored within chapter 6.  
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Research Design, implementation,analysis and recruitment of 
participants 
 
In order to guard against the potential problem of the views of the 
researcher being superimposed upon the research process an advisory 
group was recruited.  This advisory group consisted of representatives (N 
= 4) from the statutory and voluntary sectors together with one 
representative from another HEI.  The role of the advisory group was to 
provide comment on the design of the research instruments and to 
provide additional ethical oversight.  Discussions were held with the 
regional coordinator for the National Research Ethics Service regarding 
the potential need for their approval; however this was not deemed 
necessary as the recruitment pathway for respondents did not involve any 
medical practitioners or any issues of medical confidentiality.  
 
The research instruments consisted of semi-structured interviews using 
an itemised schedule (see appendix 3). In addition to the above, ethical 
consent was sought and obtained from the larger of the two local 
authorities, the smaller local authority accepting the approval process of 
its larger neighbour. This process involved the submission for scrutiny of 
all of the research protocols and instruments. The research design and 
instruments were approved by the relevant ethics committee within the 
Department of Applied Social Science at the University of Stirling. 
Throughout the design and implementation of the research specific 
consideration was given to the ethical imperative of safeguarding the 
welfare of all potential participants. Arrangements were made to provide 
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appropriate support in the event that any participants became distressed 
as a consequence of their involvement in this research. In addition to the 
clear requirement for a general duty of care towards potential and actual 
participants in the research, more specific consideration was given to the 
importance of confidentiality. The need to safeguard the identity of 
participants was regarded as particularly important, not least due to the 
contentious nature of the diagnosis of personality disorder and issues 
relating to the provision of services for those who may attract this 
diagnosis. Given the contentious nature of this subject, by participating in 
this research all respondents were of necessity making themselves 
potentially vulnerable to criticism. The anonymity of participants was 
therefore maintained by assigning each respondent a coded number with 
their real identity being stored in an encrypted database.  A double 
consent procedure was utilised, meaning that after indicating their 
willingness to participate in the research by means of completing a 
document agreeing to an initial exploratory meeting, a further consent 
form was signed by those participants who agreed to proceed.  The 
purpose of this double consent process was to ensure that participation in 
the research was based on informed consent (Davies 2001). 
 
The approach taken to the design of the empirical research was intended 
to provide an effective means for the exploration of the five questions 
underpinning this research namely: 
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1. In what ways does the inclusion of personality disorder within 
mental health law in Scotland reflect an acknowledgement of the 
legitimate needs and rights of service users?   
2. How does the inclusion of personality disorder within mental health 
law fit into a broader range of strategies of control and regulation 
characteristic of an advanced liberal democracy?  
 
3. How has the inclusion of personality disorder influenced the way 
that those who attract this diagnosis are perceived and responded 
to by front-line workers?  
 
4. In what ways has current legislation influenced the availability of 
services for those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder? 
 
5. In what ways has current legislation influenced the ability of those 
who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder to access appropriate 
services? 
 
 
Within the context provided by the literature review and analysis of policy 
and law, semi-structured interviews were used to explore these 
questions. The role of the key informants (N = 9) was to provide a 
broader policy and strategic overview; whereas the role of the 
psychiatrists and mental health officers participating in the research was 
that of exploring the details of actual practice.  The key informants were 
selected by means of purposive sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
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Eisenhardt 2002). One example of this concerns the identification of a key 
informant within the Personality Disorder Network. Initial thematic 
analysis identified that this network was more significant than I had 
originally assumed and that one person stood out as being of particular 
significance in Scotland.  Key informants occupying positions of strategic 
importance or having specific knowledge of policy were identified and 
approached. The most crucial of the key informants included 
representatives from the Millan and MacLean Committees, I deemed it 
highly desirable to try and recruit these respondents who were in a 
position to offer authoritative comment on the proceedings of these 
committees and the recommendations that were ultimately to follow. In 
addition to this it was necessary to obtain the views of someone at the 
heart of the policy process in Government. A number of psychiatrists 
occupying positions of particular influence within the area encompassed 
by the research were identified and approached, they were selected to try 
and ensure as far as possible that the views of practice from this group of 
respondents were as relevant as possible. These psychiatrists were 
identified from publicly available documents indicating their position 
within the organisations in which they were employed. Other psychiatrists 
were approached based on information received from key informants and 
MHOs together with other psychiatrists themselves. The intention was to 
identify those psychiatrists who were in positions of greatest influence 
within the area encompassed by the study. In addition to the 7 
psychiatrists interviewed for this research an additional 3 were 
approached and from whom no response was received. The reasons for 
the lack of response from these three necessarily remain obscure; 
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however given the demands upon the time of this particular group it is 
perhaps unsurprising that not all chose to respond. This combination of 
participants allowed a thematic analysis of policy and practice to be 
conducted. All participants were offered a choice of venue for the 
interview, to ensure as far as possible that they did not feel in any way 
constrained and in recognition that they may not necessarily wish to be 
identified as participating in the research. 
 
The breakdown of participants 
 
Social workers/MHOs 20 
 
Psychiatrists 7  
 
Key informants 9  
(one key informant working for an organisation 
championing the rights of mental health service 
users was also self-identified  as a service user)  
 
N = 36 
 
 
Out of those who were interviewed of the MHOs 68% of respondents were 
female, for key informants and psychiatrists the percentages were both 
50% male-female. During the course of reflecting upon the interviews, no 
discernible differences were identified based on the gender of 
respondents. Consideration was given to collecting additional 
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demographic information regarding respondents; however this was not 
done on the basis that to produce any substantive analysis using this 
information would require significantly larger numbers of participants than 
for the purpose of the qualitative analysis at the heart of this study.  
Participants were recruited from the Greater Glasgow area.  This involved 
two adjacent local authority areas.  An invitation to participate was 
distributed electronically via e-mail to all social workers who were also 
mental health officers (MHOs) within these two areas. E-mail addresses 
for MHOs in the larger authority were made available in order to permit 
me to directly make contact with each MHO. There were 75 names on the 
list of MHOs for this larger of the two local authorities. Contact with the 
MHOs in the smaller of the two authorities was made on my behalf by a 
manager within that service; there were 15 MHOs potentially available for 
interview within this local authority. In total therefore 90 named MHOs 
were invited to participate in this research. It subsequently transpired 
that as a consequence of the database not being entirely up-to-date and a 
number of named individuals no longer being in post, together with a 
number of MHOs being unavailable due to sickness absence, that the 
actual number of MHOs available to participate in the study was lower 
than the 90 referred to above. Based on the responses received it would 
have been possible to have interviewed another 15 - 20 MHOs should that 
have proven necessary. Attempts to recruit MHOs, psychiatrists and key 
informants were discontinued when theoretical saturation had clearly 
been achieved.  
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The intention had been to recruit service users via mental health officers.  
The mental health officers participating in the research were able to 
identify a number of potential service user participants: the identities of 
these potential participants were not disclosed to the researcher without 
the prior explicit consent of the service user.  A number of service users 
agreed to allow their contact details to be passed to the researcher to 
allow further discussions to take place before any decision about their 
actual participation was reached.  For a combination of reasons no service 
users actually became available to participate in the research via this 
recruitment pathway. The reasons for this were either that of loss of 
contact with the referring agency and mental health officer or 
deterioration in the health of the service user. One service user was 
recruited as a result of their key role within a service user advocacy 
organisation.  It had been anticipated that recruiting service users would 
be quite challenging and to this end an appropriate period of time had 
been allowed; the reality of the recruitment process however turned out 
to be more problematic than originally envisaged, such that it became 
impossible to complete this within a reasonable timeframe. In an attempt 
to try and address this contact was established with a key service user- 
led organisation for those who have been given a diagnosis of personality 
disorder. Despite being a UK wide organisation however, it was found that 
this organisation did not have an active network in Scotland at that time 
and no alternative network could be identified. Consideration was given to 
developing an alternative recruitment pathway for service users based on 
information provided psychiatrists and nursing staff within community 
mental health teams: this however would have required an entirely 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                163 | P a g e  
 
separate process of ethical approval. The practical reality of the necessary 
time contraints meant that this ultimately proved to be unviable. The 
empirical findings of this research therefore substantially reflect the views 
of key informants, psychiatrists and mental health officers. Given the 
disparity in size between the larger and smaller local authority from whom 
the participants in this research were drawn, the majority of responses 
received and represented within the analysis contained in this thesis are 
from those within the larger of the two authorities. 
 
 
The design of the interview schedule 
 
The interview schedule (Appendix 3) was designed in order to provide a 
relevant and coherent framework within which interviews with 
participants could be structured. Great care was taken to ensure that 
participants would not feel required to give prescribed responses and that 
no particular responses were proscribed.  
 
To ensure that the interview schedule reflected the key themes and issues 
that emerged during the course of conducting the literature review, a 
reflective analysis was used. This process reflected a self-conscious 
decision to try and give a ‘voice’ to the respondents rather than to 
superimpose explanations and conclusions upon the data.  
 
The interview schedule went through a number of iterations in the design 
process in an attempt to ensure that proper consideration and weighting 
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was given to emergent themes and concerns. Phase 1 of this process 
involved a mapping exercise on paper and flipcharts to identify the key 
concepts, debates and issues that would need to be addressed in 
interviews with participants: these were then incorporated in a table using 
Microsoft Word entitled Themes to General Issues and Questions (see 
appendix 1). This information was drawn from an Excel spreadsheet 
created at the beginning of the research that provided a historical timeline 
based upon the following categories:  
 
 
Year Date Event Memorandum/Report Legislation Legal 
ruling 
Key 
concepts  
 
The category of key concept was of particular significance because this 
provided an opportunity to identify events, memorandums/reports, 
legislation and legal rulings that have been historically most significant in 
influencing how those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder 
are understood, classified and responded to. Under this heading the 
emergence and development of particular concepts such as moral insanity 
were also noted and tracked. Phase 2 involved operationalising these 
general themes, issues and questions into more specific questions 
relevant to each of the intended participant groups before combining 
them into one integrated interview schedule. 
 
The purpose of this process was to provide both a current and historical 
context in which to try and understand the interrelationships between 
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these pivotal concepts and debates. This process followed a similar 
pattern to that subsequently used when I adopted NVivo as a tool to 
support analysis of the interview transcripts. Having reflected upon the 
literature review and mapped out an initial overview of the themes and 
concepts that seemed to me to be of greatest significance, I then re-read 
the literature review in a self-conscious effort to try and use these themes 
and concepts as a prism through which to view the literature review itself. 
The purpose of adopting this reflexive approach was to try and gain a 
sense of whether there was a good fit between these themes and 
concepts, or whether using them as a prism created additional tensions 
and conflicts, suggesting that they provided an insufficient lens through 
which to understand the content of the literature review. When I reviewed 
my initial general themes, issues and questions and how they were 
represented in the first draft of the interview schedule, it became clear 
that there were a number of duplications and overlaps between items 
within the schedule. To address this I went through a process of 
organising the themes and concepts into broad areas and then smaller 
areas with their own internal hierarchy. After a number of iterations, as I 
continued to reread my literature review, I formed the view that the 
themes and issues that I had originally identified had become 
appropriately expressed within the interview schedule. Following this the 
interview schedule was discussed with a practising Mental Health Officer 
and members of the Advisory Group to ensure it was sufficiently clear, 
relevant and did not contain any notable omissions. 
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Throughout this research process I made specific and deliberate efforts to 
avoid premature conclusions to ensure that my understanding and 
perception should continue to be fluid, thereby ensuring that I remained 
open to new interpretations as the research progressed. 
 
 
Research Implementation 
 
Given the contentious debate that characterises the diagnosis of 
personality disorder, I anticipated that participants might have some level 
of anxiety even though they had explicitly given their consent to meet 
with me. The reality however turned out to be quite different from this. At 
the start of each interview I ensured that participants were happy to 
proceed using the venue they had previously chosen, this was just in case 
anything had changed since they had made the original decision. I then 
offered the respondents an opportunity to ask about myself and discuss 
the background to the research more generally so that they could become 
comfortable with me as an interviewer and have an opportunity to 
express any concerns or doubts that they may have. Perhaps partly 
because of my own background as a social worker and extensive 
experience of talking to people in potentially stressful situations, the 
interviews with respondents quickly assumed the form of a discussion.  
 
In accordance with the principle of constant comparison (Boeije 2002), 
the interview schedule continued to go through several more iterations 
once the formal process of interviewing participants had actually 
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commenced: this ensured that the research process remained fluid 
enough to respond to lessons learned during the conduct of each 
interview. Following each interview I carried out a reflective analysis. It 
became clear early on that certain of the items were still a little repetitive 
and certain others had less relevance than I had anticipated. An example 
of an item that did not prove to be as relevant as I had anticipated 
concerned the issue of compulsory treatment orders. Contrary to what I 
had anticipated these simply did not appear to be considered relevant by 
those respondents that I interviewed early on in the process. This led me 
to return to my literature review, as a consequence of which it became 
clear to me that in direct contrast to proposals for England and Wales, it 
had never been intended that compulsory treatment orders should have 
any great significance for those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder in Scotland. As the interviews progressed I discontinued asking 
respondents to discuss their perception of the significance of compulsory 
treatment orders, unless this emerged as of particular relevance during 
the discussion, which in fact it did not.  
 
As the interviews progressed it became evident that processes of 
bifurcation and filtration were operating that had not been fully flagged up 
during the course of my review of the literature. The significance of these 
processes will be discussed extensively within my findings chapters. In 
response to this emergent theme, I gave greater attention to trying to 
understand how the processes of bifurcation and filtration were operating 
and what implications these might have for service users. 
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The process of analysis - acknowledging emerging findings 
 
In keeping with the emphasis upon reflexivity and process of constant 
comparison, I decided to adopt NVivo in order to facilitate the process of 
analysis. I determined from the outset that the use of the software should 
be as a tool and that I would not allow myself to become preoccupied with 
the software itself and its many fascinating capabilities, lest I become 
distracted from focusing upon the information that I was trying to 
understand. I decided therefore to make use of the software to the extent 
that it was helpful, rather than being determined to make use of every 
possible function and facility available within it. 
 
Following each interview I continued the process of making notes and 
reflecting upon the extent that anything new or additional had emerged, 
or to what extent the information provided by participants reinforced the 
previous information that I had already begun to analyse. I was therefore 
able to use a ranking system to categorise each interview in terms of 
whether it offered new information or confirmed existing information. I 
used this ranking system in order to determine which interviews to have 
transcribed. Once transcribed, I made each interview a case and created 
a linked memo that I could update as the research progressed. These 
memos contained observations and comments indicating specific issues 
that should be followed up and cross referenced with comments made by 
other respondents, specific pieces of policy and so forth. These memos 
and the notes that I kept in my reflective log, proved invaluable in 
developing the nodal structure that would form the basis of my 
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developing analysis and subsequent findings. This nodal structure 
underwent a number of revisions as it became evident for example, that 
certain nodes were in effect providing a duplicate function and that other 
nodes were to be of less relevance. I ceased to conduct further enquiries 
once I concluded that the point of theoretical saturation had been reached 
(Holton 2010). I defined this as the point when the information received 
from respondents became substantially repetitive rather than yielding 
new insights.  
 
The interview transcripts were coded deductively against specific nodes 
derived directly from the items within the interview schedule, at the same 
time new nodes were identified by coding inductively upwards from the 
data. A linked memo was established to each node to allow for 
observations, thoughts, reflections and questions to be recorded. 
At regular intervals I printed out a nodal report and the precise content of 
each node was reviewed at regular intervals and cross referenced with the 
linked memos associated with each interview transcript. I asked myself 
the following questions: what function is this node actually serving, could 
this function be better served by using a different node, could this node 
be reasonably merged with any other nodes and finally is it necessary for 
this node to be subdivided into more distinct and discreet nodes?  During 
this process a number of nodes were identified as ‘overlapping’ to such an 
extent that one could be subsumed within the other: an example of this 
were the nodes ‘Diagnosis of Exclusion and Difficult to Manage and 
Problem Patients’. When I reviewed the text that had been coded in 
respect of these nodes it became clear that all of the comments that 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                170 | P a g e  
 
related to the later node had also been coded under the former. The node 
Diagnosis of Exclusion also contained additional coded text and therefore 
became the node into which Difficult to Manage and Problem Patients was 
subsumed. Certain other nodes became redundant because very little or 
any data was coded against them e.g. the initial node relating to 
compulsory treatment orders. 
 
Once the nodal structure had become stable all of the text coded at each 
node was copied and pasted into its own discreet word document. This 
allowed further consideration to be given to whether or not the text and 
the coding were sufficiently aligned or whether further nodes were 
required. This process also afforded me an opportunity to identify those 
comments from respondents that most clearly illustrated the meaning of 
the node for use in my findings chapters. 
 
I produced a summary of the most important comments within each node 
before producing an analytical summary of each node that would later 
form the material from which the findings chapters were ultimately to be 
written. An example of a selection of early analytical summaries can be 
found in appendix 4. In keeping with the position advocated by Layder 
(1982), the fieldwork aspect of the research process did not therefore 
proceed on the presumption of tabula rasa; rather it reflected the 
thematic theoretical analysis of the literature review that was in turn 
informed by the views of the participants.  
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The responses of research participants have been analysed thematically, 
utilising an iterative inductive / deductive process. The approach used 
was consistent with the model described by Silverman (2005). The 
deductive aspect of the process of analysis stems from the fact that the 
responses of participants were necessarily shaped by the thematic 
framework underpinning the semi-structured interview schedule. The 
unstructured aspect of the interview process was however intended to 
ensure that the underlying thematic structure did not constrain the 
responses of participants.  
 
To ensure that the process of analysis was robust and systematic a 
number of selected transcripts deemed to have the richest content were 
imported into Nvivo.  Once these transcripts had been imported into 
Nvivo their existing coding was reviewed and additional nodes created by 
‘coding up’ from the data (Richards 2002). The interviews that had not 
been imported into Nvivo were then listened to again to ensure that no 
substantive material had been omitted from analysis.  This process was 
itself iterative because as themes emerged, previously coded transcripts 
were re-read to take account of the emergent properties of the findings. 
An example of this concerned a number of processes of filtration that 
emerged as particularly significant because of their effect of excluding 
those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder from service 
provision. These processes of filtration will be explored in detail within the 
findings chapters.  A nodal structure was consequently developed that 
reflected the themes that emerged from this process of reflexive analysis.   
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During the coding process care was taken to avoid “destroying the 
meaning of the data through intensive coding” (Eisenhardt 2002:8). The 
process of analysis and empirical inquiry was interactive in that analysis 
was undertaken as the fieldwork was in progress.  The rationale for this 
was to ensure that the themes, issues and specific questions explored 
with participants could be modified in order to follow-up emerging themes 
and issues. This process also involved reflecting on the broader 
theoretical position underpinning the research in recognition that:  
 
“...good data analysis is never just a matter of using the right 
methods or techniques but always is based on theorizing about 
using a consistent model of social reality” (Silverman 2005:186). 
 
As indicated previously a notable example of how the process of 
theorising and analysis operated concerned the emergence of processes 
of bifurcation: it became clear that these operated on several levels, most 
notably based upon risk and whether or not interventions were on a 
voluntary or statutory basis. Once the significance of these processes had 
emerged, this issue was incorporated in subsequent interviews with 
respondents.  The significance of this point is explored within the 
subsequent findings section.   
 
Once I had a nodal structure that I felt confident provided an accurate 
reflection of the themes and issues that had emerged during the course of 
the research, I began the process of identifying how this could be used to 
provide the underlying structure for my findings chapters. The decision to 
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organise my findings according to the nodal structure reflected within the 
emergent themes and issues was in keeping with the fundamental 
approach adopted throughout this research; namely that of ensuring that 
an emphasis was given to emergence and that the voices of the 
participants would remain prominent. Based on the decision that I had 
previously made to use NVivo as a tool to the extent that it was useful, on 
this occasion I decided that the next step would be best conducted in a 
manner that allowed me to quite literally see the big picture. This is not to 
suggest that Nvivo would not be perfectly capable and appropriate for this 
purpose; however for myself at least I was aware that it was not the 
optimum tool for this purpose. Using flipcharts I began the process of 
listing my nodes and comments from memos that had been linked to 
them. Having completed this initial big picture overview, I then went back 
and reviewed the interview transcripts, to ensure that as far as possible, 
my nodal structure reflected the themes and concepts that had emerged. 
I then began to cluster my nodes into broad areas, resulting in four main 
clusters:  Cluster 01: Attitudes and Boundaries; Cluster 02: Policy and 
Strategy; Cluster 03: Resource Implications; Cluster 04: Service 
Readiness. After further reflection upon the content of cluster 01 and 
cluster 04 due to their conceptual similarity these two clusters were 
combined to form the first findings chapter. The second and third findings 
chapters are respectively derived from clusters 03 and 02. 
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Conclusion 
 
The methodology underpinning this research is rooted in a commitment to 
emancipatory values and practice with a primary ethical concern for the 
welfare of participants.  The analytical framework underpinning this thesis 
reflects the theoretical insights offered by Derek Layder in his critique of 
grounded theory and provided the rationale for the design of the research 
instruments and process of analysis leading to my findings. The items 
contained within the interview schedule arose directly from the themes 
and issues identified as of particular significance within the literature 
review. The process of analysis was conducted in such a way as to ensure 
that it was systematic, integrating emergent findings with social theoretic 
considerations and was informed by an analysis of law / policy. The 
methodological approach that underpins this thesis is intended to facilitate 
the integration of social theoretic perspectives, with the authentic voices 
of the participants based on the themes that emerged through the 
process of enquiry and analysis. 
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Chapter 6: 
Service Readiness and Exclusion - the role of Attitudes, 
Expectations and Boundaries 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The emergent themes and key findings that will be discussed within this 
chapter focus upon my third research question namely:  
‘How has the inclusion of personality disorder influenced the way that 
those who attract this diagnosis are perceived and responded to by front-
line workers’?  
This chapter of the thesis will focus upon three key findings, namely the 
importance of service readiness, the significance of tension between 
specialisation and genericism and problems arising from the interfaces 
between services.  
 
In order to facilitate an interpretation of these emergent trends the 
attitudes and expectations of several key informants involved with the 
development and implementation of policy will also be discussed. Certain 
of the issues raised here will be followed up in greater detail within 
chapter 8 in the subsequent discussion of the development of policy.  
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The first emergent theme concerns the practical effect of particular 
attitudes and expectations among service providers in maintaining 
previous patterns of exclusion. Within this chapter the ‘lack of fit’ between 
many of those seeking services and the provision of services will be 
identified and explored as a key problem for those who may attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder. The concept of service readiness will be 
used to explore processes that operate within organisations that can lead 
to those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder continuing to be 
marginalised and excluded.  
 
The issue of boundaries emerged as a significant theme based upon the 
definitions of concepts such as treatment, as well as the scope and 
flexibility of professional roles and responsibilities. Other important 
emergent themes concern the tension between specialisation and 
genericism that became evident during the course of this research, 
together with broader issues concerning how services are structured and 
organised. These themes will be explored by considering the tensions 
generated by certain developments intended to promote the greater 
integration of health and social work services. Following on from the 
analysis of changes to mental health legislation in the earlier literature 
review, the notion of symbolic legislation and the move away from a 
primarily sovereign coercive or commanding function of law, to a primarily 
regulatory function (Dean 1999) within advanced liberal democracies will 
also be noted. 
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Lifting the Veil - Service Readiness and Reluctant Engagement 
 
During the course of this research the importance of service readiness 
became increasingly apparent. The meaning of this term is somewhat 
counterintuitive and will therefore be defined before proceeding with the 
findings and discussion. The concept of service readiness was developed 
in a report published by Vale and colleagues that provided a particular 
analysis of the relationship between need and service provision (Vale, 
Watts et al. 2009). Service readiness is a concept that focuses upon the 
expectations, both stated and unstated, that service providers frequently 
have of those seeking services that act as a barrier to accessing services. 
Service readiness describes the attributes that service providers typically 
expect service users to possess as a prerequisite for accessing the 
services that they provide (see appendix 2).  
 
The importance of those who wish to actually become service users, 
demonstrating that they are able to behave in the required manner was 
echoed widely by respondents, most notably MHOs; the following 
comment sums this up this most clearly: 
 
"If somebody with a personality disorder walked into the… Area 
Team (office) and came up to the window and was acting a bit kind 
of strangely… They might actually be shown the door; or they might 
actually have the police called on them!" (R: 06 Mental Health 
Officer). 
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The expectations of service readiness are particularly pernicious because 
they operates largely at an invisible level, often greatly complicating the 
process of service users being able to successfully gain access to services. 
The concept of service readiness is of particular analytical value, because 
it helps to explain problems that have been frequently identified between 
the apparent lack of fit between services and those who require them: 
this in turn can help us to understand why unmet needs tend to become 
clustered among individuals and groups who are perceived as 
insufficiently service ready  (Vale, Watts et al. 2009). Those who are most 
likely to be given a diagnosis of personality disorder are also more likely 
to find it particularly difficult to manage their interactions with others in 
order to increase their prospects of pressing home their claims to 
services. This is not least because a core feature of routine human 
interaction involves individuals trying to present themselves as acceptable 
persons, who are abiding by social conventions, in order to elicit 
favourable responses (Miller 1995). It is inherent in any diagnosis of 
personality disorder that the service user will have become characterised 
as having difficulties of social functioning that mean they will tend to 
conform less with these expectations: 
  
“…it can be difficult to work with the person because there is a 
strong likelihood they won't engage with you…in working with PD 
it's difficult to be able to get beyond…a sense that you’re not quite 
engaging with somebody" (R 01: Mental Health Officer). 
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When considering whether to try and engage with someone with a 
diagnosis of personality disorder, an additional invisible hurdle was 
repeatedly identified by respondents based on the perceived likelihood 
that the service user would engage in the expected manner resulting in a 
question being frequently posed: 
 
"…if we were to get involved is the person able to undertake the 
tasks that they would be asked in relation to the treatment and that 
sometimes can be difficult because of the personality disorder" (R: 
27 Mental Health Officer). 
 
These apparent difficulties of engagement can be helpfully 
reconceptualised by the application of the concept of service readiness. 
The degree to which this process of reconceptualisation is however 
effective, depends substantially on a proper understanding of the concept 
itself.  Providing that this concept is properly understood however then it 
offers a progressive alternative to the concept of’ hard to reach’ groups, a 
concept that tends  to locate the reason for any real or apparent failure in 
engagement between service providers and service users with service 
users themselves (Stalker 2005; Brackertz 2007). This often involves 
service users becoming characterised as being unwilling to engage with 
services and therefore not yet ready to make use of the services that may 
be available. The notion of service readiness however locates the 
obstacles and impediments to potential service users successfully 
accessing services largely within the structure, modality and attitudes of 
those responsible for service provision. Those service users who do not 
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possess the required characteristics will tend to be classified by service 
providers as not being sufficiently service ready; consequently they are 
therefore likely to find it much harder or simply impossible to successfully 
access the services that they may require because they are in some sense 
perceived as fundamentally deceitful: 
 
“...my own experience of people (who have been given a diagnosis 
of personality disorder) is...that they have a mask and it’s quite 
difficult to get behind so you’re never absolutely sure, who the 
person is because you’re getting this kind of presentation” (R 01: 
Mental Health Officer).   
 
The notion of those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder 
wearing a mask referred to by respondent (R:01), echoes Cleckley’s 
assertion that those with so-called psychopathic personality disorder, 
masquerade as sane and reasonable by wearing a “mask of sanity” 
(Cleckley 1941). When applied more generally to those who may attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder, this pejorative characterisation creates 
the potential for the stigmatisation of this group of service users as 
inherently untrustworthy and dishonest: 
 
“...nobody else would touch them (mental health service users) 
because they’re difficult to engage with, violent, aggressive, 
whatever, and (consequently statutory services are reluctant to 
engage with them and are) just not really willing or wanting 
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anything to do with it” (R 16: Key Informant within a Voluntary 
Sector Provider). 
 
One response to this perceived lack of service readiness is that of the 
subcontracting-out by agencies within the statutory sector of this area of 
work to agencies within the voluntary sector. This process of 
subcontracting-out services and tasks was particularly evident for those 
service users who have the most complex needs, including those who 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder and are regarded as hard to 
reach or are insufficiently service ready. One of the most significant 
difficulties for service users stemming from the notion of service 
readiness, is that so many of the expectations held by service providers 
are typically unstated and may run counter to the publicly expressed 
aims, objectives and mission of those providing services, particularly 
where the stated emphasis is placed upon inclusion (Vale, Watts et al. 
2009). The additional hurdles involved in trying to navigate through a 
potential minefield of unstated assumptions and expectations, creates the 
potential  for added confusion and frustration among those who may 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder and other groups who may be 
regarded as particularly at risk of marginalisation. 
 
As discussed previously, those who are more likely to attract a diagnosis 
of personality disorder, which is itself based upon the perceived failure to 
abide by social norms and conventions, are by definition likely to find it 
more difficult to conform to the expectations created by the operation of 
professional bureaucracies, including for example keeping appointments.  
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Rather than adopting a more flexible approach to contact however, during 
the course of this research it emerged that the response in the event of a 
‘failure to attend’ is all too often one of simply sending a letter to the 
service user effectively ending contact on the basis that:  
 
“...you’ve not turned (up)” (R 01: Mental Health Officer). 
 
Bureaucratic responses such as this may serve to reinforce any sense of 
alienation and frustration that the service user may already be 
experiencing, and consequently may make their subsequent engagement 
with services more problematic. 
 
“...they (statutory agencies) don’t really want to get involved (and 
argue that) that’s your job because that’s how we commissioned 
the service”(R 16: Key Informant voluntary sector provider). 
 
The attitude of the statutory sector towards its voluntary sector partners 
would therefore appear to be somewhat like that of a dominant partner 
towards their junior counterpart in a marriage of convenience. 
 
“...people with borderline get the worst of both worlds.  Nobody else 
is really helping them but they... still get admitted really quite 
frequently but once they’re in, they’re kind of resented and not 
given the support that they need” (R 03: Psychiatrist). 
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“...whether they’re (clinicians) too busy or whether they don’t feel 
they’ve got skills or they haven’t got experience or appropriate 
things to offer, you know, I think that’s maybe why they don’t 
dedicate more time or (are) more inclusive with regards to adding 
them to their caseloads” (R 03: Psychiatrist). 
 
“(Workers)...fall off the side cause they don’t believe that there’s 
something can be done so there’s maybe one or two people end up 
still trying to keep things going.  It becomes quite impossible 
because you’ve not got the commitment of other colleagues” (R 01: 
Mental Health Officer). 
 
As can be seen from the above comments, it emerged during the course 
of this research that the continued reluctance of some clinicians to engage 
with those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder has the 
potential to result in unintended consequences; notably a form of double-
bind resulting from the continued admission of those who have been 
given this diagnosis, without them being fully accepted as legitimate 
recipients of assistance and care. The risk here is that service users who 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder come to occupy a kind of no 
man’s land characterised by ambivalence and uncertainty concerning their 
status. Several possible different explanations emerged for the apparent 
reluctance of some psychiatrists to engage with this group of service 
users including: time constraints, concerns about whether they are 
sufficiently skilled, lack of appropriate experience and uncertainty 
concerning the availability of effective interventions. The common 
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perception of the very limited benefits of efforts to assist this group 
appear to increase the rate at which professionals withdraw or disengage 
from interventions, so that workers somewhat ironically, become hard to 
reach or at least it becomes difficult to maintain their engagement. 
 
“...they’re (Workers employed within mental health crisis 
services)...all absolutely terrified and they make direct referrals to 
us saying, can you become involved” (R 10: Mental Health Officer). 
 
Referrals continue to be made to Community Mental Health Teams even 
from those working within specialist crisis services. This would appear to 
be due to anxiety experienced by workers within these specialist teams 
about working with those who may attract a diagnosis of a personality 
disorder. This results in referrals to CMHTs that are not based on any 
clearly identified role for the CMHT; rather the referral appears to be a 
mechanism whereby workers seek to manage their own anxieties. 
 
“...why can’t you (those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder) just help yourself... why can’t you just kind of do stuff for 
yourself?” (R 10: Mental Health Officer). 
 
This respondent acknowledged that in discussions with colleagues that 
frustration regarding the perceived unwillingness of some service users 
who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder to help themselves was 
often used to call into question the legitimacy of their claim upon 
services.  
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Mind the Gaps - Specialisation and Integration  
 
A tension emerged during the course of this research between the 
potential benefits of specialisation within the context of a more integrated 
approach to service provision and the practical realities experienced by 
workers themselves. 
 
“... (social workers are being) more and more segregated into 
specialist teams (creating the) potential for gaps and those folk that 
are most likely to fall into those gaps, are people with PD” (R 01: 
Mental Health Officer). 
 
“...we’re (social workers) integrating into the medical model 
ostensibly” (R 10: Mental Health Officer). 
 
The above comments from respondents (R 01 and R 10) suggest that 
social workers risk being marginalised in the on-going process of 
integrating health and social care services. The process of integrating 
‘into’ medical approaches, if unchallenged, may curtail the scope for social 
workers to effectively intervene on behalf of those who attract a diagnosis 
of personality disorder. 
 
Another respondent offered a slightly different view, being more positive 
about the opportunities that integration creates for social workers noting 
that: 
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"I think it is easier for social work, we've been reinventing ourselves 
now for… 10 years and I've done other things. There are nurses 
that get to my age and at 50 they've been doing (the same things 
for) 30 or 40 years… that's a different game" (R: 11 Mental Health 
Officer). 
 
“I am not persuaded by specialist teams because I don’t think that 
people that work in specialist teams are specialists because they 
come and go...from various teams but they give out an impression 
that they’re very specialist and it’s only us that can do that” (R 01: 
Mental Health Officer). 
 
“...for the MHO it’s become even more incredibly specialist now 
we’re losing interfaces with other specialist colleagues” (R 10: 
Mental Health Officer). 
 
"…specialisation is quite a polarising situation in my 
experience working across specialisms from my previous job 
(is) no no!" (R: 07 Mental Health Officer). 
 
“...the specialist approach is profoundly unhelpful because in a 
multi-agency kind of approach if your people are involved in that 
you want coordination and cohesion, and if you have people 
attending specialist services dotted here and there you really lose 
continuity” (R 17: Psychiatrist). 
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“...you don’t know that they’re always getting it (the promised 
package of care)” (R 01: Mental Health Officer). 
 
One response to the perceived problems of poor fit between the 
expectations and requirements of agencies i.e. requirements for service 
readiness, is that of establishing dedicated services and promoting 
specialisation among workers.  Specialisation is regarded by its advocates 
as offering a number of key benefits to service users and potentially 
service providers: these typically include enabling service users to gain 
prompt access to those who are best placed to assist them on the basis of 
their knowledge and experience.  The potential benefit for service 
providers following from the prompt matching of service users with the 
correct specialism should include increased overall efficiency.  The 
potential efficiency gain follows from timely problem identification and 
onward referral where appropriate, together with the potential benefits 
from earlier rather than belated intervention. Those however who take a 
more sceptical view of specialisation tend to emphasise the fact that 
specialisation itself typically involves narrowing referral criteria, thereby 
making it harder for service users to actually access services.  From this 
perspective then, specialisation whether by design or default can all too 
easily act as a barrier to services. The risk therefore is that one of the 
unintended consequences of specialisation is that it may tend to reinforce 
existing patterns of exclusion. This carries particular dangers for groups 
that have historically tended to have more difficulty accessing services, 
which certainly includes those service users who have attracted a 
diagnosis of personality disorder.   
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The general move within service provision towards greater service 
integration is potentially very significant for service users who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder, not least because this process of 
integration was typically characterised by respondents as largely one-
directional, raising concerns that this development can be seen in terms 
of the broader expansion of the hegemony of the medical paradigm that 
tends to give priority to service users with a diagnosis of severe and 
enduring mental illness: this will be discussed further below. 
 
The shift towards greater integration appeared to be accelerating during 
the period in which this research was conducted, as evidenced by the 
attempt by Glasgow City Council and NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde 
Health Board, to fully merge health and social work services within 
Community and Health Care Partnerships (CHCP’s).  This project 
represented a very significant extension of the Community Health 
Partnership model.  The fully integrated CHCP was subsequently 
abandoned in May 2010 (Samuel 2010); this followed from concerns 
about the open-ended nature of the financial liability that the local 
authority may incur and the reluctance of the health board to continue 
with the joint arrangement on the basis of a modified funding agreement. 
Despite these difficulties the current policy being pursued by the Scottish 
Government is based on substantially increasing the integration between 
health and social care services. This is expressed most clearly in the Adult 
Health and Social Care Integration Bill currently working its way through 
the Parliamentary process. 
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During the course of this research, as can be seen from the preceding 
comments from respondents (01; 10; and 17), a degree of scepticism 
became evident regarding one of the fundamental assumptions 
underpinning specialised teams; namely that they provide a means for 
service users to gain more ready access to relevant expert knowledge and 
experience. The reality of this may be called into question, not least 
because of the consequences of on-going processes of reorganisation, 
redeployment and organisational ‘churn’. In addition to actual expertise 
and knowledge, another critical requirement for the effective operation of 
specialist teams is that they can appropriately refer service users onto 
other specialist services; this requires the effective management of 
multiple interfaces, both within and between different departments and 
agencies.  Effective work across and between services is however 
notoriously difficult to sustain.  Specialisation was therefore seen by some 
respondents to represent a threat to the disruption of vital 
interdisciplinary connections. The potential for the loss of continuity of 
care also emerged as one possible consequence of increasing 
specialisation. 
 
Concern about the potential for service users to be “siphoned off” (R 17), 
particularly to the private sector also emerged as an issue within the 
research.  In particular concern was expressed that the promises made by 
private sector providers, regarding the quality of their services and the 
skill set of their staff, could not be taken at face value due to uncertainty 
concerning what would actually be delivered as distinct from promised. 
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This raises fundamental issues regarding not just best value but 
accountability in the broader sense.  
 
“...they’ve (the UK government) spent a huge amount of money 
and there’s all sorts of disasters going on down there (England) 
that, you know, are just bubbling to the top” (R 19: Key Informant 
and Psychiatrist). 
 
This comment by respondent (R: 19), a Key informant and member of the 
MacLean Committee, is consistent with the concerns about the conceptual 
basis for the DSPD programme articulated so clearly within the report of 
this committee. 
 
 
Specialisation - personality disorder and severe and enduring 
mental illness 
 
Any debate concerning the potential merits or shortcomings of increasing 
specialisation needs to be contextualised within a broader 
acknowledgement of the way that services have and continue to be 
configured and the implications that this has on how services are 
provided: 
 
"Personality disorder is invariably a second comorbidity diagnosis 
and the primary diagnosis whether it be bipolar or whatever it is…is 
concentrated upon" (R: 26 Mental Health Officer). 
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“PDs get used as a sort of ‘oh we’re too busy seeing people with 
schizophrenia and we can’t help you’ sort of thing... So I think the 
only real way is a dedicated sort of service” (R 03: Psychiatrist).  
 
“...they (those with a primary diagnosis of personality disorder, 
even when they may have a dual diagnosis involving a mental 
illness)...will not be deemed to meet the criteria of severe and 
enduring mental illness... more than likely they can’t access those 
teams because they would have to be deemed as having mental 
illness” (R 01: Mental Health Officer). 
 
“...they (those with a primary diagnosis of personality disorder)... 
end up not quite fitting, so the real concern is that very vulnerable 
people don’t get through the doors of (the) specialist team (R 01: 
Mental Health Officer). 
 
"(That personality disorder has been) a diagnosis of exclusion, is 
absolutely very apparent I think. It still is. I think even though it's 
included in the Act… I think it's because it doesn't fit into the 
medical model" (R: 05 Mental Health Officer). 
 
The following comment was offered by an MHO who had been in practice 
for a considerable period of time and had practised under both the two 
Acts that preceded the current legislation. This comment summarises the 
view expressed by the majority of mental health officers: 
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"What I saw was that personality disorder was used by psychiatrists 
as a get out of jail card… If someone was, for want of a better word, 
a bit of a nuisance then there was a very quick reaching for the 
personality disorder as being the main frame of reference for which 
we should approach this individual (providing a rationale for service 
disengagement) I don't detect any significant difference" (R: 30 
Mental Health Officer). 
 
From the above comments it is clear that there are fairly convincing 
arguments both for and against greater specialisation. One of the 
strongest arguments in favour of specialisation is based on the 
assumption that the traditional priorities following from the medical 
paradigm, are such that those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder are likely to continue to lose out in the competition for resources, 
in favour of those groups of service users that are more firmly established 
within its traditional areas of interest. The implication of this finding is 
that the operational framework for community mental health teams has 
not changed adequately to reflect the explicit inclusion of personality 
disorders within mental health legislation. A possible consequence of this 
lack of fit between those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder 
and the way that services are currently configured, is that those who 
attract this diagnosis are particularly at risk of on-going marginalisation 
and exclusion. 
 
“...people (workers) are sort of stuck in their ways.  So I think new 
services are probably the most realistic way of doing it but 
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obviously it’s the most expensive way of going about it.  But new 
dedicated services is the only real way to get anything done 
properly in the short-term.  I suppose if you look at the longer 
term, cultural change and that sort of thing takes, you know, 
forever” (R 03: Psychiatrist). 
 
The arguments in favour of specialisation centre around the need to 
ensure that those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder cannot 
so easily continue to be overlooked in favour of those whose problems are 
considered to fit more comfortably with the traditional expectations of 
‘diagnose and treat’. The above comment from informant (R: 03) 
indicates that one possible response to the difficulties associated with 
established custom and practice would be to develop new and specifically 
dedicated services. It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the practical 
realities of such an undertaking are all the more formidable in the current 
economic climate.  The alternative to having dedicated services is  
reliance upon cultural change; this however offers no guarantee of a short 
or even a long-term solution to the problem of service users not being 
able to access appropriate services in a timely manner. 
 
The absence of specialised services for those with personality disorders 
means that it is quite likely that they are going to continue to be 
perceived as:  
 
“...piggybacking” (onto services designed for those with) “affective 
disorders... or schizophrenic disorders” (R 03: Psychiatrist).  
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The following comment succinctly represents the view typically expressed 
by respondents concerning the focus of community mental health teams: 
 
"This is a team that deals with severe and enduring mental illness" 
(R: 11: MHO) 
 
 
 
Unintended Consequences and Professional Uncertainty  
 
“...this is the downside of The Mental Health Act, it’s like, the people 
that have (been detained) on formal legislation probably do get 
everything coordinated well because you have to, it’s just like the 
kids on the Child Protection Register, the people (who) are tiddling 
along, you know, possibly get a bit side lined” (R 10: Mental Health 
Officer and Practice Team Leader). 
 
“...with newer referrals, I think they’re (clinicians) much more 
tuned in to what kind of treatment they’re going to give from the 
outset” (R 10 Mental Health Officer and Practice Team Leader).  
 
"(For those on a statutory order people will say) Oh it's a priority 
piece of work...That's the difference with the new mental health Act. 
It means that we have to do it" 
 
"I think the psychiatrists are more structured now in their thinking 
because they know that they could eventually be working towards a 
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CTO and they know that they're going to have to sit through a 
tribunal... They know they are not going to be asked by a Sheriff… 
they're going to be asked by a psychiatrist, a fellow psychiatrist 
about what they're doing" (R: 05 Mental Health Officer). 
 
As can be seen from these comments by respondents (R: 10, 05 and 06) 
the law of unintended consequences can be seen at work in the 
bifurcation that occurs as a result of the distinction between formal and 
informal patients under the current mental health Act.  The procedural 
requirements within the Act are intended to provide greater clarity and 
safeguards in respect to the rights of formal patients, not least with 
regard to the transparency of the treatment plan that forms the basis of 
the suspension of their civil liberties. 
 
This has been described elsewhere as rather like the distinction between a 
champagne and white cider service (Atkinson, Lorgelly et al. 2007); from 
this perspective the non-detained population effectively become second-
class citizens in the clamour for scarce resources. The use of champagne 
as a metaphor is however perhaps somewhat overoptimistic! 
 
“...the anxious avoidant personality disorder won’t be thought 
about, or it will be sort of recognised but sort of in a ... mildly 
irritating way or more as a sort of therapeutic obstruction rather 
than something in and of itself that might need to be dealt with or 
helped ... I think there’s a disappointing lack of interest in other 
personality disorders” (R 17: Psychiatrist). 
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The historical antipathy felt by clinicians towards those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder is well established (Lewis and Appleby 
1988). One of the potential unintended consequences therefore of the 
highly selective inclusion of borderline personality disorder, may be that 
service users interpret this as evidence of residual ambivalence towards 
them. The above comment by respondent (R:17) provides reason to 
believe that a degree of residual ambivalence towards those who attract 
diagnoses of personality disorder is still a practical reality with real 
exclusionary consequences. 
 
“...people (who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder) are left 
to the bottom of the pile, or the other response is to kind of throw 
one hundred and one services at somebody with personality 
disorder”(R 10: MHO and Practice Team Leader). 
“It’s definitely the most least restrictive, most hands off that we can 
do with anybody with a personality disorder.  But then on the 
converse side of the coin probably, if you’ve got somebody in a 
forensic mode, you’re piling on maximum restriction because of the 
emphasis now, probably since Mr L. and Mr M. on public safety and 
lots of other cases as well” (R 10: Mental Health Officer). 
 
"(Those who have a diagnosis of personality disorder and are most 
likely to get a service) are those who hit the criminal justice 
system" (R: 28 Mental Health Officer). 
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These last comments by respondents (R: 10 and 28) shed light upon the 
distinction made in practice between those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder and who are not perceived to represent a risk to 
others, and those who attract this diagnosis and are perceived to 
represent a risk to others. 
 
"In terms of personality disorder my experience recently has been 
risk has been to the fore, and I'm concerned we actually going 
further down the English model" (R: 11 Mental Health Officer). 
 
This comment from an experienced MHO indicates that while Scotland has 
not embraced the DSPD gender being pursued by the UK Government, 
that the potential for drift towards a public protection rather than health 
driven agenda for those who may attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder remains real. 
 
These and other examples of ‘sorting’ can be understood as examples of 
the exercise of power through the application of scientific knowledge 
(Foucault 1982), such that people as subjects become turned into objects 
that can then be classified, sifted, ranked and so forth (Madigan 1992). A 
further example of this process that emerged during the course of this 
research resulting in the bifurcation, or the separating out of different 
groups of service users, is that of the distinction between forensic and 
non-forensic service users. There would appear to be a tendency by front-
line workers to adopt very contrasting positions in terms of the 
intervention / restriction of liberty continuum, depending on which side of 
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the general / forensic dividing line any given service user who has 
attracted a diagnosis of personality disorder is positioned. The above 
comments from respondent (R 10) illustrates one of the unintended 
consequences of the clear divide between formal and informal patients 
within the current mental health Act: namely that the principle of 
adopting the least restrictive approach that is embedded within the 
legislation, has been used to provide a rationale and justification to 
legitimise this process of bifurcation based on the distinction between the 
general and forensic spheres.  
 
 
Confidence, Competence and Cultural Change  
 
Uncertainty and an apparent lack of confidence among some 
psychiatrists, regarding their competence to work effectively with service 
users who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder also emerged during 
the course of this research:   
 
“...doctors just don’t know what to do, they’re not necessarily 
trained to have that skill set” (R 04: Psychiatrist). 
 
“...we needed to understand how to help...but not sort of be blinded 
by oh well I am not a DBT therapist so I don’t know what to do 
here” (R 17: Psychiatrist). 
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The emphasis often given to very specific therapeutic interventions such 
as Dialectical Behaviour Therapy, on the grounds of treatment efficacy, 
would appear to have the potential to create a degree of tension 
concerning who is qualified to work with service users who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder. These tensions are exemplified by the 
two comments above from respondents 04 and 17. Respondent 04 was 
sceptical about whether or not psychiatrists are sufficiently trained to 
work effectively with those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder, 
whereas respondent 17 felt that psychiatrists were well-placed to make 
use of the insights and techniques used within approaches such as 
dialectical behaviour therapy, without necessarily being formally trained in 
its use and application. 
 
“...psychiatrists are not comfortable dealing with stuff that clearly 
isn’t illness” (R 04: Psychiatrist). 
 
“...borderline personality disorder in particular is business for us” (R 
17: psychiatrist). 
 
These comments further illustrate the tension within psychiatry 
concerning the extent that those service users who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder should fall within the limits of the role and 
responsibilities of psychiatrists as health professionals operating within a 
medical paradigm. The debate concerning the proper extent of psychiatric 
involvement in the sphere of personality disorders can be understood in 
terms of cultural change, which by its nature is not linear and uniform but 
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contested and characterised by a degree of uncertainty.  Certain 
psychiatrists clearly hold the view that there is no question as to whether 
or not they should be working with service users who have attracted a 
diagnosis of personality disorder; this view however appears to be 
confined very largely to the more specific diagnosis of borderline 
personality disorder.  
 
“I’m not trained properly in this risk document, I am not trained 
properly in suicide prevention, you know, in comparison to their 
health colleagues” (R 10: Social Worker and Practice Team Leader).  
 
This comment from respondent (R 10) illustrates that anxiety regarding 
competence and training was however not limited to psychiatrists. This 
Mental Health Officer and practice team leader observed that social 
workers often expressed anxiety that they lacked training in comparison 
to health colleagues, particularly in the use of specific instruments and 
issues that were perceived to be especially relevant in working with those 
who have attracted a diagnosis of personality disorder.  
 
 
  
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                201 | P a g e  
 
Dissocial / antisocial personality disorder 
 
Debate concerning whether and if so how, those falling within this 
diagnostic category should be included and provided with services 
continues: 
 
“(I) don’t think there’s any reason why we shouldn’t be seeing 
antisocial personality disorder you know... obviously the percentage 
of prisoners with antisocial personality disorders is very high” (R 19: 
Psychiatrist and Key Informant). 
 
“...for people with, you know, antisocial and psychopathic PDs, then 
I think they probably don’t have a place within psychiatry, you 
know within medicine and they’re probably best dealt with legally” 
(R 02: Psychiatrist). 
 
These responses from respondents (R: 19 & 02) both of whom are 
psychiatrists, illustrates that fundamental disagreement still continues 
regarding how those who attract a diagnosis of specific categories of 
personality disorder should be responded to. The established Scottish 
position, following the tragic events at the state hospital in the mid-1970s 
discussed earlier within the literature review, is that those who have 
attracted a diagnosis of dissocial / antisocial personality disorder fall 
outwith the province of medicine and therefore psychiatry: this contrasts 
strongly with the emphasis of recent years in England shaped significantly 
by the DSPD agenda. The established position of excluding those who 
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attract a primary diagnosis of dissocial / antisocial personality disorder 
from medical facilities including the State Hospital has been reinforced: 
 
“...they (the MacLean Committee)...took the view...that if you were 
a risk to the public and you’ve got a criminal background you should 
be in prison, you shouldn’t be in hospital” (R 22: Key Informant - 
Member of the Millan Committee).  
 
“No, in fact, it doesn’t happen at all (the admission of those who 
attract a primary diagnosis of personality disorder to the state 
hospital)... We think that they are better handled within the justice 
system... The current provision isn’t adequate but the model is 
probably the right model” (R 14: Key Informant). 
 
The above comments from respondents (R: 22 and R: 14) illustrate that 
the established Scottish position, endorsed by the MacLean Committee, 
favouring a corrections rather than healthcare based response to those 
within this group continues to be reflected within the approach favoured 
by the Scottish Government. During the course of this research however 
the established position within Scottish psychiatry of not working with 
those with dissocial / antisocial Personality Disorder was contested by one 
psychiatrist (R: 19), who can be reasonably said to be in the vanguard of 
moves towards greater inclusion as advocated by organisations such as 
the forensic network (Thomson 2005; Thomson 2008). 
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The above comment from respondent (R 22) however, sums up the 
position in Scotland concerning the maintenance of the established 
position of excluding those who attract a primary diagnosis of dissocial - 
antisocial personality disorder from a medical / healthcare approach in 
favour of a corrections model. The maintenance of this position was 
endorsed by the MacLean Committee as part of its rebuttal of the DSPD 
agenda. As discussed elsewhere within this thesis the position adopted by 
the MacLean Committee was particularly important, given that the Millan 
Committee were mandated to take account of any recommendations 
made by the MacLean Committee with regard to personality disorder.  
 
 
Borderline Personality Disorder  
 
During the course of this research it emerged that the growing emphasis 
upon borderline personality disorder has increased to the point where for 
practical purposes it has become synonymous with personality disorder 
more generally: 
 
“...we’ll always get the border... whether the Act’s there or not 
because of the way they behave and the difficulties they have” (R 
02: Psychiatrist). 
 
“Personality disorder has almost become synonymous with 
borderline personality disorder (and BPD is becoming) core business 
for psychiatric services “(R 17: Psychiatrist). 
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“...there’s lots of services there for people with schizophrenia, quite 
rightly (these tend to be) vulnerable people (with) a 10% risk of 
mortality, frequent suicide (who constitute) roughly 1% of the 
general population and (we have) treatments that work, so it is 
appropriate to invest in that and support people...I think there’s a 
slow, very slow shift round to thinking, actually borderline is about 
1%, with a 10% mortality rate and... broadly speaking... a well 
established evidence for effective treatment, mainly DBT” (R 04: 
Psychiatrist). 
 
The greater acceptance of the legitimacy of providing services for those 
who have attracted a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder would in 
part appear to be based upon growing evidence of their similarity with, 
rather than difference from other groups of service users with whom 
psychiatrists routinely engage. The narrow focus upon borderline 
personality disorder is also shaped by current evidence concerning 
treatment efficacy: 
 
“(the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder)... is the only 
condition that has an evidence base for treatment” (R 19: Key 
Informant and Psychiatrist). 
 
However: 
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“...even that is a bit wobbly, but the others (specific diagnostic 
categories of personality disorder) just don’t have anything” (R 19: 
Key Informant and Psychiatrist). 
 
The process of adopting a more inclusive approach towards personality 
disorders is shaped by a number of factors, not least the availability of an 
evidence base to provide a rationale for engagement by health 
professionals.  The highly specific inclusion of the diagnosis of borderline 
personality disorder, as distinct from personality disorders more 
generally, has been justified on the basis that this specific diagnosis has a 
developing evidence base. The robustness of this evidence base was 
however seen to be open to question; however in comparison to other 
personality disorders it is significantly more developed. 
 
“...people haven’t done the kind of research that things like 
integrated care pathways and NICE guidelines... require” (R 19: Key 
Informant and Psychiatrist). 
“...they’re a group that have generated a great deal of interest 
research wise as well in contrast with some of the other personality 
disorders and so there are evidence based treatments as well, and 
because they come psychiatrist’s way and because psychiatrists... 
use drugs on them...drugs companies get very interested in 
them...” (R 17: Psychiatrist). 
 
These comments from respondents (R: 19 and R: 17) illustrate that the 
emerging evidence base that has contributed to the process of inclusion is 
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not however neutral; rather it reflects in part the interests of researchers 
and those who fund research activities. Funding for research was to some 
extent regarded as being influenced by the potential market available to 
pharmaceutical companies, who were perceived as taking an increasing 
interest in borderline personality disorder due to the potential to provide 
some means of regulating the patterns of behaviour that are generally 
associated with this form of diagnosis. At a local level at least, certain 
behaviours stereotypically associated with the diagnosis of borderline 
personality disorder, have resulted in an increased expectation that health 
services will engage with service users who attract this diagnosis.  This 
was noted by one respondent in connection with specific behaviours 
including: 
 
“...burning houses or threatening to throw themselves off the... 
Bridge” (R 17: Psychiatrist). 
 
A financial imperative for restructuring services also emerged during the 
course of this research; given the current economic climate and emphasis 
upon austerity this may well become more significant:   
 
“...we did audit people with borderline a few years ago and roughly 
a sixth of our in-patients are in because of borderline.  On average, 
they spend one year out of three, as an in-patient... So there is, if 
nothing else... a financial imperative for us to do what we can to re-
provide in-patient services in the community...” (R 04: Psychiatrist). 
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The potential to restructure services in such a way that less in-patient 
beds are required represents a significant financial incentive to reduce the 
rate of admissions.  Despite the on-going reluctance by some clinicians to 
work with those with personality disorders, in-patient beds still tend to be 
occupied to a significant extent by those with a comorbid diagnosis that 
includes borderline personality disorder.  One respondent (R: 04) put this 
as high as one in six in-patient beds.  Redesigning services so that service 
users can be better supported in the community, thereby reducing the 
need for admissions offers the potential for significant financial savings. 
Re-providing services in the community in such a way that does not lead 
to the needs of those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder being 
further marginalised, highlights the need for the agenda of inclusion to be 
embraced more widely and readily by the full range of front-line staff. 
 
 
Cultural Change 
 
A picture of a partial cultural shift towards the inclusion of those who 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder emerged during the course of 
this research; this was however tempered by a recognition that progress 
has to date been fairly limited: 
 
“I think over the years the profession has moved on a bit and I 
think is more comfortable with the nature of our involvement” (R 
17: Psychiatrist). 
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“I think that cultural change is very difficult to achieve and requires 
a lot of hard work, but once it’s happened it perpetuates itself” (R 
17: Psychiatrist). 
 
The apparently slow rate of progress towards greater inclusion was not 
however seen by this respondent to be a cause for pessimism; rather on 
the contrary it was perceived as a long-term project that would ultimately 
prove successful. This gradual attitudinal change is underpinned by the 
blunt reality of the inclusion of personality disorder explicitly within the 
Act which means that: 
 
“...it (personality disorder) must be something to do with the 
mental health services and psychiatrists have to take it on” (R 19: 
Psychiatrist and Key Informant). 
 
When a range of professionals were surveyed as part of the preparatory 
work for the establishment of the Scottish Personality Disorder Network, 
resistance to the move towards inclusion was however found to be 
strongest among psychiatrists: 
“...psychiatrists were the least positive” (R 19: Psychiatrist and Key 
Informant).  
 
Whether or not they welcome it however; the majority of psychiatrists 
would appear to be moving towards a more inclusive position such that: 
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“Even if they are reluctantly changing they are probably still 
changing” (R 17: Psychiatrist). 
 
“...people have to have eyes to see that the change is actually 
happening” (R 17: Psychiatrist). 
 
The last of the comments above illustrates that one of the most crucial 
variables that is likely to influence how far and fast the process of 
including those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder moves, will 
not so much be determined by definitions contained within legislation; but 
rather that the attitudes and disposition of clinicians towards those who 
attract this diagnosis is likely to be of central importance. The limited 
scope of the law to impact upon practice has been explored by Pilgrim 
(2012) in his discussion of the limits of legalism and will be discussed 
further later within this thesis. 
 
Proponents of inclusion based upon incremental cultural change, regarded 
this as far more significant than resources per se: 
 
“... (Inclusion is) not about lots of money, it’s about attitudes and 
culture and education and training” (R 19 Psychiatrist and Key 
Informant). 
 
“...we were invited down to the Department of Health to tell them 
how we managed to do so much (with so little)” (R 19: Psychiatrist 
and Key Informant). 
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The approach being pursued in Scotland is based on encouraging a 
change of attitude and approach amongst clinicians and the broader 
range of professionals who may be expected to work with those who 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder: this approach was contrasted 
by respondent (R: 19) with that adopted in England, the latter being 
heavily influenced by the DSPD agenda that has involved very 
considerable financial investment with disappointing results (Tyrer, 
Duggan et al. 2010). 
 
Cultural change was seen to have a wider significance beyond the specific 
inclusion of personality disorder, which was itself seen as part of a 
broader shift or realignment of the relationship between doctors and 
patients: 
 
“I think the reason it was included in the Act, was a reflection of the 
importance of ... a kind of shift in the doctor / patient relationship” 
(R 04: Psychiatrist). 
 
“I think the Act kind of marked that trend, which has continued to 
change.  The change we might have seen since the Act came in and 
now, I don’t think... I wouldn’t say is really the Act” (R 04: 
Psychiatrist). 
 
The process of inclusion can therefore be seen as encompassing the Act, 
rather than having a more direct relationship to it. The psychiatrist who 
offered this fairly positive view of the broader context in which any move 
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towards inclusion is taking place, also conceded that the change was to 
date very limited in scope, being confined almost exclusively to Borderline 
Personality Disorder: 
 
“(for) other forms of PD, particularly the Dissocial PD... I don’t think 
practice has particularly changed but I think there is a... significant 
shift in the way people think about Borderline PD and that probably 
predated the Act (R 04: Psychiatry). 
 
One psychiatrist who may be said to be championing the move towards 
the broader inclusion of those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder, also expressed the view that positive changes were not 
particularly related to the Act itself; rather the changes that have taken 
place so far have: 
 
“...happened independently of legislation...the legislation is 
irrelevant to these issues” (R 19: Psychiatrist and Key Informant). 
 
“...it (the explicit inclusion of personality disorder within mental 
health legislation) hasn’t made any difference...to be honest” (R 03: 
Psychiatrist). 
 
"No (the explicit inclusion of personality disorder within mental 
health legislation) it doesn't make any difference to have it included 
in the Act (R: 27 Mental Health Officer). 
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"It hasn't changed, it is still seen by clinicians as not being a mental 
disorder despite the fact that it is included in the legislation" (R: 28 
Mental Health Officer). 
 
The process of inclusion was however perceived by one psychiatrist as 
dependent upon a change not so much in attitude among psychiatrists; 
rather the crucial change was on the part of the public because 
psychiatrists felt the need: 
 
“...to be given permission to become involved (in order to avoid the 
accusation that they were acting as) social police (by) medicalising 
everyday life and... being society’s policeman” (R 04). 
 
“The key change on the Ward where staff start to get it about 
someone with very difficult behaviour who’s got PD is when they 
see the person, I am sounding similar to the sort of See Me ad but 
when it clicks with them, that the reason they’re doing this 
behaviour isn’t because they’re a nasty piece of work who’s at it, 
but because they were so badly damaged during their upbringing 
that they don’t know any other way to behave or can’t respond 
differently” (R 04: Psychiatrist). 
 
This optimistic view was uncharacteristic of comments offered by 
respondents in general, and can be contrasted with a view more typically 
expressed that once admitted those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder are likely to be viewed with a certain degree of ambivalence or 
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possibly even hostility. This was exemplified by one MHO who described 
their experience of working with a particularly service user: 
 
"Due to the management difficulties that this young man 
represents, I get the distinct impression that he will be discharged 
as soon as possible (because) supporting him is such a 
management problem, so we still have revolving door patients" (R: 
26 Mental Health Officer). 
 
As discussed previously, a significant number of people who are admitted 
into psychiatric care are likely to meet the diagnostic criteria for a 
personality disorder; the approach adopted by Ward staff is therefore of 
particular importance in shaping how those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder actually experience services: 
 
“...treatment, even though you’ve got a broader definition under 
the Mental Health Act, still means very specific things to them (and 
psychiatrists) may choose to ignore it “ (R 10: Mental Health 
Officer). 
 
“...our job really (is) to look at medication” (R 02: Psychiatrist). 
 
"Treatment is very focused upon medication" (R: 28 Mental Health 
Officer). 
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A sense of frustration was expressed widely by MHO respondents at the 
reluctance to make use of a more expansive definition of treatment 
contained within current legislation. The following comment articulates 
this most clearly: 
 
"Health tends to be very prescriptive as to what fits into that small 
box (what is treatable), and it's a very small box" (R: 27 Mental 
Health Officer. 
 
The traditional parameters of the medical paradigm create a degree of 
tension in terms of how the Act is interpreted.  The Act contains an 
expanded definition of treatment that is intended to provide greater 
flexibility to clinicians; however the professional discretion available to 
clinicians and psychiatrists more specifically, means that those who wish 
to adhere to a more traditional interpretation of treatment are likely to be 
able to do so. Psychiatrists wishing to work in accordance with a more 
traditional interpretation of treatment, and by extension treatability, may 
be inclined to justify this by defining their role in terms of prescribing 
rather than taking a broader view. 
 
“...because people with PDs tend to present out of hours, you’re 
more likely to see them (as a junior Dr) than when you’re a 
consultant” (R 02: Psychiatrist). 
 
This comment concerning service users presenting out of hours provides 
further evidence of the structural difficulties that emerged during this 
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research; these difficulties relate more broadly to the notion of service 
readiness.  The specific issue being highlighted here is that the availability 
of those with the greatest degree of experience and expertise, are often 
least available when those who are likely to attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder are most likely to present seeking assistance. 
 
“...still in lots of parts of the country (problematic harmful 
behaviours are still not always) ascribed to borderline personality 
disorder, partly because it was felt exclusive as a pejorative term” 
(R 03: Psychiatrist). 
 
“...my practice has changed and I haven’t found anybody who 
hasn’t welcomed the diagnosis, you know, where it is appropriate 
and where it’s done in the proper way.  Actually everybody we’ve 
discussed this with has found it helpful to be able to put a term 
around this particularly when you... have... a context that lets them 
access help” (R 04: Psychiatrist). 
 
This view was echoed by a number of MHO's, the following observation is 
typical: 
 
“It's good that people are upfront, more upfront about the 
diagnosis. Prior to the new Act, it was often written in people's 
notes and not discussed with them…it was kind of undercover. Now 
I think… It is much more transparent but I think there is still the 
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difficulty with people getting diagnosed…psychiatrists are reluctant 
to diagnose a personality disorder" (R: 05 Mental Health Officer). 
 
Perhaps somewhat ironically given the acknowledged tendency for a 
diagnosis of personality disorder to act as a barrier to accessing services, 
it emerged during the course of this research that a reluctance to offer 
this diagnosis may itself hinder efforts by those who view this diagnosis 
positively as a gateway to greater service provision. Where practice has 
changed, resulting in a greater willingness to make and share this 
diagnosis with service users, this would appear to have been broadly 
welcomed. An important caveat within the last comment from respondent 
(R: 04) concerns the importance of making sure that once such a 
diagnosis is given that resources and sources of support are actually 
available. Offering a diagnosis of personality disorder without being able 
to also offer service responses that are considered meaningful and 
relevant, both to the clinician and service user, creates the risk of further 
alienating service users and adding to their distress. This acknowledges 
that being given a diagnosis of personality disorder is in itself a very 
significant life event for many service uses. In essence this argument 
extends the principle of reciprocity so that it precedes the point at which 
any formal intervention may commence. This has parallels with the 
debate that emerged following the introduction of the NHS and 
Community Care Act 1990, which increased the expectations of service 
users by placing a greater focus upon the assessment of their needs but 
was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in resources (Postle 
2002). 
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The Tension between Rights and Resources  
 
During the course of this research it emerged that concerns about the 
dangers of raising expectations to unrealistic levels impacted upon the 
work of the Millan Committee and further illustrates the limits of legalism. 
 
“...we had to be aware of what was available or what was likely to 
be available... I think we were rather cautious about saying that 
any member of the population or any patient or any prisoner... 
should have a right to a mental health assessment.  Who’s going to 
do it?  (R 22: Key Informant and Member of the Millan Committee). 
 
“...we did make the point... that you could do anything you like with 
the legislation but it was the follow-up that mattered, and the vast 
number of people with mental health problems were not really 
interested in what was in the Act but they were interested in the 
services” (R 22: Key Informant and Member of the Millan 
Committee). 
 
“...it’s a question of services rather than the law and therefore it 
becomes a question of resources and it becomes a question of all 
the other things that are competing all the time for expenditure” (R 
22: Key Informant and Member of the Millan Committee). 
 
The distinction between the law, and the resources and services that are 
actually provided was acknowledged as particularly significant by the 
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above respondent. This echoes previous observations identified among 
others by Postle (2002), concerning the ambiguities and tensions that 
often characterised the gap between the policy / legal framework and the 
reality of service provision as experienced by front-line workers. The last 
comment above from respondent (R 22) is consistent with the 
observation that within advanced liberal democracies legislation has 
increasingly come to fulfil a symbolic role (Fieschi 2006) intended to apply 
a degree of moral force, rather than providing a clearly mandated 
command function. This development within the function of law in 
advanced liberal democracies was explored by Foucault (Dean 1999) in 
his exploration of the transition from a primary reliance upon sovereign 
power to the process of normalisation as a means for regulating conduct. 
From this perspective legislation comes to serve a communicative 
function, intended to reinforce particular expectations in terms of 
attitudes and conduct. According to Foucault, among others , social 
workers and psychiatrists occupy key roles within the juridical institutions 
that “act as coordinating points for normalizing powers and governmental 
regulations” (Dean 1999:145). Building on the work of Claus Offe, Pilgrim 
(2012) has highlighted the role of the welfare system and those working 
within it as that of trying to mitigate the pathogenic consequences of the 
current organisation of industrial societies. The implications of this line 
analysis will be discussed further within chapter 8. 
 
“Everything’s a battle trying to get a service for somebody with 
personality disorder” (R 10: Mental Health Officer and Practice 
Team Leader). 
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“...if you ask lots of psychiatrists, they’ll say no, I don’t treat 
borderline PD or we don’t take in people with BPD” (R 04: 
Psychiatrist). 
 
"I think we could do with some clarity to do with what we mean by 
personality disorder… That lack of clarity still leaves a loophole for 
clinicians to say that with personality disorder is not really anything 
treatable that I can offer so therefore there is not really a role for us 
as a team" (R: 27 Mental Health Officer). 
 
“...our particular battle with housing is legendary” (R 09: Mental 
Health Officer). 
 
"Everybody's reluctant to take responsibility (for those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder) (R: 05 Mental Health Officer) 
 
Despite some evidence of an increasing emphasis in practice upon 
inclusion for those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder, social 
workers continue to encounter fairly entrenched attitudes that extend well 
beyond those professionals with direct responsibility for working with 
those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder. 
 
“I have fought for about 12 months to get a psychiatrist to review 
him, just to review the medication and I’ve come up against, we 
don’t want to break the routine” (R 10: Mental Health Officer). 
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The emphasis upon consistency and maintaining very clear boundaries 
when working with service users who have attracted a diagnosis of 
personality disorder is well documented (Alwin, Blackburn et al. 2006); it 
would appear however that at least on occasion, this emphasis on 
maintaining stability itself can lead to tensions concerning how the needs 
of service users can be most appropriately addressed. 
 
“...even though I suppose as an MHO, we are supposed to be 
involved in the treatment plan, I have not been really involved 
because they tend to arrive in the mail” (R 01: Mental Health 
Officer). 
 
A broader tension emerged during the course of this research concerning 
the relationship between MHOs and psychiatrists; this centres upon the 
role and expectations of MHOs vis-a-vis their involvement and 
participation in the treatment planning process. MHOs still felt that their 
role was often perceived by psychiatrists as continuing to be one of 
getting on with the work that no one else wanted to do, hence they were 
often left to: 
 
“...pick up the chaos” (R 10). 
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The Twilight zone  
 
During the course of this research it became evident that service users 
who have been given a diagnosis of personality disorder, or who are 
perceived to have personality traits that are consistent with this diagnosis 
are all too often regarded as unwelcome by those responsible for 
providing services. 
 
“...there’s a lot of controversy about this diagnosis (personality 
disorder) and we often find that within the Team (CMHT), anyone 
who’s got a diagnosis of personality disorder is kind of, eventually, 
filtered out” (R 10: MHO and Practice Team Leader). 
“...we get a lot of people referred to the Community Mental Health 
Team. They will get an initial assessment, and, you know, the term 
is kind of bandied a lot about that nurses or social workers or the 
psychiatrist will say, oh we’ve assessed this person and we think 
there’s personality features or there’s borderline personality traits, 
and that sort of strengthens the argument not to bring them into 
the teams” (R 10: MHO and Practice Team Leader). 
 
“...it (a diagnosis of personality disorder) does prevent...access to 
care sometimes...because if you hear somebody you know that has 
a comorbidity or personality disorder, you know they’re going to be 
more difficult to treat” (R 02 Psychiatrist). 
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"There is still that view that personality disorder just takes so much 
time and what you do doesn't make any difference" (R: 27 Mental 
Health Officer). 
 
“...what happens is that they’re then pushed out of the Team and 
they’re not really pushed anywhere...there’s a general perception 
of, this isn’t somebody that belongs anywhere” (R 10: MHO and 
Practice Team Leader). 
 
"Because (their behaviours) are related to their personality 
disorder…I've seen paperwork where people have sat down and said 
this compulsory treatment order is not working (because) it is not 
touching this part of the person (i.e. the underlying personality 
disorder that has been diagnosed) and so therefore they allow it 
(the CTO) to lapse” (R: 26 Mental Health Officer). 
 
A Twilight zone is defined as “a situation or conceptual area that is 
characterized by being undefined, intermediate, or mysterious” (O.E.D.). 
The response to those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder 
discussed above, suggests that those who attract this diagnosis are 
vulnerable to being denied access to services on the basis that in some 
sense they do not have a legitimate claim to them. The consequence 
however is that they can then be left in an ill-defined area without 
alternative sources of assistance being put in place. It is therefore 
reasonable to characterise this position as somewhat like a Twilight zone 
characterised by ambiguity and uncertainty. This ambiguity and 
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uncertainty is likely to increase any sense of alienation, frustration fear 
and anxiety experienced by service users who find themselves in this very 
precarious position of not belonging anywhere. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The concept of personality disorder continues to invoke strong feelings, 
beliefs and attitudes among those who work with this group of service 
users.  The field of personality disorder remains characterised by 
contested meanings, expectations and boundaries. 
 
During the course of this research differing views emerged concerning 
how a more inclusive agenda for those who attract this form of diagnosis 
might be implemented. The clearest dividing line between proponents of 
greater inclusion was based on sharply contrasting views of the potential 
merits of developing more specialised services, or trying to re-orientate 
generic services to be more accepting of those who may attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder. The emergent theme that arguably has 
the greatest significance for those who may attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder concerns the distinction made in practice between 
borderline personality disorder and other forms of personality disorders. 
This distinction comes most clearly into focus with regard to the 
diagnoses of borderline personality disorder and dissocial personality 
disorder. In particular the very selective inclusion of the diagnosis of 
borderline personality disorder and de facto exclusion of those who may 
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attract a diagnosis of other forms of personality disorder. This process of 
bifurcation is likely to reinforce the suspicion and hostility that service 
users who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder have all too often 
encountered (Ferguson, Barclay et al. 2003). Further dividing lines were 
evident in terms of the potential for unintended consequences based upon 
the distinction between forensic and non-forensic service users and formal 
and informal service users.  
 
The perception of those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder as 
wearing a veil or mask, is likely to act as a barrier to accessing services 
as they are more likely to regarded as not sufficiently service ready: the 
practice of terminating contact following the ‘failure’ to keep 
appointments is an example of the lack of fit between the expectations of 
those providing services and the capacity of those seeking or needing 
them to act in the required manner. The subcontracting out of services by 
the statutory to the voluntary sector has been used in part to allow 
statutory services to distance themselves from those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder. Service users who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder continue to be admitted to inpatient care; however 
once admitted they may well experience a degree of hostility and 
resentment because of the perceptions of staff that there is lack of fit 
between their needs and those who fall more squarely within the 
diagnostic and treatment framework of the medical paradigm.  
 
The on-going degree of ambiguity concerning the status of those who 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder and ambivalent responses to 
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them, mean that service users who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder may continue to occupy a space within the sphere of service 
provision somewhat like a twilight world of half recognition and 
acknowledgement. The reluctance of some professionals to engage with, 
and tendency to disengage from working collaboratively with other 
professionals in respect of those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder, emerged as an on-going issue for front-line workers during the 
course of this research.  
 
Increasing moves towards specialisation create the possibility of further 
unintended consequences, due to the disruptive effects of specialisation 
upon maintaining effective service interfaces: any loss in the effectiveness 
of these interfaces is likely to mean that those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder are particularly vulnerable to falling through the gaps 
between specialisms and boundaries between services. If they are to be 
successful, nascent efforts to re-provide services for those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder in the community, will require a broad 
range of support from those professionals involved and those responsible 
for planning and resourcing community-based services. Changes in the 
responses by front-line workers towards those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder, and changes in the manner in which services are 
provided appear to be quite limited.  
 
Changes in attitudes and practices, where they are evident, appear to be 
developing independently of the decision to retain personality disorder 
within mental health legislation in the Mental Health (Care and 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                226 | P a g e  
 
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 following its explicit inclusion by means 
of the emergency legislation of 1999. The implication is that to some 
extent at least, the explicit retention of personality disorder within the 
2003 Act can be regarded as more symbolic than intended to drive 
forward actual changes in how the needs of those who attract a diagnosis 
of personality disorder are understood and addressed. A tension emerged 
in the course of this research between a reluctance by psychiatrists on the 
one hand to make a diagnosis of personality disorder, on the grounds that 
this may hinder service users from gaining access to services, contrasted 
with a change in practice by some based on a greater willingness to be 
open with service users when making this diagnosis. The important 
caveat being that a shift in practice based upon a greater willingness to 
be open about diagnosis needs to be accompanied by an appropriate 
follow-up response, so that the needs of service users can be 
appropriately acknowledged and addressed. During the course of this 
research, on-going tensions were evident concerning whether or not those 
who attract a diagnosis of dissocial / antisocial personality disorder should 
be brought within the sphere of healthcare, or continue to be dealt with 
outwith this sphere within criminal justice settings in accordance with a 
corrections model. 
 
During the course of this research it became clear that attitudes towards 
those who attract this form of diagnosis continue to be contested, with 
evidence of a desire by some to adhere to a traditional position, based on 
a fairly narrow interpretation of treatment and of their role as primarily 
that of prescribing medication, contrasted with those who were more 
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willing to accept the more sweeping definition of treatment contained 
within this legislation. Where attitudes have however changed in favour of 
a more inclusive approach, this almost exclusively concerns borderline 
personality disorder: while this is likely to be welcomed by some this 
particular emphasis may have the effect of reinforcing the de facto 
exclusion of those who attract a diagnosis of any other form of personality 
disorder. Service responses to those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder do not appear to have substantially changed; 
however this may be partly explained by the absence of services that can 
be readily utilised by those who attract this diagnosis and made use of by 
those who would wish to make referrals to them.  
 
The availability and access to services does not appear to have 
significantly changed either as a consequence of this legislation or as yet 
more broadly because of cultural and attitudinal changes among front-line 
workers. As noted by respondent (R: 22), it is not changes to the law that 
are ultimately important; rather it is the actual availability of resources 
and services.  
 
The decision to maintain the inclusion of personality disorder within 
mental health legislation in Scotland as expressed within the Mental 
Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, serves more of a 
symbolic function than operating as a direct driver for changes in working 
practices. It is likely that for the foreseeable future those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder will continue to find accessing 
appropriate services very problematic: those seeking to provide services 
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for those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder are likely to 
experience their endeavours as an on-going battle in the competition for 
resources. Service users who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder 
continue to be caught in a web of contested meanings and competing 
imperatives.  
 
The emergent themes that have been explored within this chapter are 
underpinned by dividing lines that have the clear potential to take the 
form of battle lines in the struggle for resources and on-going tensions 
concerning how far the process of inclusion should be extended. While the 
characterisation of service responses referred to previously as those of 
champagne or white cider, may be too optimistic on the one hand it may 
be all too realistic on the other. Those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder are likely to continue to occupy a twilight zone in 
which they are at best, offered partial recognition and acknowledgement. 
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Chapter 7: 
Resources and Needs - Implications for Practice 
 
 
This chapter will primarily focus upon my fourth research question 
namely:  
 
‘In what ways has current legislation influenced the availability of services 
for those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder’? 
 
During the course of this research among the key themes to emerge, 
were those of the central importance of how the needs of those who may 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder can and should be met, and 
how resources should be understood and allocated. The key themes that 
will be explored in this chapter include the tension between public / 
private sector provision, the potential significance of the Scottish 
Personality Disorder Network and specific factors impacting upon access 
to services.  Having considered the significance of attitudes, expectations 
and boundaries in a previous chapter, this current chapter will focus more 
specifically upon how the needs of those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder are understood and the availability of resources to 
address these needs.  
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Need, Presentation and Perception 
 
How the needs of potential service users are perceived and their claims 
upon services responded to can have a profound effect upon their well-
being: 
 
"I think the way the system responds to people almost provokes 
them to maybe do worse things or present on a more frequent basis 
because they feel like that's the only way people will recognise how 
much distress and how much trouble they are having…you kind of 
get locked into this kind of vicious circle” (R 18: Informant and 
Service User). 
 
"I would like people to actually listen to what I was saying (rather 
than) through the sort of filter of their diagnosis, rather than as an 
individual" (R 18: Informant and Service User). 
 
“...people get accused of being dependent on the service and 
playing up to their diagnosis and all this kind of stuff, whereas I 
think that’s actually a response to the way the system is set up, and 
that it has been quite dismissive of their issues in the first 
place......the threshold of risk to self-harmers seems to be 
incredibly high. You know, you are told self-harming, that’s not a 
very intelligent thing to do, is it?  Why were you doing that?  If you 
are going to do that, go to a different hospital - that kind of 
thing......(the) approach to self-harm (is not the same as) maybe 
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ten years ago, but it’s not across the board, it’s a bit luck of the 
draw...(R 18: Key Informant and Service User).  
 
Evidence of a residual antagonism towards those who may attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder was acknowledged by a broad range of 
MHO respondents. The following comment expresses this particularly 
clearly: 
 
"…some people think they're just doing it for attention and…so there 
is a lot of debate and people get quite extreme views…thinking they 
actually know what they're doing… The word they often use is 
manipulative" (R: 05 Mental Health Officer) 
 
This respondent echoed the comments offered by a number of MHOs that 
ambivalence towards those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder 
was something they still frequently encountered in working with nursing 
staff: 
 
"…some of the nurses are quite upfront (in saying) I don't like 
working with them, don't like them, they're trouble I don't want to 
work with people with personality disorder…because it's not seen to 
be a real mental illness (and therefore not part of their role)" (R: 05 
Mental Health Officer). 
 
Service responses such as those described above by respondents (R: 18 & 
05) would appear to be incompatible with one of the oldest tests of 
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professional ethical conduct, namely that of non-malfeasance (Banks 
2012). The process of identifying and meeting human needs is framed 
within a range of tensions, competing interests and imperatives. The 
above comments from a service user and informant, illustrate that these 
tensions are perhaps more evident in discussions concerning those who 
may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder, than for any other group 
of service users. These comments also illustrate that the needs of those 
who may have attracted a diagnosis of personality disorder are all too 
often overlooked by a focus upon the difficulties that the behaviour being 
exhibited represents to workers. One of the perverse consequences of this 
is that the behaviours that are perceived as so troublesome can all too 
easily become amplified as the underlying needs of the service user 
remain unmet and therefore exacerbated.  
 
 
The Public and Private Provision of Services 
 
The tension between the public and private provision of services has been 
a key feature of policy debates since the introduction of the concept of the 
purchaser provider split within the community care reforms of the early 
1990s. These tensions emerged as of clear relevance to debates in 
Scotland concerning how services for those who may attract a diagnosis 
of personality disorder should be provided: 
 
“I get a request about once every three or four months for a 
meeting with... one of the private sector providers from south of the 
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border who would like to come to Scotland and start opening... 20 
or 30 bed personality disorder units” (R 14: Key Informant - The 
Scottish Government). 
 
The pressures exerted in favour of the marketisation of services is 
considerable, not least because it is one of the key mechanisms of 
managing the inherent contradictions that arise from the role of the 
welfare state in mediating between the subsystems of capitalist 
production and exchange relationships and the subsystem constituted by 
structures of socialisation (Pilgrim 2012). Although not directly applicable 
in Scotland, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 gives very explicit 
impetus to the marketisation of healthcare provision. Given the current 
funding relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK, the 
pressure for policy within Scotland to move in this direction is likely to 
increase. 
 
The above comments of  Key informant (R: 14) underscore the extent 
that policy, law and practice, should be contextualised within a broader 
arena in which mental health disorders have become a major growth 
opportunity for private sector providers in England and a number of other 
jurisdictions. The impact of mental illness / disorder within advanced 
economies has been costed at between 3% and 4% of GDP (W.H.O. 
2003), thereby potentially creating a very significant market opportunity 
that will include the provision of services and treatments in respect of 
personality disorders. The cost of private provision per person per year is 
estimated by this respondent to be: 
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“Somewhere around £130,000 to £150,000 per year, a place” (R: 
14 Key Informant - The Scottish Government). 
 
The potential impact of increasing the range of service provision upon the 
health budget in Scotland should therefore not be underestimated. 
Service providers are currently experiencing the impact of an increase in 
expressed need (Bradshaw 1972) as a result of greater awareness among 
service users of what services are available elsewhere as information, 
whether reliable or not, becomes increasingly accessible. Service users 
and carers are able to identify the apparent availability of private 
provision when they: 
 
“...go away and look up the Internet and find…units down south” (R 
03: Psychiatrist). 
 
This causes an added degree of tension in the relationship between 
service providers and service users and carers because in general: 
 
“...the Health Board won’t fund it” (R 03: Psychiatrist). 
 
The costs of this private sector provision are generally regarded as 
prohibitive by health boards within Scotland: this increases the sense of 
frustration amongst service users who believe that they are likely to 
benefit from and should therefore be entitled to such provision. This 
problem is compounded by the promotion of private sector provision that 
has the effect of creating demand that cannot then be satisfied.  
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The Availability of Services 
 
Given that receiving a diagnosis of personality disorder is of itself likely to 
be highly momentous for the majority of people, the need for appropriate 
services, delivered by properly trained workers in a timely manner is of 
great importance. During the course of this research clear difficulties 
emerged concerning all three of these criteria: 
 
“We don’t have access to a great deal of psychology... I think 
they’re (psychiatrists and psychologists) a bit dismayed because 
they realise the resource implications and so to date, I would say 
there’s been a bit of a reluctance to kind of engage with that and 
start to open up to be accepting” (R 01: Mental Health Officer). 
 
“If you think of trying to access DBT from this team...I don’t know 
why you would go quite honestly, I mean, our psychology service is 
inundated” (R 10: Mental Health Officer). 
 
“(The lack of services for those who may attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder results in practitioners)... Trying to cobble 
something together with what we’ve got available, which is 
unsatisfactory (and leads to the creation of a) postcode lottery” (R 
03: Psychiatrist). 
 
"…it depends a lot on whether or not the, you know on whether or 
not you've got a psychiatrist who's actually interested in working 
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with somebody with personality disorder in the first place" (R: 06 
Mental Health Officer). 
 
“...the patients get a....poor service really, because of lack of 
resources” (R 03: Psychiatrist). 
 
When asked about what additional resources had been made available to 
help make the process of inclusion a reality for those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder, the response was almost universally one 
of little or nothing: 
 
"I can't think of anything that has been changed that would (help us 
to) accommodate this group" (R: 26 Mental Health Officer). 
 
The above comments from respondents (R: 01; 10, 03, 06 and 26) are 
testimony to the patchwork nature of current service provision for those 
who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder. The efficacy of 
treatment interventions for personality disorders continues to be 
contested; however the increasing although heavily caveated acceptance 
that in some circumstances, some of those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder may benefit from specific treatment interventions 
(NICE 2009), may create the expectation among service users and also 
some professionals that additional services should be provided. The 
evidence that is available for treatment effectiveness, emphasises the 
importance of a structured and integrated approach to psychological and 
drug-based therapies in order to alleviate and manage distressing 
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symptoms that are associated with the diagnosis of personality disorder 
(NICE 2009). 
 
Interventions such as dialectical behaviour therapy (TSG 2008) and 
cognitive behavioural therapy have become established as the primary 
psychological interventions for those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder, most notably borderline personality disorder 
(Palmer, Davidson et al. 2006).  
 
“... I wouldn’t like to go as far as to say it is emperor’s new clothes 
but smoke and mirrors definitely” (R 12: Key Informant and 
Psychiatrist). 
 
“... (CBT and DBT are) not much different to what the 
psychoanalytical psychotherapists started from” (R 12: Key 
Informant and Psychiatrist). 
 
These comments from respondent (R: 12) who was in a position of 
strategic oversight and a key budget holder, indicate however that the 
extent that approaches such as DBT should be regarded as advances in 
treatment is by no means settled. During the course of this research it 
became clear therefore that not only is the effectiveness of available 
interventions subject to on-going debate but that some of the treatments 
most commonly advocated are contested at a fundamental level. 
 
 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                238 | P a g e  
 
Access to services  
 
During the course of this research boundary disputes between services 
and what might be understood as territorialism emerged as significant 
obstacles to service uses accessing services:  
 
“...there are a lot of issues around whether you are stable enough 
to use (a) service, but the difficulty is people won’t refer you for 
something you might get in two years because you are not stable 
enough now and people have been turned down for assessment on 
the grounds that they are not stable enough and, you know, the 
argument of people obviously coming back with how on earth do 
you know I’m not stable enough if you’ve never met me? (R 18: 
Key Informant and Service User). 
 
And: 
 
“... it’s extremely difficult to access the service because the 
statutory services won’t treat the sort of personality disorder issues 
until you have sorted out the substance abuse problem, and a lot of 
substance abuse services either won’t, or really struggle to help sort 
it out because obviously it’s all intertwined, and it seems to me 
there just doesn’t seem to be an awful lot of meeting of minds to 
try and solve all of these, to accept that all of these things are part 
and parcel” (R 18: Key Informant and Service User). 
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“...people still bounce about” (R 03: Psychiatrist).  
 
“(People who have been given a diagnosis of personality disorder) 
get kind of bumped…bounced about between social work and 
health” (R: 05 Mental Health Officer). 
 
From the above comments by respondents (R: 18,03 and 05) it is clear 
that one of the potential consequences of this on-going territorialism and 
boundary disputes may be that service users who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder, may continue to find it particularly difficult to access 
appropriate services in a timely fashion. 
 
The restructuring and withdrawal of services has had a significant impact 
on service provision for certain groups, notably those who fall within the 
forensic sphere. An example of this was provided by one respondent in 
commenting upon an early intervention scheme that had subsequently 
been dismantled. The purpose of the scheme was: 
 
“... to offer a service to the courts and it tended to be low-level 
offending where there was a mental health dimension, and the 
mental health dimension being...that it would not require the Mental 
Health Act but there were concerns around some aspect of the 
offender’s behaviour, presentation, whatever. And so we were 
getting quite a lot with low-level personality disorders rather than, 
you know, psychopathy and high end other ones” (R 25: Mental 
Health Officer and Practice Team Leader). 
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“...that’s no longer available, so a service that was available and 
met the needs of people suffering from personality disorders that 
the court could use, instead of imposing a harsher sentence, has 
been withdrawn” (R 25: Mental Health Officer and Practice Team 
Leader). 
 
“So there’s no Diversion from Prosecution scheme in Glasgow 
anymore which was one of our prides and joy” (R 25: Mental Health 
Officer and Practice Team Leader). 
 
“Yes, you’re keeping people out of the system, you’re addressing 
their mental health needs, you’re looking at their life and social 
needs, you know?  And that’s been totally withdrawn now.  There’s 
no funding available for diversion under the funding routes of 
criminal justice, so it’s not a priority and there is nothing there.  
But, similarly, within a deferred sentence scenario that we offer to 
the courts, there has been nothing.  So what, in terms of the lower 
level mentally disordered offender, you are left really with a criminal 
justice worker to carry a Probation Order who has the knowledge, 
the time to tie into the appropriate care pathway, which they 
wouldn’t know anyways” (R: 25 Mental Health Officer and Practice 
Team Leader). 
 
“... what’s tending to happen just now is square pegs in round holes 
in terms of resource allocation” (R 25: Mental Health Officer and 
Practice Team Leader). 
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Given the evidence of the over-representation of those with mental health 
problems in the criminal justice system (Royal College of Psychiatrists 
2007), then the need for effective early intervention and diversion from 
prosecution is clear. Those with a diagnosis of personality disorder may 
be even more likely to receive a justice based response, because of the 
historical reluctance to permit personality disorder to be used as a 
mitigating factor (Darjee and Crichton 2003). Recent case law however 
suggests that Scotland (HMA v Theresa Riggi 2011) is moving closer to 
the position that has pertained in England for some time, where in certain 
circumstances personality disorder has been accepted as a basis for a 
finding of diminished responsibility (Crichton 2004). This development 
however represents a double-edged sword, in that a diagnosis of one or 
more personality disorders remains profoundly stigmatising (Stalker, 
Ferguson et al. 2005). 
 
 
Resources and the Scottish Personality Disorder Network 
 
The Scottish Personality Disorder Network was established in 2006 
following the successful efforts by a small number of clinicians to gain the 
support of the Mental Health Division of the Scottish Government. Its 
mission was and remains that of promoting awareness of personality 
disorder and challenging stigma associated with this form of diagnosis 
(The Scottish Government 2006).  
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“...there wasn’t any money to do very much, but (there) certainly 
wasn’t going to be any new personality disorder services and so I 
think the best they could come up with was really looking at 
developing a network” (R: 16 - Key Informant: Voluntary Sector). 
 
“...resources are not always money, and one of the things that has 
happened with the personality disorder network is in getting 
involved with the integrated pathways and raising their profile” (R 
19: Key informant and Psychiatrist). 
 
The development of the Scottish Personality Disorder Network can be 
viewed as an example of the use of network capital (Swart 2006). This 
network is intended to harness intellectual and human capital to facilitate 
knowledge sharing and production across a range of stakeholders of 
differing backgrounds, disciplines and levels of expertise. Such an 
approach has the potential to create a degree of momentum to influence 
practice that transcends formal regulations and guidelines. The extent to 
which this is achievable however will substantially depend upon how the 
network is perceived. During the course of this research two contrasting 
views emerged of the potential significance of this network. The 
comments above from respondents (R: 16 and 19) indicate that the 
development of a network approach can either be viewed as a poor 
substitute for additional resources; or alternatively as the creation of a 
network capital resource that offers an effective way of sharing 
knowledge, good practice and increasing the profile of personality 
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disorder. The primary focus upon a network-based approach has meant 
that: 
 
“...we’ve not put in bespoke services for people with personality 
disorders (R 12: Key Informant and Psychiatrist). 
 
Whatever the merits of a network led approach, resource constraints 
would appear to be acting as a driver to further change in practice: 
 
“...there’s a financial imperative for us to do what we can to re-
provide in-patient services in the community” (R 04: Psychiatrist). 
 
This has resulted in a greater focus on community-based services 
meaning that: 
 
“...we’ve closed beds (resulting in a) natural experiment” (R 04: 
Psychiatrist). 
 
"… the person that they (workers in a community mental health 
team) go to for specific advice) (is not someone) they can refer to 
(even though they) are a personality disorder specialist…they might 
give you some advice but they'll not take a referral" (R: 11 Mental 
Health Officer). 
 
The availability of services from those with specific expertise in working 
with those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder would therefore 
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appear to be an on-going and significant issue. Professional expertise 
constitutes a specific form of human capital (Curtis, Moriarty et al. 2011). 
The emphasis upon consultation can be understood as a particular means 
of deploying this capital / resource in a manner that is intended to 
rationalise costs. A potential difficulty with such an approach is that those 
who may require the most knowledgeable and skilled support from social 
workers and other professionals, may be more likely to receive a ‘diluted’ 
service that is insufficiently responsive to their needs. 
 
As services seek to cope with increasing levels of demand another theme 
that emerged in the course of this research was a tendency for those with 
the greatest expertise to draw back from direct service provision. This 
was felt to have particular implications for other professionals who 
increasingly: 
 
“...are expected to do absolutely everything” (R 20: Key 
Informant). 
 
These comments indicate that the process of rationing may be being used 
to manage the potential demand upon clinicians’ time. It is clear that this 
is not intended to constitute a form of active exclusion based on the 
notion of deserving and undeserving; rather it is a pragmatic response to 
the mismatch between supply and demand. Whatever the intention the 
practical reality for many of those who may attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder, is that they may then subsequently be left without 
the follow-up or support that they may regard as necessary, thereby 
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increasing their subjective distress and sense of marginalisation. The lack 
of readily available expertise can have a range of unintended 
consequences including those relating to the assessment and 
management of risk: 
 
“...we had a very tragic incident...resulting in somebody’s 
death...when we began to look at it...the patient had not been seen 
by anyone other than a junior doctor. And when we looked at the 
caseloads the consultants were carrying (we found) caseloads of 
500 and upward”(R 12: Key Informant and Psychiatrist).  
 
“...we looked at that and tried to alter practice because we thought 
that was really dangerous. So yes there will be... A targeting in that 
way because there’s finite resources”(R 12: Key Informant and 
Psychiatrist). 
 
These comments illustrate the inherent problems associated with filtering 
claims upon services in an effort to manage demand. Perhaps the best 
that can be achieved when such an approach is adopted, is that of more 
accurately targeting or filtering demands in such a way as to minimise the 
risk of adverse outcomes for service users. 
 
“...I think what happens...in terms of clinical practice there is a 
whole host of people out there that if we were to do a clinical 
diagnostic interview with them, I think they would meet the criteria 
for one or the other or more of a personality disorder.....I think 
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there’s a reluctance for medical staff, nursing staff to put that label 
on people, and you can debate the pros and cons of that until the 
cows come home.  So I think that’s one thing, there’s a whole range 
of people that would be avoiding personality (disorder)” (R 20: Key 
Informant). 
 
Concerns regarding the inability of overstretched services to adequately 
meet potential demand emerged as a significant theme during the course 
of this research. The challenge represented in meeting the potential 
demand was summed up by one respondent who observed that the 
potential number of those who might attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder was: 
 
“...just enormous, and it’s too big a number, it’s unmanageable 
really” (R 20: Key Informant). 
 
The above comments reflect an underlying anxiety that became clear as 
this research progressed, namely that the greater inclusion of personality 
disorder might raise expectations of a more substantial level of service 
provision among those who attract this form of diagnosis and their carers. 
The potential discrepancy between increased expectations and scarce 
resources may mean that  policymakers and service providers view it as 
necessary to take measures to ensure that the floodgates are not opened, 
thereby running the risk of overwhelming services. The potential for very 
considerable demands upon services to be created by the adoption of a 
genuinely inclusive approach towards those who attract a diagnosis of 
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personality disorder, is well illustrated by the findings of a recent report 
concerning the allocation of resources within the NHS in England (Centre 
for Economic Performance 2012). This report indicates that within 
England the percentage of the population that are deemed to be 
“diagnosable” for personality disorder, including borderline and antisocial 
personality disorder is 0.7% of the adult population: of this number only 
34% are actually receiving treatment. Assuming that the prevalence rates 
are not substantially different between Scotland and England, then the 
potential number of those who might attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder is quite considerable. Based on population size approaching 5 1/2 
million the figure for those who might be deemed to be diagnosable would 
approximate 385,000. 
 
“I think people have been more aware, I think especially people 
who have been diagnosed more recently have been really shocked 
at the fact they have struggled to access treatment or they have 
been put on these enormous waiting lists” (R 18: Key Informant 
and Service User). 
 
The current emphasis upon austerity would suggest that the experiences 
of service users such as those reported by this Key Informant are likely to 
become more rather than less common. This has the potential to further 
marginalise and exclude a group of service users who are already 
systemically neglected. 
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When services are not able to respond promptly and sensitively to the 
needs of service users, this inevitably exacerbates any feelings of 
alienation and distress that they may experience. Those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder are more likely to face delays in being 
able to access services because of the relative status of this diagnosis 
when compared with those that fall within the category of severe and 
enduring mental illness in: 
 
“...a sort of pecking order. Personality disorder...comes bottom 
after everything else...(R 18: Key Informant and Service User). 
 
The notion of there being a hierarchy of importance among those falling 
within different diagnostic categories was widely acknowledged by the 
majority of MHOs and psychiatrists alike, thereby reflecting the 
observations of the service user and key informant noted above: 
 
"(people who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder are) not 
seen as being the biggest / highest priority" (R: 05 Mental Health 
Officer). 
 
One of the potential unintended consequences of this pecking order is 
that service users are effectively encouraged to escalate problematic and 
potentially harmful behaviours in order to move up the rankings based on 
risk rather than relying upon appropriate responses to their needs. 
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Conclusions  
 
For those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder the manner 
in which their needs are understood and resources are defined and 
allocated, reflect a range of competing interests and are subject to on-
going debate. The provision of services for those who attract a diagnosis 
of personality disorder is problematised by on-going uncertainty regarding 
the efficacy of available treatments as well as more fundamental 
questions concerning the legitimacy of this diagnostic category itself. 
 
The moral imperative to meet human needs is reflected in a broad range 
of policy documents that give prominence to the notion of well-being. In 
practice however this moral imperative often appears to be outweighed by 
more practical considerations, for example concerns about services being 
inundated with demands that would overwhelm them. Service users are 
to some extent caught in the middle of the tension between the public 
and private sector provision of services. The apparent availability of 
services for those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder in 
certain other parts of the United Kingdom, serves to raise expectations 
that are often frustrated because funding is not available for equivalent 
provision in Scotland, or to support services being accessed from 
elsewhere in United Kingdom. Private sector provision in particular is very 
expensive and has the potential to place a particularly severe demand 
upon scarce resources. Favoured models of practice such as dialectical 
and cognitive behavioural therapy have a growing but contested evidence 
base: their efficacy is insufficiently clear in the view of at least one budget 
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holder in a pivotal position to oversee and commission services. Waiting 
times and obstacles in moving between services continue to result in 
service users “bouncing about” rather than moving relatively seamlessly 
between services. The extent to which the Scottish Personality Disorder 
Network, as an example of the utilisation by policy makers and some 
practitioners of network capital, will be able to exert a significant influence 
upon practice in the future at this time remains to be seen. The role of 
expert knowledge emerged as a particularly important theme during the 
course of this research: it became clear as this research progressed that 
respondents felt that due to increasing demands upon services, that those 
with the most expertise were increasingly withdrawing from direct service 
provision themselves and offering a supervisory and consultative role 
instead. Service users who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder 
continue to do poorly in the pecking order of the competition for scarce 
resources to meet pressing needs. 
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Chapter 8: 
A Response to an Unruly Population - the Inclusion of Personality 
Disorder in Law and Policy in Scotland 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The focus of this chapter concerns the legal, policy and regulatory 
framework underpinning the inclusion of those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder in Scotland. The implications of the manner in which 
the policy of inclusion emerged and has subsequently developed within 
policy and regulatory frameworks will be discussed. This chapter will 
therefore primarily address my second research question: 
 
How does the inclusion of personality disorder within mental health 
law fit into a broader range of strategies of control and regulation 
characteristic of an advanced liberal democracy?  
 
Three imperatives emerged during the course of this research that 
created a particular series of tensions that underpin the current position 
regarding the inclusion of those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder within Scotland. The first arises as a consequence of the 
established position in Scotland of not admitting those who attract a 
primary diagnosis of personality disorder to forensic psychiatric settings; 
the second concerns the political imperative for governing political parties 
to retain their legitimacy by being seen to be able to maintain order, and 
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the third arises from a recognition of the aspirations of those who attract 
a diagnosis of personality disorder to be included within service provision. 
The consequences of the manner in which these different imperatives 
interact with each other in law, policy and practice will be explored within 
this chapter.  
 
These tensions are evident in the process of moving from an initial 
position of broad-based inclusion, implied by the term personality 
disorder, to the much more limited focus upon those who may attract a 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. Consideration will be given to 
the further narrowing of focus, exemplified by the omission of personality 
disorder from the Health, Efficiency, Access and Treatment target – 
hereafter referred to as HEAT target for waiting times for psychological 
therapy. This development within the policy framework has the potential 
to reinforce the position of those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder as marginalised and excluded. Decisions made by those 
responsible for planning service provision and allocating resources provide 
the context in which decisions regarding who should receive services and 
on what basis are made: consequently the importance of the policy 
framework as distinct from legislation itself is difficult to overstate.   
 
The policy framework and manner in which it is implemented at a local 
level, steered by regulatory devices such as HEAT targets, sets the 
context in which front-line practitioners are required to make decisions 
concerning how they should respond to those seeking services who may 
attract a diagnosis of one or more personality disorders. The extent that 
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those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder are likely to find that 
such a diagnosis continues to be one of exclusion, or alternatively one 
that  provides a gateway to appropriate service provision will therefore 
depend to a significant extent upon how inclusion itself is embedded 
within and expressed through policy frameworks and guidelines. 
 
 
Political Imperatives and the Force of Realpolitik 
 
The practical considerations of the policy-making process emerged as of 
particular significance during the course of this research. This reflects the 
reality that changes or reversals to legislation create a range of problems 
that need to be managed in order to minimise the risk of calling into 
question the legitimacy of the decision-making process itself (Patty and 
Penn 2011): 
 
“...once you had it (personality disorder) in the legislation (Mental 
Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999) it was very 
difficult for new legislation to say we should take that out again. If it 
hadn’t been for the 1999 Act... I think the chances were that 
personality disorder wouldn’t have been in our report as a 
recommendation... we had evidence which argued both ways but I 
think the committee at the end of the day, this was something that 
we had great difficulty in recommending.  I think if it hadn’t been 
for the 1999 Act which we suggested should be abolished then that 
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might have been different” (R: 22 Key Informant - Member of the 
Millan Committee). 
 
“We (the Millan Committee) didn’t like the 1999 Act, and in fact we 
wrote to the ministers saying that they panicked, basically what 
happened with the Ruddle case... they panicked... because of the 
tabloids and all the rest of it and also because of all the stuff that 
there’d been in England about dangerous mentally disturbed people 
committing murders” (R 22: Key Informant - Member of the Millan 
Committee). 
 
The above comments from Key Informant (R: 22) are noteworthy not 
least because this respondent also played a significant role in drafting 
previous legislation. It emerged clearly during the course of this research 
that whatever the specific arguments for and against the explicit inclusion 
of personality disorder within mental health legislation; that the practical 
reality was  that reverting to the previous innominate (Darjee and 
Crichton 2003) status of personality disorder that characterised mental 
health legislation prior to the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) 
(Scotland) Act 1999, was simply not a practical possibility. This 
interpretation is consistent with an acknowledgement contained within the 
Millan Report itself: 
 
“...it would not be realistic to ignore the fact that the 1999 Act has 
given new emphasis to the question of personality disorder (Millan 
2001):44. 
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The emergency legislation is of considerable importance, not least 
because it was the first legislative act of the reconstituted Scottish 
Parliament - this is consistent with the expectation that in order to be 
regarded as competent, particularly when faced with a crisis, 
governments must first demonstrate that they are able to maintain order 
and therefore maintain their legitimacy (Offe 1976).  
 
 
Diagnosis, Risk and Dangerousness 
 
The policy of the UK Government being pursued at the time that the 
reform of mental health legislation in Scotland was being debated was 
predicated upon the spurious intertwining of mental disorder, criminality, 
risk and dangerousness exemplified by the construct ‘Dangerous and 
Severe Personality Disorder’. This caused a number of tensions that 
emerged during the course of this research: 
 
“(The MacLean Committee)...disliked the reference to personality 
disorder actually being mentioned in their terms of reference and 
effectively in their report they said it was not helpful.  They wanted 
to focus on risk to the public and that was the main consideration” 
(R 22: Key Informant -Member of the Millan Committee). 
 
“... they (the MacLean Committee) also I think took the view, as a 
lot of people in the field did, that if you were a risk to the public and 
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you’ve got a criminal background you should be in prison, you 
shouldn’t be in hospital” (R 22: Key Informant) 
 
“I think England’s included it (personality disorder) because of the... 
more...anti-social side than the emotional unstable side” (R 02: 
Psychiatrist). 
 
and  
 
“...it was the Home Office rather than the Department of Health 
that’s obsessed with this (the inclusion of personality disorder in 
mental health legislation) in England” (R 22: Key Informant - 
Member of the Millan Committee). 
 
“...the Home Office was...obsessed by this concept, and the result is 
that they couldn’t get legislation” (R 22: Key Informant - Member of 
the Millan Committee). 
 
“The English committee that was set up to look at the English 
legislation at the same time as our committee was established, got 
kind of instructions from ministers as to some of the things that 
they could do and some of the things they couldn’t do.  There’s no 
way in which the Scottish Office, as it was before, and the Scottish 
Executive would have given us instructions or would have tried to 
give us instructions” (R 22: Key Informant - Member of the Millan 
Committee). 
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“...in Scotland I think there’s much more of a feeling that 
psychiatrists are actually to some extent involved in the political 
process and we actually have a political voice in Scotland and we 
are not excluded from government (in contrast to England 
therefore) the political process for psychiatric reform in Scotland 
has been much better” (R 17: Psychiatrist).  
 
The above comments suggest that the ability of psychiatrists within 
Scotland to influence the political process may to some extent explain 
why in Scotland the policy of not admitting those who have attracted a 
primary diagnosis of personality disorder to forensic psychiatric units has 
been maintained, in sharp contrast to the position that has developed in 
England. The Millan Committee was required as part of its remit, to take 
account of the findings of the MacLean Committee as far as it may make 
any recommendations in respect of personality disorder. The apparent 
reluctance of the MacLean Committee to specifically address personality 
disorder is therefore of particular interest.   
 
The MacLean Committee (2000) indicated their discomfort with being 
asked to give specific consideration to personality disorder when 
reviewing the law concerning serious violent sexual offenders, appearing 
to regard this as the unwelcome intrusion of the DSPD agenda.   
In their report the MacLean Committee rejected the idea that the 
development of a medical protocol, in accordance with the DSPD 
programme, was appropriate for the treatment of offenders who may 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder.  In its report the committee 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                258 | P a g e  
 
reaffirmed the established Scottish position: namely that for those who 
commit offences, prison rather than hospital should provide the normal 
means of disposal.  The committee went further by challenging the very 
assumption that personality disorder was likely to be of any great 
importance in the commission of serious violent or sexual offences: see 
Sections 2.32, 7.4 and 10.2. 
 
This contrasts with the position in England, whereby those with a primary 
diagnosis of personal disorder have not been systematically excluded 
from the Special Hospitals.  The position favoured by the Maclean 
Committee was therefore directly contrary to that being advocated by the 
UK Government in pursuit of its DSPD agenda, thereby providing evidence 
of a divergence of policy between these two jurisdictions. 
 
 
Social Aetiology and Inclusion - The Acceptance of an Alternative 
Paradigm? 
 
During the course of this research it emerged that increasing recognition 
is being given to the social context in which problems of human 
functioning emerge and of the potential for trauma to impact upon 
individual growth and development. This would in part appear to reflect 
the growing influence of psychological approaches, as exemplified in the 
position statement in response to the launch of  DSM 5, published by the 
Division of Clinical Psychology (2013) of The British Psychological Society. 
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“(Trauma is increasingly being seen as a central) organising aspect 
(of personality disorder)” (R 14: Key Informant - The Scottish 
Government). 
 
and more specifically to have a: 
 
“...significant read across to the BPD group” (R 14: Key Informant - 
The Scottish Government). 
 
The significance of adopting a trauma-based approach to working with 
those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder was also echoed 
by a broad range of respondents typified by the following comment: 
 
"I have huge empathy because I think, looking back I've never yet 
come across somebody with that diagnosis that didn't have sort of 
terrible trauma" (R: 05 Mental Health Officer). 
 
“...functioning and well-being in the... more traditional approach of 
psychotherapy and recovery (represents a key element of the policy 
and strategy being pursued by the Scottish Government) “ (R 14: 
Key Informant - The Scottish Government).  
 
“...we’ve got the generic standards for admission and discharge... 
but also then the specific care standards in respect of borderline 
personality disorder, that’s the way in which we’ve sought to bring 
personality disorder within the wider context of good quality health 
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care, by identifying it as one of the five alongside schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder ...and depression” (R 14: Key Informant). 
 
“(as this group of patients typically presents)...with relationship 
problems and social problems” (the implication being that they do 
not fit comfortably within the standard medical model) (R 14: Key 
Informant - The Scottish Government). 
 
“(this reflects a broader policy attempt to refocus services such that 
they become more) trauma-sensitive” (R 14: Key Informant - The 
Scottish Government).  
 
Advocates of the trauma based paradigm argue that recovery should be 
seen as a reasonable expectation, rather than the exception or near 
impossibility: 
 
“If skin can heal itself with minimum non-drug support, why can’t 
minds” (Johnson 2010: 4). 
 
It would seem therefore that trauma has been invoked in order to 
reposition personality disorder, in policy terms at least, so that it sits 
more comfortably within health care policy.  This emphasis upon trauma, 
in terms of the aetiology of personality disorder, is particularly significant 
because it represents a distinct alternative perspective to the standard 
medical model, thereby representing a challenge to the traditional medical 
paradigm underpinning psychiatric nosology.  This alternative approach 
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has been termed a “neo-medical model” (Johnson 2010):4. The notion of 
trauma is also inherently more compatible with the notion of recovery 
(Department of Health and Well-Being 2007) which is a prominent feature 
of current mental health policy. The apparent shift away from the classical 
medical model is also reflected within a number of key policy documents: 
 
“Our approach is based on a social model of health which recognises 
that our mental state is shaped by our social, economic, physical, 
and cultural environment, including people’s personal strengths and 
vulnerabilities, their lifestyles and health-related behaviours, and 
economic, social and environmental factors” (Department of Health 
and Well-Being 2009: 6). 
 
“One of the main themes of the standards is the incorporation of a 
recovery approach.  ICPs must capture the ethos and values of 
recovery and to deliver recovery-orientated services” (NHS Quality 
Improvement Scotland  2007: 6). 
 
It is noteworthy that within the Mentally Flourishing Scotland policy 
framework referred to above, the focus is exclusively upon recovery for 
those who attract a diagnosis of mental illness - there is no consideration 
whatsoever given to those who may attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder. This may go some way to explain why recovery approaches did 
not emerge as having a significant impact upon practice for those who 
may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder during the course of this 
research.  
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The changing way in which borderline personality disorder in particular is 
being reconceptualised is evident from a consultation paper concerning 
the development of an Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) published by North 
Lanarkshire Council and NHS Lanarkshire in August 2010.  This 
consultation paper is entitled: is ‘Borderline Personality Disorder/Complex 
Trauma’? Citing NICE as an authoritative source this consultation paper 
makes it clear that the understanding of personality disorder is 
increasingly being based upon the concept of trauma. Specific prominence 
is also given to recovery in contrast to the policy at a national level 
discussed above. This policy perspective owes a good deal to the social as 
distinct from traditional biomedical approaches to understanding health 
and well-being.  This is consistent with the current influence upon policy 
of those advocating an emphasis upon the social determinants of health 
(Marmot 2010).   
 
This repositioning of personality disorder as a response to trauma i.e. a 
reaction to experiences primarily beyond the control of the individual, 
may have the effect of reducing the sense in which those who attract this 
diagnosis are held to be morally culpable for their ‘problematic’ 
behaviours. This shift is essential if the policy objective, whether 
considered desirable or not, of repositioning Borderline Personality 
Disorder within the medical / healthcare paradigm is to be accomplished.  
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The Matrix - a Scottish Alternative to NICE 
 
Models of clinical governance in Europe and beyond increasingly reflect 
the importance of integration underpinned by clinical pathways, of which 
integrated care pathways are an example. Within England and Wales 
NICE, a special health authority, has a strategic role in driving clinical 
practice by evaluating and indicating which treatment modalities should 
be made available.  Policymakers in Scotland have however adopted a 
different approach; in the case of mental health the chosen method of 
influencing clinical governance and practice is based upon the Matrix of 
Psychological Therapies (NHS Education Board for Scotland 2008), 
otherwise referred to as ‘the Matrix’ in conjunction with the integrated 
care pathways for mental health (ICP).  Together these form the 
backbone of policy in respect of clinical governance vis-a-vis mental 
health in Scotland.  
 
“... the Matrix of psychological therapies... wasn’t like NICE... 
(rather it was) intended as a communication to health boards” (R 
14: Key Informant - The Scottish Government).   
 
“...we’re doing two pieces of work, one of which is on establishing 
information systems to monitor the application of the Matrix in 
practice, but also...alongside (that) work on referral pathways so 
that we can actually set expectations about how people actually 
choose and select; and that is intended to enable us then to set, in 
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due course, access time targets” (R 14: Key Informant - The 
Scottish Government).    
 
The adoption of the Matrix does not therefore mean that the Scottish 
Government favours a laissez-faire approach to the implementation of its 
mental health strategy.  The extent to which the ICP for mental health 
can be expected to deliver significant benefits to service users has 
however been called into question: 
 
“...we probably just see ICPs as another layer of bureaucracy... 
probably... funding went to other things... it’s ...negligible as to 
whether ICPs... within mental health are going to shape and 
improve services... it’s a kid on if we think that having an ICP is 
going to open the door to people coming into services, because ICPs 
don’t deal with attitudes” (R 16: Key Informant from a voluntary 
sector organisation directly involved in the planning of the ICP for 
mental health). 
 
More specifically focusing upon borderline personality disorder, the 
majority of the recommendations for the ICP were absorbed within the 
generic standards. The ICP for borderline personality disorder is 
introduced as Standard 26 under the heading ‘Condition-Specific Care 
Standards’ (p 57).  Standard 26 is simply entitled ‘Medication’ (NHS 
Quality Improvement Scotland 2007): 
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“...the integrated care pathway for borderline personality disorder 
ended up being a tiniest little thing in a sense that it was just... the 
medication that was all that was left” (R 19: Key Informant and 
Psychiatrist). 
 
“…if it’s already a diagnosis of exclusion then you are only going to 
make it more exclusive by making the ICP only for one of the 
Personality Disorders…if you cut it down to just borderline then 
what about everybody else. If you have a PD diagnosis and 
obviously I know that a lot more people are diagnosed with 
borderline than the other ones but equally there is a lot of, it is 
quite common not to have just one and, you know, there is a lot of 
crossover” (R 18: Key Informant and Service User). 
 
However: 
 
“...unfortunately borderline personality disorder is the only condition 
that has an evidence based acute intervention and even that is a bit 
wobbly, but the others just don’t have anything.  Not because I 
don’t think that they’re treatable, but that people haven’t 
offered...well people haven’t done the kind of research that things 
like integrated care pathways and NICE guidelines blah, blah, blah 
require.  So borderline personality disorder is the only personality 
disorder, and you’ve got anti-social personality disorder down South 
as well, with the NICE guideline, you know, so it really is much 
more about the academic perspective of having to get the right 
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evidence base to be able to write these things up in a kind of 
authoritative way (R 19: Key Informant and Psychiatrist). 
 
The importance of the Matrix and ICP for mental health emerged as a 
significant theme during the course of this research: this was not least 
because the probable significance of this two-pronged strategy for those 
who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder is concerned is 
contested. 
 
The ICP for mental health is underpinned by specific standards namely: 
The Standards for Integrated Care Pathways for Mental Health (NHSQIS 
2007). These standards followed the draft standards published earlier in 
that same year without any changes being made regarding personality 
disorder.  Both the draft standards and the final standards make 
reference to borderline personality disorder exclusively rather than 
personality disorder more generally. 
 
The ICPs for mental health consist of four sets of standards and five 
specific conditions.  The four elements are: Process Standards, Generic 
Care Standards, Condition-Specific Care Standards and Service 
Improvement Standards.  The five specific conditions are: Bipolar 
Disorder, Dementia, Schizophrenia, Depression and Borderline Personality 
Disorder. 
 
The adoption of the ICP approach to the provision of mental health 
services was a policy response to the perception that: 
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“...mental health services sometimes lack coordination, do not 
deliver evidence-based interventions, do not record outcomes and 
often do not meet service user assessed needs” (NHS Quality 
Improvement Scotland 2007: 4).  
 
The standards document makes it clear that in response to these findings 
NHS QIS published a three year strategic programme of work in 2005 
entitled ‘Improving the Quality of Mental Health Services’, 2005-2008 
(NHS Quality Improvement Scotland  2005).  This strategic plan 
recommended the introduction of ICPs to ensure a much better level of 
coordination and to allow the measurement of:  
 
“...the extent to which the needs of service users are actually met” 
(NHS Quality Improvement Scotland  2007: 4). 
 
The agenda of inclusion contained within Delivering for Mental Health 
(Scottish Executive Health Dept 2006) is consistent with international 
agreements predicated upon a rights-based approach (World Health 
Organisation 1986; 2005).  This inclusive approach to mental disorder 
ostensibly provides the basis for the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) 
(Scotland) Act 2003.  
 
Delivering for Mental Health ( Scottish Executive Health Dept 2006) was 
part of a broader health strategy that saw the publication of Delivering for 
Health in 2005 (Scottish Executive Health Dept 2005). Delivering for 
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Health contained a commitment to introducing ICPs including personality 
disorder: 
 
“In Delivering for Mental Health we committed to developing 
standards by the end of 2007 for Integrated Care Pathways (ICPs) 
for schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, depression, dementia and 
personality disorder” (Scottish Executive Health Dept 2006: 8).  
 
Delivering for Mental Health (Scottish Executive Health Dept 2006) 
contained the phrase “personality disorder”:6; rather than the much more 
restricted form of borderline personality disorder. This is highly 
significant, not least because of the fundamental role that the ICP 
governance framework, together with the Matrix for Psychological 
Therapies is intended to play in steering practice within Scotland. 
 
Clear differences emerged during the course of this research concerning 
the aspirations and expectations for mechanisms such as the Matrix and 
ICP to impact upon practice. From the point of view of the Scottish 
Government, the Matrix and ICP are intended to directly influence practice 
by making expectations clearer both to clinicians and indirectly service 
users; furthermore the Matrix and ICP are designed to sit within a broader 
framework of clinical governance, allowing a degree of central steering to 
take place through the introduction of targets: this aspect of clinical 
governance will be discussed subsequently within this chapter. The Key 
informant from the Scottish Government (R: 14) was clearly of the view 
that the combination of the Matrix and ICP represented a preferred way 
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forward in Scotland, as an alternative to the approach adopted in England 
based upon NICE. The other two key informants, both of whom were 
involved in the establishment of the ICP for mental health, expressed 
views that were however much less optimistic regarding the probable 
significance of the ICP in terms of its impact upon practice. 
This tension between aspirations and expectations can be partly 
understood in terms of a more fundamental tension between meeting the 
needs of those with severe and /or enduring mental illness and the 
perceived needs of those who may attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder. This tension was specifically acknowledged within ‘The 
Framework for Mental Health Services in Scotland’ (Scottish Office and 
Dept of Health 1997). The tension arises due to the poor fit between 
personality disorder and the way that mental health services have 
historically been constituted i.e. Based upon the perceived needs of those 
who attract a diagnosis of severe and / or enduring mental illness. This 
framework document provides the conceptual basis for the subsequent 
Matrix. The policy origins of the framework and by extension the Matrix 
can however be traced farther back to work undertaken in the mid-1990s 
by the Scottish Office: 
 
“The Mental Health Reference Group (MHRG) was set up in 1996 to 
assist the (then) Scottish Office working party developing the first 
draft of the Framework” (Mental Health Reference Group 2000):5.  
 
“During the 1990s, especially in England, a series of incidents such 
as the Christopher Clunis episode heightened public awareness. For 
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some this was taken to an exaggerated extent in considering the 
risk to the community arising from those with mental health 
problems who live within it” (Mental Health Reference Group 2000: 
7). 
 
Consequently: 
 
“A central part of the philosophy of the Framework for Mental 
Health Services in Scotland (1997) was that no patient should be 
discharged from hospital unless services and accommodation were 
in place and available” (Mental Health Reference Group 2000: 7). 
 
These comments illustrate that concerns about risk were foundational to 
the process of reviewing mental health legislation in Scotland in the late 
1990s as they were in England. 
 
 
Why the Focus on Borderline Personality Disorder?  
 
During the course of reviewing the literature in preparation for 
undertaking the empirical field work at the heart of this thesis, as well as 
during the fieldwork itself, it became evident that among the variety of 
diagnostic labels available that borderline personality disorder was 
receiving notably more recognition: 
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“People with borderline personality disorder are not going to fail to 
come to somebody’s attention and when they do come to 
somebody’s attention they will generally cause alarm unless a 
service is actually used to dealing with them...So I think there’s a 
disappointing lack of interest in other personality disorders... I don’t 
think they’re seen as a focus for treatment... they’re a group that 
have generated a great deal of interest research wise as well in 
contrast with some of the other personality disorders and so there 
are evidence based treatments as well, and because they come 
psychiatrists’ way and because psychiatrists have drugs to use they 
also use drugs on them and so drugs companies get very interested 
in them as well” (R: 17 Psychiatrist). 
 
Consequently: 
 
“(BPD) has almost become synonymous with personality disorder“ 
(R 17 - Key Informant and Psychiatrist).   
 
Several possible explanations can be identified to help understand why in 
clinical practice as well as policy in Scotland, BPD and personality disorder 
have become conflated into a single entity. As highlighted earlier, 
borderline personality disorder has a more substantial evidence base than 
can be said for other diagnoses of personality disorder. This may in part 
be because those with this diagnosis are more likely to seek treatment, 
(Bateman and Tyrer 2004) than those who are diagnosed with other 
categories of personality disorder, thereby making it somewhat easier for 
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an evidence base to be accumulated.  Having a treatment seeking 
orientation is certainly more consistent with the inherent assumptions of 
the ‘sick role’ that is central to the medical model (Rush 2004). 
Alternatively BPD may have become synonymous with personality 
disorder because its associated symptoms are believed to be more 
susceptible to pharmacological interventions: borderline personality 
disorder has featured quite extensively within drug trials (Tyrer and 
Bateman 2004).  
 
Pharmacological interventions have become the dominant modality within 
modern psychiatry (Nadesan 2008). This to some extent reflects a mutual 
interest between psychiatrists in terms of increasing and reinforcing their 
status within the medical profession and the financial interests of 
pharmaceutical companies (Carlat 2010). These potential conflicts of 
interest are well illustrated by the scandal involving GlaxoSmithKline 
resulting in a fine of $3 billion in 2012. This pharmaceutical company was 
fined for withholding data concerning the safety of its products and 
providing unlawful financial incentives to doctors as part of a strategy 
known as ‘off-label marketing’ (Reuters 2012). It is noteworthy that 
despite the acknowledged benefits of approaches such as cognitive 
behavioural treatment for some service users who may attract a diagnosis 
of personality disorder (Working Group on Services for People with 
Personality Disorder 2005) that the integrated care pathway referred to 
above focuses exclusively upon medication rather than other forms of 
intervention. This reflects the prevalence of a biomedical approach to the 
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treatment of mental health problems that allows pharmaceutical 
companies to significantly influence clinical norms (Pilgrim 2012). 
 
 
The Continued Exclusion of Antisocial Personality Disorder 
 
In response to published data (Thomson 2005) suggesting that up to 80% 
of prisoners within Scotland may meet the diagnostic criteria for this 
diagnosis, one particularly respondent with a key role in implementing 
government policy noted that: 
 
“I don’t think that’s the case at all, I don’t think I’ve seen anything 
which suggests antisocial personality disorder. (The) diagnosis that 
we see within the prison population would probably be borderline 
personality disorder, and so 80% isn’t a figure that I’d recognise” (R 
14: Key Informant – The Scottish Government). 
 
This contrasted with the view of another respondent who noted that: 
 
“...obviously the percentage of prisoners with antisocial personality 
disorders is very high” (R 02: Psychiatrist). 
 
The potential implications of a shift from a corrections to healthcare 
paradigm for those who commit offences and also have been given a 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder are far reaching: 
 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                274 | P a g e  
 
“We would see some relocation (of the prison population) from the 
justice system into the health care system and probably reasonably 
quickly, demands for further increases and extension of that 
provision” (R 14: Key Informant – The Scottish Government). 
 
Consequently: 
 
“(Those who attract a diagnosis of dissocial/antisocial personality 
disorder are)...better handled within the justice system” (R 14: Key 
Informant - The Scottish Government. 
 
The view taken by policymakers in Scotland was therefore that rather 
than being brought within the health paradigm that those who attract a 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, should be kept firmly within 
the justice / corrections paradigm. It became clear during the course of 
this research that part of the reluctance to include a broader definition of 
personality disorder within the Matrix, including antisocial personality 
disorder, was that of the potential consequences of increased demands 
upon health services. 
 
“I think they probably don’t have a place within psychiatry, you 
know within medicine and they are probably best dealt with legally 
(R 02: Psychiatrist). 
 
This is an opinion which can be contrasted with: 
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“(I) don’t think there’s any reason why we shouldn’t be seeing 
antisocial personality disorder” (R 19: Key Informant/Psychiatrist). 
 
“(however in establishing the personality disorder network)...we did 
kind of separate ourselves off from the forensic aspect... we didn’t 
want people to think that personality disorder meant forensic” (R 
19: Key Informant/Psychiatrist). 
 
As can be seen from the above comments a lack of consensus among 
respondents regarding the most appropriate response to the needs of 
those with antisocial personality disorder emerged during this research. 
Even among those therefore who adopt a more inclusive approach 
towards antisocial personality disorder, a concern was evident for the 
need to maintain a degree of distance between those who attract this 
diagnosis and other forms of personality disorder.  This led to a clear 
decision to exclude those who fall within the so-called forensic sphere 
from the agenda of the Scottish Personality Disorder Network. 
 
Somewhat contrary to the view expressed by the key Government 
informant (R:14), the MacLean Committee accepted research findings 
that the prevalence rate of antisocial personality disorder amongst 
sentenced male prisoners in Scotland was high at approximately 50% 
(MacLean 2000: para 10.17). This was somewhat less than other 
estimates that put the figure as high as 80% (Thomson 2005). A 
discussion document published by the forensic network contains a very 
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clear statement concerning the policy of exclusion within Scotland, 
summarising it as one of:  
 
“Do not admit individuals with a primary diagnosis of personality 
disorder to forensic psychiatric units” (Thomson 2005).  
 
This same document argues for an end to antisocial personality disorder 
as a diagnosis of exclusion in Scotland:  
 
”Personality Disorder should not be a diagnosis of exclusion from 
Forensic Mental Health Services. Services for people with 
personality disorder should be provided given the frequency with 
which they are found in the criminal justice and mental health 
systems in Scotland” (Thomson 2005).   
 
 
HEAT Targets and Personality Disorder - a Diagnosis Too Hot to 
Handle? 
 
Delivering for Mental Health ( Scottish Executive Health Department 
2006) contained a number of commitments, one of which namely 
commitment 6, provided for the basis of a number of HEAT targets that 
were intended to direct policy and practice at a local level.  
 
“(HEAT targets) dictate the agenda” (R 20: Key Informant - in a 
pivotal strategic position within the NHS in the West of Scotland). 
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This confirms the importance that HEAT targets are intended to have as 
an accompaniment to the Matrix and driver behind the ICP for mental 
health and that they have become operationalised in strategic planning. 
From this it necessarily follows that the precise details of the relevant 
HEAT target are most important.  
When respondents were asked what procedures or guidance had been 
issued to clarify how those who may attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder should be accommodated within service provision, without 
exception, no respondent was able to identify any specific procedures or 
guidance. The following represents the views typically expressed by 
respondents: 
 
"No guidance has been issued for working with those with 
personality disorder -  none at all" (R: 26 Mental Health Officer) 
 
Delivering for Mental Health contained three specific HEAT targets. 
Commitment 6 within Delivering for Mental Health is specifically linked to 
these three HEAT targets (Scottish Executive Health Department 2006: 
20). These HEAT targets were clearly intended to be fairly generic: 
 
“Target 1: Reduce the annual rate of increase of defined daily dose 
per capita of antidepressants to zero by 2009/10 
Target 2: Reduce suicides in Scotland by 20% by 2013 
Target 3: Reduce the number of readmissions (within 1 year) for 
those that have had a hospital admission for over seven days, by 
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10% by the end of December 2009” (NHS Quality Improvement 
Scotland 2007: 5).  
 
The original targets were subsequently revised at the end of 2007 and a 
fourth, this time diagnosis specific target concerning dementia was added 
(NHS Quality Improvement Scotland 2008).  A specific HEAT target for 
the waiting time for psychological therapy was approved by the Scottish 
Government in November 2010 to be included as a HEAT target from April 
2011 onwards: the waiting time target being a period of 18 weeks from 
initial referral to the commencement of treatment (Information and 
Services Division NHS Scotland 2011). The published commitment was 
however rather narrow in its focus: 
 
“Our intention is to promote timely delivery of evidence-based 
psychological therapies to treat mental illness” (Information and 
Services Division NHS Scotland 2011). 
 
The fundamental issue with the adoption of this HEAT target as far as 
those with an interest in personality disorder are concerned, is that it 
focuses explicitly upon mental illness and omits any reference to 
personality disorders whatsoever. 
 
Uncertainty regarding the efficacy of available treatments is unlikely to 
have provided the basis for this decision given the acknowledgement of 
specific psychological interventions for borderline personality disorder 
within the Matrix. Furthermore the policy document accompanying this 
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HEAT target asserts that uncertainty regarding treatment efficacy should 
not preclude interventions being undertaken.  The point is made that 
clinicians must be free to undertake therapeutic interventions based on 
the needs of patients. The imperative to intervene is regarded as 
overriding the absence of an established treatment methodology: the 
assumption is rather that the Matrix will be updated as clinical experience 
develops further (Information and Services Division NHS Scotland 2011). 
 
The strategic decision to omit personality disorder from this key target 
becomes all the more obvious when the details of those whom the target 
is intended to apply to are indicated: 
 
“where the therapy is delivered to individuals or groups on a face-
to-face basis, by staff trained to recognised standards, operating 
under appropriate supervision, in dedicated/ focused sessions 
to all ages (including CAMHS services); 
in inpatient as well as community settings; 
in physical health settings where there is associated mental illness 
such as depression or anxiety e.g. chronic pain and cancer; 
for substance misuse where there is associated mental illness; 
for learning disabilities where there is associated mental illness” 
(Information and Services Division NHS Scotland 2011).  
 
Substance misuse, learning disabilities and even physical pain and 
diseases such as cancer are included within the HEAT target for access to 
psychological treatment, under the broad term of mental illness.  The 
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omission of personality disorder is therefore particularly notable within 
this otherwise very broad and flexible approach to how this HEAT target 
should be interpreted.  
 
Another key policy document namely: Equally Well (The Scottish 
Government 2008) also notably omits any reference to personality 
disorder when making reference to the Scottish Government’s current 
agenda: 
 
“The Government’s Delivering for Mental Health Programme is 
improving care and treatment for people. It covers not only those 
with severe and enduring illnesses such as schizophrenia, bi-polar 
disorder and dementia, but also those with a wider range of 
conditions such as depression, anxiety and stress”:37. 
 
The Scottish Government (Department of Health and Well-Being  2007) 
published an implementation plan to accompany ‘Towards a Mentally 
Flourishing Scotland’ in October 2007.  The implementation plan was 
entitled ‘The Future of Mental Health Improvement in Scotland 2008-11’. 
In keeping with other policy documents referred to above, this document 
places the emphasis explicitly upon mental illness and admits any 
reference to personality disorders. The vision outlined within this 
particular document is intended to: 
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“...prevent, treat and care for mental illness and improve the 
quality of life for people living with mental illness” (Department of 
Health and Well-Being  2007: 2). 
 
One possible explanation for the omission of personality disorder from the 
mental health policy framework in Scotland might be that of the political 
challenge of justifying expenditure on a group of service users who are 
characteristically unproductive (Pilgrim 2012). Service users who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder are perhaps the most likely to be 
designated as least susceptible to being behaviourally activated to 
participate productively in the labour market. Given the greater emphasis 
that has been placed upon personality disorder by the UK Government, 
albeit substantially driven by an agenda based on risk, it is perhaps not 
surprising that personality disorder has not been excluded from the 
equivalent policy in England intended to increase access to psychological 
therapies (Department of Health 2012), this however makes the exclusion 
of this group of service users from key aspects of policy in Scotland all the 
more stark in contrast. 
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Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding the arguments advanced in favour of inclusion by those 
who believe that this is the most effective means of promoting the rights 
of those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder, those who do 
attract this diagnosis continue to occupy an ambivalent position within law 
and policy in Scotland.  
 
The explicit inclusion of personality disorder within the Mental Health 
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, follows from the amendment 
to the law introduced in the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) 
(Scotland) Act 1999. This had the effect of making the inclusion of 
personality disorder explicit in Scottish mental health legislation for the 
first time. The decision to retain the explicit inclusion of personality 
disorder in the 2003 Act does not merely follow in a sequential sense; 
rather it became clear during the course of this research that the 
continued explicit inclusion of personality disorder followed as a practical 
political necessity. Once again, notwithstanding the potential merits of 
explicitly including personality disorder in Scottish law in terms of 
increasing access to services, the original decision to explicitly include this 
form of diagnosis was largely a response to tabloid driven anxieties, 
resulting in the decision by the Scottish Executive to pursue the 
enactment of emergency legislation. Had it not been for this emergency 
legislation then the previously established position of the innominate 
inclusion of personality disorder in Scots law would in all likelihood have 
been maintained. The adversarial approach adopted by the UK 
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Government towards the perceived failure of psychiatrists in particular to 
grasp the nettle and accept their responsibility to work with those who 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder, particularly dissocial / 
antisocial personality disorder, was not echoed in Scotland. Rather in 
Scotland a greater consensus was evident in the desire to maintain the 
policy of not admitting those with a primary diagnosis of personality 
disorder to forensic settings, reflecting the position that became 
established in Scotland in the mid-1970s. Due to its explicit rejection of 
the DSPD agenda being pursued by the UK Government, the MacLean 
Committee proved instrumental in allowing the established Scottish 
position to be largely maintained in regard to the ‘do not admit’ policy.  
 
The Millan Committee took their lead from the MacLean Committee with 
regard to the DSPD agenda. During the course of this research it became 
clear that the concept of trauma has been used to make the inclusion of 
personality disorder, in the limited form of borderline personality disorder 
at least, more palatable to those who question its legitimacy within the 
biomedical paradigm. A trauma-based approach is also more consistent 
with the ethos of recovery and that is a key aspect of current Government 
policy. Despite the initial broad-based inclusion of those who might attract 
a diagnosis of personality disorder, a process of narrowing is evident 
resulting in a much more limited focus upon the inclusion of those who 
attract a diagnosis of borderline personality. Even this more limited focus 
disappears completely within some key aspects of policy, most notably 
the HEAT target for waiting times for psychological treatment. The Millan 
Committee acknowledged a range of opinions regarding the merits of 
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explicitly maintaining the inclusion of personality disorder within the law 
in Scotland. Despite the current emphasis upon a more rights-based 
approach to mental health law, the explicit inclusion of personality 
disorder within the emergency legislation of 1999 and its subsequent 
retention within the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 
2003, was not primarily based on an acknowledgement of the legitimate 
needs and rights of those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder. 
The inclusion of personality disorder owed more to earthy considerations 
such as the political imperative for the Scottish Executive, and Scottish 
Parliament more broadly to reinforce its legitimacy. To this end it was 
necessary for the Parliament to be seen to be able to provide an effective 
regulatory framework to maintain order. To this extent the decision to 
explicitly include personality disorder within mental health legislation in 
Scotland does reflect the broader imperatives of an approach to control 
the regulation that reflects neoliberal governmental imperatives (Pilgrim 
2012).  
 
To date the decision to explicitly include personality disorder within 
mental health legislation does not appear to have significantly impacted 
on the ability of those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder to 
access appropriate services in a timely manner. The extent to which this 
state of affairs is likely to change will depend on a substantial extent upon 
the efforts of organisations such as the Scottish Personality Disorder 
Network who continue to champion the rights of those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder to meaningful inclusion within the 
spectrum of service provision. This network is even more important given 
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the absence of any other obvious champions to assert the rights of this 
group of service users. The assumption of entitlement that might be 
presumed by many to follow from the explicit inclusion of personality 
disorder within the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 
2003 is likely to remain an unfulfilled hope. This is not least because 
entitlement without the provision of services cannot materially impact the 
ability of those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder to 
successfully access appropriate services. As things currently stand 
therefore those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder in Scotland 
are likely to continue to experience significant levels of marginalisation 
and exclusion. 
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Chapter 9: 
Final Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this research has been to explore five key questions that 
are of fundamental importance to the well-being of those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder in Scotland.  These were: 1) in what 
ways does the inclusion of personality disorder within mental health law in 
Scotland reflect an acknowledgement of the legitimate needs and rights of 
service users?; 2) how does the inclusion of personality disorder within 
mental health law fit into a broader range of strategies of control and 
regulation characteristic of an advanced liberal democracy?; 3) how has 
the inclusion of personality disorder  influenced the way in which those 
who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder are perceived by front-line 
workers?; 4)in what ways, if any, have front-line workers  changed their 
response to those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder as a 
consequence of current legislation?; and 5) how has  current legislation  
influenced the availability of, and access to, services for those who attract 
a diagnosis of personality disorder?  
 
The inclusion of personality disorder within the Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 reflects two very different agendas. 
During the course of this research clear evidence emerged of the 
significance of the political imperative of the newly devolved Government 
in Scotland to demonstrate that it could fulfil one of its most basic duties, 
namely that of maintaining order by being seen to effectively manage and 
limit the potential for disorder. A potential crisis of legitimacy for the 
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newly established parliament was triggered by the legal ruling requiring 
the release from detention of Noel Ruddle, this resulted in emergency 
legislation in the form of the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) 
(Scotland) Act (1999), often referred to as ‘Ruddle's law’. The potential 
for a political crisis in Scotland was increased due to the support in the 
tabloid press for the punitive policies being pursued at that time by the 
UK Government. The second agenda was that of a campaign that 
championed the rights of those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder to be included within mental health legislation, in order that their 
needs could be more readily acknowledged and services provided. In 
England this was most clearly expressed in the strategy document 
Personality Disorder No Longer a Diagnosis of Exclusion (National 
Institute for Mental Health in England  2003). While in Scotland there was 
no equivalent policy document, the agenda of inclusion was reflected in 
the establishment of the Scottish Personality Disorder Network. Two very 
different agendas can therefore be identified that underpin the explicit 
inclusion of personality disorder within mental health law in Scotland. The 
underpinning logic of these two agendas is however very different indeed. 
These differences create tensions and contradictions that explain why 
despite the explicit inclusion of personality disorder within legislation, the 
subsequent policy framework largely excluded or at best marginalised 
those who may attract a diagnosis of personality disorder.  
 
During the course of this research some evidence emerged that those 
who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder are somewhat less likely to 
be perceived as making an illegitimate claim upon services when they 
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express their needs. This change in perception however is far from 
uniform, meaning that for service users the response they receive 
continues to be something of a lottery. The perception of those who 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder also continues to be 
significantly influenced by the specific form of diagnosis or combination of 
diagnoses that are attached to any given service user. Among the various 
diagnoses of personality disorder that can be made, borderline personality 
disorder has received by far the most attention in policy documents and 
academic publications. One consequence of this is that service users who 
may attract this particular form of diagnosis are somewhat less likely to 
be automatically filtered out and therefore excluded from services. Those 
who attract a primary diagnosis of other varieties of personality disorder 
are however likely to continue to be perceived fairly negatively and face a 
significantly greater risk of being excluded from service provision. 
 
To date the impact of the inclusion of personality disorder within the 
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, has at most 
been to offer encouragement to those seeking to drive forward cultural 
change by promoting the acceptance and meaningful inclusion of those 
who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder within service provision. 
 
The diagnosis of personality disorder continues to be and is likely to 
remain deeply contested in almost every respect. Those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder in Scotland, despite the efforts of the  
Scottish Personality Disorder Network, are likely to continue to experience 
significant obstacles in accessing appropriate services in a timely manner. 
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These obstacles stem from difficulties following from service structures 
and the prerequisite necessity for those seeking services to be service 
ready. Other impediments originate from processes of bifurcation and 
filtration; these processes frequently result in those who have attracted a 
diagnosis of personality disorder, or are likely to do so, being screened 
out and therefore effectively being denied access to services. The 
majority of services continue to place an exclusive emphasis upon 
working with those with whom they have traditionally been concerned, 
namely those who fall within the diagnostic circumference of severe and 
enduring mental illness. 
 
The explicit inclusion of personality disorder within the Mental Health 
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, has not been fully reflected in 
subsequent policy developments and frameworks that play a crucial role 
in steering policy and practice at a local level. Those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder are likely to continue to occupy an 
ambivalent and uncertain position that can be characterised as somewhat 
of a ‘twilight zone’. In this case the zone is bounded by perceptions of 
legitimacy and illegitimacy: the boundary encompassing legitimacy is still 
predominantly defined in terms of a traditional medical emphasis 
favouring those who attract a diagnosis of a severe and enduring mental 
illness: those who attract diagnoses that fall outwith this boundary 
however continue to be perceived with varying degrees of illegitimacy and 
are therefore deemed to be less eligible for services. A further distinction 
between those who are deemed to be making a legitimate and illegitimate 
claims upon services concerns the maintenance of the established 
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Scottish position regarding those who attract a diagnosis of dissocial / 
antisocial personality disorder. This is despite the fact that the legislation 
makes no distinctions whatsoever in terms of the different forms that a 
diagnosis of personality disorder may take, instead simply referring to 
personality disorder. The narrowing of focus to that of borderline 
personality disorder also emerged as a key development during the 
course of this research. As discussed in the preceding analysis this 
process has moved beyond one of narrowing, so that within key policy 
developments and frameworks reference to personality disorder is simply 
omitted altogether. 
 
It emerged during the course of this research that the perception of those 
who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder among front-line workers, 
ranges from one of broad acceptance to considerable scepticism and 
reticence to embrace them within service provision. In practical terms it 
emerged that there was some evidence of limited changes in the response 
at a local level to those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder; 
more fundamentally however, those who attract this diagnosis are still 
subject to various processes of screening and filtration that significantly 
reduce the opportunities for them to access appropriate services in a 
timely manner. The overall impact on the availability of services 
stemming from the decision to specifically include personality disorder 
within the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, 
consequently appears to be negligible reflecting the very real limits of 
legalism (Pilgrim 2012). For the foreseeable future it is unlikely therefore 
that those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder in Scotland are 
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going to be able to access appropriate services in a timely manner on a 
consistent basis. 
 
The original decision to amend the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, to 
explicitly include personality disorder within mental health law in Scotland 
was rooted in a panicked political reaction. This reaction was based upon 
fears that the legitimacy of the newly established Parliament in Scotland 
might be called into question if decisive action was not demonstrably 
taken. The political response to these anxieties was that of the decision to 
enact the emergency legislation of 1999 referred to above. This 
interpretation is consistent with the findings contained within Millan 
Report (2001) and the comments of a Key Informant from that same 
committee, both of which have been explored within this thesis. This 
interpretation is also consistent with the particular problems of 
maintaining political legitimacy within Parliamentary democracies (Offe 
1976; Pilgrim 2012). 
 
The de facto exclusion of many of those who may attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder in Scotland has therefore been maintained by three 
key impediments. Namely a policy framework that effectively entrenches 
the marginalised position of this group of service users; residual 
ambivalence towards the legitimacy of the diagnosis of personality 
disorder itself, and the legitimacy of the claims made upon services by 
those who have attracted this form of diagnosis; finally insufficient and 
inadequately focused resources for which networks, no matter how 
sincere their members, cannot provide a sufficient substitute for services. 
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The explicit inclusion of personality disorder within mental health law in 
Scotland was essentially coercive, predicated on the assumption that a 
dangerous legal loophole needed to be urgently closed. Although this 
rationale is less obvious in the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) 
(Scotland) Act 2003, the so called ‘public safety test’ introduced in the 
Mental Health (Public Safety and Appearance) (Scotland) Act 1999 has 
not been repealed. The political imperative for the explicit inclusion of 
personality disorder is therefore consistent with the argument that:  
 
"…the State differentially focuses on the coercive management of 
social problems under the guise of the paternalistic care of 
individual pathology" (Pilgrim 2012:1079).  
 
The explicit inclusion of personality disorder within legislation in Scotland 
therefore, on the one hand closes the so-called loophole based on the 
treatability criterion, thereby allowing those who may attract a diagnosis 
of personality disorder to be detained when they might otherwise have to 
be released, while at the same time doing little to genuinely promote the 
inclusion of a much broader range of people who may attract a diagnosis 
of one form of personality disorder or another. The absence of follow-
through in terms of a policy framework to promote inclusion may also 
reflect the perception that those who may attract this form of diagnosis 
have less economic utility because they are less amenable to being 
behaviourally reactivated and participating in the labour market (Pilgrim 
2012). 
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This thesis represents an example of how the post-empiricist model 
proposed by Derek Layder can be effectively used to investigate complex 
issues that combine law, policy and practice. This thesis provides an 
example of how a comprehensive historical analysis of law, policy and 
practice provide a necessary context in which to interpret findings from 
the empirical research into current practice and the impact of law and 
policy. This study also provides an example of how adopting a different 
perspective, in this case that of service readiness, can provide a 
significantly different vantage point from which to view and interpret how 
services respond to the needs of potential service users. In this case the 
concept of service readiness was used as a direct alternative to the more 
commonly used concept of hard to reach groups. This relatively new 
approach to understanding how and why marginalised groups become 
excluded from service provision and how this exclusion is maintained, 
offers the potential for the development of a radically different approach 
to understanding how services should be commissioned, designed and 
then ultimately offered. 
 
This thesis has a number of specific implications for the development of 
policy and practice. With specific regard to the policy framework, then this 
in effect reinforced the traditional position and status of those who attract 
a diagnosis of personality disorder as a marginalised group. The clearest 
example of this concerns the omission from those who attract a diagnosis 
of personality disorder from the HEAT targets. These targets are 
specifically intended to drive the way in which services are commissioned, 
organised, delivered and against which the performance of service 
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providers are benchmarked. Those who attract a diagnosis of personality 
disorder have a fundamental human right to have their needs 
acknowledged and appropriate services provided; they should not 
continue to be side-lined within policy as a group who are perceived as 
too problematic to embrace. With specific regard to practice, then the 
‘lottery effect’ created by how clinicians use their discretion to determine 
how narrowly the concept of treatment should be defined in practice 
should be specifically challenged. The processes of filtration that emerged 
during the course of this research based on the criteria of nuisance and 
risk should also be specifically challenged. During the course of this 
research the unintended consequences of the more rigorous approach 
underpinning the use of compulsory treatment and the role of the tribunal 
system emerged as of particular significance. The safeguards built into 
the tribunal system are of themselves to be welcomed; however the 
unintended consequence of marginalising informal patients should be 
addressed. As envisaged in the Millan Committee report, those who 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder are far more likely to fall into 
the informal rather than formal category and are therefore particularly 
vulnerable to this particular unintended consequence. Practice takes place 
within a context framed by law, policy and the structure of services 
themselves. It became clear during the course of this research that 
changes to the law in and of itself have relatively little effect upon 
practice, and therefore the experience of those who are likely to attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder. In addition to addressing the current 
deficiencies described above within the policy framework, it is necessary 
for services to be redesigned around the needs of potential service users 
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rather than the administrative requirements of providers. Much has been 
said and written in recent years about the importance of providing needs-
led services: the reality however is that the current way in which services 
are designed and configured is very far indeed from this. Ultimately it is 
important to recall why all of this matters: the reason is no less important 
than the fact that human suffering and misery should be acknowledged 
and addressed, rather than side-lined simply because it is ‘packaged’ 
within a particular diagnostic category. 
 
Limitations of Thesis  
 
This thesis and the analysis that it contains necessarily provide a window 
into developments within law, policy and practice. The findings are likely 
to be generalisable to a substantial degree because the policy framework 
in particular embraces Scotland as a whole, rather than merely being of 
relevance to the West of Scotland in particular. It should be noted 
however that the precise ways that policy is implemented on the ground 
and practice decisions are taken, may to some extent vary on a regional 
basis. As discussed within this thesis it was not possible to include a 
substantial number of service users within this study as had been 
originally intended; further research will therefore be required to ensure 
that the voices and experiences of service users are brought into and 
allowed to influence the on-going debate regarding how the needs of 
those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder should be catered for 
within service provision. 
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Areas for Further Investigation and Final Remarks 
 
Despite its prominence within the broader policy framework 
encompassing mental health in Scotland, the use of the recovery model 
did not emerge as a significant theme within this research. The extent to 
which recovery approaches are being applied to those who may attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder therefore requires further investigation. 
The extent to which the predominant focus upon borderline personality 
disorder has the effect of screening out those who may attract other 
varieties of label within the diagnostic suite of personality disorder also 
requires monitoring and evaluation. Given that the primary focus of social 
work concerns that of working with the vulnerable and marginalised, it is 
perhaps surprising that a more clearly defined role for social workers in 
respect of those who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder was not 
evidenced during the course of this research. The process of integrating 
health and social care, or rather social care into health suggests that 
social workers will need to redouble their efforts to maintain clarity 
regarding their distinctive role and purpose within increasingly integrated 
multi-professional teams. The potential contribution that social work as a 
discipline can make to improving the quality of life for those who may 
attract a diagnosis of personality disorder is considerable, not least in 
ensuring that their voices are heard and needs acknowledged. The extent 
to which social workers can effectively utilise a recovery approach in 
working with this group of service users in pursuit of these objectives 
requires further research. This will include finding ways to move beyond 
the fairly prescribed role of mental health officers within current 
legislation. 
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Finally, it is clear from this research that for many of those who attract a 
diagnosis of personality disorder in Scotland that this is likely to prove to 
be an on-going obstacle to accessing services and having their needs met 
in an appropriate and timely manner. Those who attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder are likely to continue to occupy an ambivalent and 
uncertain position, based on the at best partial recognition of the 
legitimacy of their needs and entitlement to services. Those service users 
who attract a diagnosis of personality disorder are therefore  likely to 
remain in the twilight zone of mental health practice and service 
provision: consequently there is reason to believe that those who attract 
this diagnosis, of whatever form, are likely to continue to experience the 
“harshly real effects” (p 323) of exclusion (Foucault 2003). As discussed 
earlier within this thesis the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act 
(Scotland) 2003 has been widely acknowledged as a progressive piece of 
legislation. For the majority of those who are given a diagnosis of 
personality disorder in Scotland however, the warning sounded by Stalker 
(2003) is all too likely to be the reality that they most often experience; 
namely that they will remain isolated and invisible if they are deemed to 
be ‘low risk’ and subject to segregation and exclusionary practices where 
they are deemed to be other than low risk. This distinction is likely to 
become even more pronounced for those service users who fall within the 
forensic sphere. This is perhaps not so much a case of champagne and 
white cider (Atkinson, Lorgelly et al. 2007) but rather white cider and 
undiluted bitter lemon! 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Spreadsheet containing historical timeline 
 
 
YEAR DATE EVENT REPORT / MEMORANDUM LEGISLATION RULING CONCEPTS 
1809      Pinel describes mania 
without delirium (manie 
sans delire) 
1835      Pritchard describes 
Moral Insanity 
1844     H. M Advocate v Gibson: the 
concept of moral insanity was 
rejected as a basis for the 
insanity defence. 
 
1844     Her Majesty's Advocate v 
Gibson:  this case resulted in 
the rejection of vanity as a 
basis for the defence within 
Scots law. 
 
1846  Criminal Lunatics Department 
established at Perth Prison.   
This was the first specifically 
dedicated facility within 
Scotland for forensic 
psychiatric patients. 
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YEAR DATE EVENT REPORT / MEMORANDUM LEGISLATION RULING CONCEPTS 
1857      Morel's concept of 
Degenerative and 
Pathological deviations 
from normality, which 
was said to be causally 
responsible for mental 
illness.  This idea draws 
upon the French theory 
of degeneration. Which 
greatly in Lombroso and 
his concept of the born 
criminal (1867). 
1867     Her Majesty's Advocate v 
Dingwall: this case introduced 
the concept of into Scots law. 
 
1889      Koch first used the term 
psychopathic when he 
described psychopathic 
inferiority 
1893     Her Majesty's Advocate v 
Smith: this case resulted in a 
ruling that for diminished 
responsibility to be found, 
they had to be a physiological 
as distinct from merely mental 
cause. 
 
1896      Kraepelin described the 
concept of Psychopathic 
States, influenced by the 
French notion of 
biological degeneration, 
which proved to be 
significantly influential 
others including 
Henderson 
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YEAR DATE EVENT REPORT / MEMORANDUM LEGISLATION RULING CONCEPTS 
1902     Her Majesty's Advocate v 
Aitken: the court ruled that 
brain disease have to be 
demonstrated in order for a 
finding of diminished 
responsibility to be made. 
 
1908   Royal Commission on the Care 
and Control of the Feeble-
Minded, 1904-1908, Radnor 
Committee. This provided the 
foundation for the legislation 
introduced in 1913 regarding 
moral imbecility. (Walker and 
McCabe, 1973), quote this 
particular commission as 
stating that it would be 
"scientifically incorrect" to 
include a distinctive category 
for the morally insane within 
mental health legislation.  This 
commission provided the basis 
for the introduction of parallel 
legislation in Scotland and 
England/Wales. 
   
1908    Crime Prevention Act  Introduced the concept 
of preventive detention 
1913    Mental Deficiency and Lunacy 
(Scotland) Act.   Moral 
Imbecile was introduced as a 
category of mental deficiency. 
The definition approximated 
the concept of personality 
disorder. 
  
1913     Her Majesty's Advocate v 
Higgins: Lord Johnston 
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rejected the principles of the 
Dingwall case altogether, 
arguing that partial 
responsibility was an illogical 
concept. 
1913    Mental Deficiency Act 
(England/Wales) 
  
1923      Kurt Sncheider 
differentiated between 
10 different forms of 
psychopathic personality. 
He provided an 
important definition of 
psychopathic 
personalities as those 
abnormal personalities 
whose from their 
abnormality or whose 
abnormality".  
1923     Her Majesty's Advocate v 
Savage: this proved to be the 
most significant case 
subsequent to Dingwall in 
there could be term 
diminished responsibility was 
actually introduced, the 
directions of Lord Alness had 
provided a basis for more than 
legal practice. 
 
1926   Report of the Departmental 
Committee on Sexual Offences 
against Children and Young 
Persons in Scotland (Scottish 
Office). This report lamented 
the underuse of s9 of the 1913 
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Act, which the committee 
believed would allow for the 
segregation of defective 
sexual offenders which would 
facilitate treatment and result 
in a reduction in recidivism. 
1927    Mental Deficiency Act   
1928   Protection and Training 
(Scottish Office). This report 
on juvenile delinquency, 
recommended that the 
definition of the moral 
imbecile be immediately 
amended, this did not happen 
within Scotland but did so in 
England in the 1927 Act. 
   
1932 May  Report of the Departmental 
Committee on Persistent 
Offenders, Home Office. 
  Highlighted that 
preventive detention had 
fallen into disuse in 
England and to an even 
greater extent within 
Scotland. 
1939  Psychopathic States published 
by Sir David Henderson. 
    
1940    Mental Deficiency (Scotland) 
Act 1940. This legislation 
contained the category moral 
defective of as a replacement 
of the previous concept of 
moral imbecility.  The 
intention had apparently been 
to provide a basis for 
hospitalising those whose 
antisocial behaviour was 
believed to have psychological 
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origins. This legislation 
reclassified the moral imbecile 
within the term moral 
defective which itself was a 
subcategory of mental 
deficiency.  This change had 
alyesy been made with the 
Mental Deficiency Act 1927 
applicable to England/Wales 
1941      Cleckley use the term 
"convincing mask of 
sanity" to describe 
psychopaths, he also 
provided 16 different 
criteria for the diagnosis 
of psychopathy based 
upon personality trait 
theory. 
1946     Carraher v Her Majesty's 
Advocate: Lord Normand ruled 
that psychopathy to act as a 
basis for a finding of 
diminished responsibility as 
this would have a producing 
the severity of disposals in the 
worst offenders.  He also 
argued that the evidence 
presented to him had simply 
been descriptive of a typical 
criminal. 
 
1946   The Russell Committee 
(Department of Health for 
Scotland), strongly influenced 
by Henderson's concept of 
psychopathic states: The 
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Report of the Committee 
included a recommendation 
that the category of moral 
imbecile should be removed 
from Scots law can be 
replaced by legislation for 
"unstable erratic behaviour 
types". 
1953   Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment (1949-1953), 
Chaiyes by Sir Arthur Gowers. 
This commission apparently 
concluded that the concept of 
psychopathic States based on 
the work of Henderson was 
legitimate but that there was a 
lack of agreement among 
psychiatrists about what it 
meant which was deeply 
problematic. 
   
1957    Homicide Act 1957: this 
applied to Scotland as well as 
England and the concept of 
diminished responsibility with 
and effectively introduced that 
for the first time into English 
and Welsh law. 
  
1957   The Royal Commission on the 
Law Relating to Mental Illness 
and Mental Deficiency (Percy 
Commission 1954-57). 
Recommended the inclusion 
of psychopathy within the 
definition of mental illness, 
and form the basis of the Into 
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the Health Act 1959 - England 
and Wales. 
1958   Dunlop Committee 
(Department of Health for 
Scotland), consideyes whether 
or not the proposals of the 
Percy Commission should be 
adopted in Scotland and 
concluded that they should 
not; one of the most 
substantive reasons for the 
rejection of his proposals was 
the lack of definition will 
clarity regarding the concepts 
involved.this represented a 
significant point of departure, 
at least superficially, between 
Scotland and England/Wales.  
The Scottish 1960 Act did 
include the psychopathic 
group, however only within 
the grounds for detention and 
not by name.  The 
English/Welsh legislation 
explicitly acknowledged the 
psychopathic group as a 
distinctive category. 
   
1960      R v Byrne Court of Appeal.  
The court gave a wide 
interpretation to diminished 
responsibility which had the 
effect of including personality 
disorder within this defence, 
within jurisdictions of England 
and Wales. 
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1960    Mental Health (Scotland) Act. 
This act mirroyes the 1959 Act 
for England and Wales by 
including although not naming 
category of psychopathy. 
Mental health law in Scotland 
had remained largely 
unchanged since 1913 prior to 
the 1960 Act, despite the 1940 
Act. 
  
1960   Parliamentary Debates (1960) 
Mental Health (Scotland) Bill, 
Scottish Standing Committee, 
House of Commons Official 
Reports.  HMSO.  Eighth to 
Tenth Sittings, p364-452. The 
report of this committee is 
said to clearly indicate the 
intention to mirror the English 
and Welsh legislation and the 
inclusion of psychopathy. 
Consider the comments given 
in evidence by the Solicitor 
General. 
   
1969   Harper Report: Forensic 
Psychiatry, Report of a 
Subcommittee of the Standing 
Medical Advisory Committee.  
Scottish Home and Health 
Department, Edinburgh, 
HMSO 
   
1975   Crime and the Prevention of 
Crime: a Memorandum by the 
Scottish Council on Crime 
   
1975   Butler Report, Home Office    
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                338 | P a g e  
 
YEAR DATE EVENT REPORT / MEMORANDUM LEGISLATION RULING CONCEPTS 
and Department of Health and 
Social Security, Report of the 
Committee on Mentally 
Abnormal Offenders, Cmnd 
6244. This report is said to 
have recommended the 
inclusion of a treatability 
criterion, which influenced the 
formulation of the Scottish 
1984 Act. 
1976  Escape and murders at 
Carstairs 1976. Two patients 
escaped from Carstairs, a 
diagnosis of personality 
disorder.  It made they 
murdeyes three people, a 
nurse pati police officer.  This 
event is distinct from other 
homicides which have 
occuryes within some special 
hospitals, during an escape 
attempt. 
    
1977   Scottish Home and Health 
Department (1977) State 
Hospital, Carstairs: Report of 
Public Local Inquiry into 
Circumstances Surrounding 
the Escape of Two Patients on 
30 November 1976 and into 
Security and Other 
Arrangements at the Hospital.  
The report alleged that expert 
evidence this is from the BMA 
came out against detain 
dangerous psychopaths within 
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hospital settings. 
1983    Mental Health Act, this 
continues with the conclusion 
of a distinctive psychopathic 
category 
  
1984    Mental Health Act 
(Scotland).this legislation 
continued with another label 
psychopathic group I.e. 
innominate. 
  
1990 June 5, 1990    Connelly v Her Majesty's 
Advocate.  This case is 
important because it was 
subject to contestation in the 
subsequent appeal made by 
Galbraith regarding the scope 
of diminished responsibility.   
Lord Caplan specifically 
directed the jury that they 
could not allow the presence 
of personality disorder to be 
regarded as providing a basis 
for a finding of diminished 
responsibility.  Rather for a 
finding of diminished 
responsibility it would be 
necessary for the jury to be 
convinced that the accused 
was suffering from mental 
illness or a degree of mental 
impairment bordering 
insanity. 
 
1993 1st January Ben Silcock, enteyes the lion's 
den at London zoo. 
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1994     Williamson v Her Majesty's 
Advocate.  This case heard 
under appeal confirms that 
personality disorder should be 
excluded from the criteria for 
a finding of diminished 
responsibility. 
 
1997 Jul, 16 Michael Stone arrested for 
murder of Megan Russell and 
Megan Russell and attempted 
murder of Josie Russell. 
    
1997 Summer The new pre-devolution 
Government established a 
joint ministerial working group 
drawn from the Home Office 
and Health with a remit of 
considering the need for 
legislative reform dangerous 
severe personality disorder. 
    
1997 September  Framework for Mental Health 
Services in Scotland (see 
document by Joint 
Improvement Team, August 
2005 
   
1998 October Establishment of the 
Richardson Committee 
    
1998 October    Michael Stone sentenced to 
life imprisonment.  He was 
found to be suffering from a 
personality disorder are not 
mentally ill etc. This conviction 
was quashed in February2001. 
 
1998     Hutchinson Reid verses 
Secretary of State for 
Scotland, House Of Lords 
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1999 January  Health, Social Work and 
Related Services for Mentally 
Disordered Offenders in 
Scotland. NHS MEL 1999(5) 
Health Department, The 
Scottish Office 
  This "provides the basis 
for forensic mental 
health services in 
Scotland" from The 
Forensic Network, July 
2007 PowerPoint second 
slide 
1999 July  Managing Dangerous People 
with Severe Personality 
Disorder - proposals for policy 
development, Department f 
Health and Home Office. 
Consultation Document. 
   
1999 August  Research Note Mentally 
Disordered Offenders in 
Scotland, published by The 
Information Centre of the 
Scottish Parliament (99/34) 
  Specifically highlights 
personality disorder as a 
problem to be addressed 
particularly concerning 
the need for further legal 
clarification 
1999 November  Richardson Committee 
Report:published alongside 
the Green Paper (publication 
represents sabotage?). 
   
1999 March Establishment of the Maclean 
committee by the UK 
government. 
    
1999 November Reform of the Mental Health 
Act 1983: Green Paper 
    
1999   Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into the Personality 
Disorder Unit, Ashworth 
Special Hospital, chaiyes by 
Peter Fallon QC 
  This contains some very 
interesting information 
relating to concept 
formation in the history 
of personality disorder. 
1999    Mental Health (Public Safety 
and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 
 Changed the definition of 
mental illness to include 
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1999 personality disorder. 
1999    Ruddle Case   
1999   NHS MEL 73.  Mental Health 
(Public Safety and Appeals) 
Scotland Act 
   
1999     Reid v Secretary of State for 
Scotland, 
 
2000 December Reforming the Mental Health 
Act: White Paper 
    
2000 March Home Affairs Committee, First 
Report, Managing Dangerous 
People with Severe Personality 
Disorder. GP/HC 42 1999-
2000. 
    
2000   Atkinson and Patterson, 
Scottish Executive Central 
Research Unit, Review of 
Literature Relating to Mental 
Health Legislation 
   
2000   MacLean Report, Report of the 
Committee Violent and Sexual 
Offenders 
   
2000  Literature review for the 
MacLean Committee (Connelly 
and Williamson, 2000). 
    
2001 October    Retrial and conviction of 
Michael Stone for murder. 
 
2001     Galbraith v Her Majesty's 
Advocate High Court of 
Judiciary Appeal. The court 
clarified the definition of 
diminished responsibility by 
allowing a broader 
interpretation, based upon 
accepting the argument that 
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the courts had historically 
misinterpreted previous 
guidance issued to a jury by 
Lord Alness in the case of 
savage 1923.  The appeal 
Court held that before criteria 
provided to the jury by Lord 
Alness will individual 
exemplar's of the doctrine of 
diminished responsibility and 
that any one of them was 
sufficient rather than a 
requirement that all four be 
demonstrated in order for a 
finding of diminished 
responsibility to be possible.  
The court however continued 
to explicitly exclude 
psychopathy as grounds for 
diminished responsibility. 
2001   Reducing the Risk, Improving 
the Response to Sex 
Offending, Report of the 
Expert Panel - Cosgrove 
   
2001   Millan Report, New Directions, 
Report of the Review of the 
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 
1984. 
   
2001   Serious Violent and Sexual 
Offenders: Criminal Justice.  
Edinburgh, Scottish Executive 
   
2002 May Conference: Mental Welfare 
Commission for Scotland.  A 
National Conference on 
Services for Mentally 
   This also states that NHS 
MEL 1999 (5) "set out the 
guiding principles upon 
which services for 
 © Nuttall, L. (2013)                                                                                                344 | P a g e  
 
YEAR DATE EVENT REPORT / MEMORANDUM LEGISLATION RULING CONCEPTS 
Disordered Offenders in 
Scotland 
mentally disordered 
offenders in Scotland 
should be based":30 
2002 June Reform of the Mental Health 
Act 1983: Draft Mental Health 
Bill 
    
2002     Galbraith v Her Majesty's 
Advocate 
 
2002 December  Positive Mental Health.  SPS.  
This document refers to NHS 
MEL 1999 (5) and also to the 
World Health Organisation. 
  This document is quite 
progressive! 
2003   Scottish Law Commission, 
Discussion Paper no. 122, 
Discussion Paper on Insanity 
and Diminished Responsibility. 
This report recommends that 
psychopathy and antisocial 
personality disorder should 
continue to be excluded from 
the definition of insanity but 
should effectively be brought 
within the definition of 
diminished responsibility. 
   
2003    Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 
2003 
  
2003    Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act  Introduced the OLR. 
2004 September Revised Mental Health Bill. 
Cm6305. This Bill included an 
amendment to introduce 
Mental Health Tribunals. 
    
2004   Dangerous and Severe 
Personality Disorder, a Secure 
Services Planning and Delivery 
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Guide, Department of Health, 
Home Office 
2004    European Court of Human 
Rights. The proposals are in 
response to the 2004 
European Court of Human 
Rights judgment involving an 
autistic man who lacked the 
capacity to consent who was 
kept at Bournewood 
Hospital…see notes. 
  
2005 July Governments Response to the 
Report concerning the Revised 
Mental Health Bill 
    
2005 March  Report concerning the Revised 
Mental Health Bill, joint House 
of House of Lords Committee. 
HL 79-I / HC 95-I. This 
Committee Report contains a 
further rejection of the revised 
DSPD provisions the report 
recommended that separate 
legislation be introduced for 
this group. 
   
2005   Report of the Working Group 
On Services for People with 
Personality Disorder.  This 
contains a number of 
important observations 
regarding the law and its 
implications for those who 
attract a diagnosis of 
personality disorder. 
   
2005   Atkinson, Scottish Executive, 
Review of Literature Relating 
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to Mental Health Legislation 
2005  Code of Practice, for the 2003 
Mental Health Act. 
    
2005    Management of Offenders Etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2005 
 This legislation not only 
established Criminal 
Justice Authorities but 
also contained details of 
the scheme of 
accreditation for the 
RMA. 
2006 March Next Steps for the Mental 
Health Bill.  Rosie Winterton 
announced that the 
government would bring 
forward a Bill to amend 
existing legislation rather than 
introduce an entirely new bill 
as in the form of the previous 
two draft bills. This will focus 
upon post release supervision 
of the treatability criterion. 
    
2006   Report of the Independent 
Inquiry into the Care and 
Treatment of Michael Stone 
   
2005   Atkinson and Reilly et al. 
follow-up Review of Mental 
Health Legislation.  Scottish 
Executive. 
   
1999 24 June Publication of The MacLean 
Consultation Paper 
    
2009  Article by Denise Coia entitled 
Mental Health Quality and 
Outcome Measurement and 
Improvement in Scotland 
   this article contains the 
following quotation: 
"Almost independent of 
the political party in 
power, Scotland has 
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always been a country 
with broadly socialist 
leanings, based on its 
Calvinistic heritage":643.  
                                        
The article contains a 
very interesting overview 
of recent policy 
developments 
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Appendix 2: Service Readiness 
 
 
Service Readiness - Key Attributes 
 
 A postal address 
 
 Photographic ID 
 
 National Insurance Number 
 
 Sufficient time and the absence of other competing demands 
 such as childcare responsibilities 
 
 The ability to recognise and appreciate financial incentives 
 
 An absence of fear due to stigma, the threat of violence, perverse incentives such as 
those found in the informal economy or criminal situations 
 
 Willingness to disclose personal information in surroundings which may be 
unfamiliar or uncomfortable 
 
 Linguistic capacity (as defined by the service) 
 
 Intellectual capacity (as defined by the service) 
 
 Recognition of timeliness, deadlines, sanctions and penalties 
 
 Trust in and willingness to behave respectfully and politely (as 
 defined by the service) to staff 
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Appendix 3: Research Schedule 
 
 
1. Following the introduction of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, personality disorder is now 
for the first time included as a specific category of mental disorder in Scotland.  What are you views of this change? 
 
2. In your experience do other psychiatrists / mental health officers view this change as a positive and welcome 
development? 
 
3. What changes, if any, has the inclusion of personality disorder resulted in :)1 for service users )2 for mental health 
professionals? 
 
4. In your opinion has the new Act resulted in more resources being made available to provide services for people with 
personality disorders? 
 
5. What difference has the Act made to the support available to those with personality disorders and any advice that you 
may offer? 
 
6. In your experience have services become more responsive to the needs of those with personality disorders since the 
new Act? 
 
7. As you will know, personality disorders have often been referred to as a diagnosis of exclusion; to what extent do you 
believe that this remains true? 
 
8. Based on your experience in what ways has the inclusion of personality disorder impacted upon service users? 
 
9. In what ways, if any, has the inclusion of personality disorder, resulted in service users participating more fully in 
decision-making processes regarding their welfare and treatment? 
 
10. In your view why was personality disorder included within the new Act? 
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11. In your experience how are service users involved in deciding how their needs can best be met? 
 
 
12. In your opinion what has been the effect of the inclusion of specific principles such as non-discrimination within the 
Act? 
 
13. In your opinion, has the inclusion of any particular principles proved to be more significant than others? 
 
14. In your experience has the inclusion of personality disorder had any impact on the way other professionals work with 
you? 
 
15. In your experience do other professionals tend to focus more upon the needs of those with personality disorder or the 
risk that they might be seen to pose to others? 
 
16. In your experience how has the inclusion of personality disorder influenced the approach of other professionals 
towards the process of assessment and diagnosis? 
 
17. What policies and procedures has your organisation introduced as a result of the new Act concerning those with 
personality disorders? 
 
18. In what ways, if any, has the inclusion of personality disorder impacted upon your perception of your role? 
 
19. How has the inclusion of personality disorder impacted upon your own practice? 
 
20. In what ways, if any, has the inclusion of personality disorder impacted upon the roles of other professionals that you 
work with? 
 
21. What is your view about the treatability of personality disorders? 
 
22. Have your views about the treatability of personality disorders changed since introduction of the new Act, if so in what 
ways? 
 
23. What training and support have you received concerning personality disorders since the introduction of the new Act? 
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24. In your experience does having a personality disorder make it any more or less likely that a CTO will be recommended?  
(If either more or less) - Why do you believe this to be the case? 
 
25. In your experience what factors make the application for a CTO more likely? 
 
26. Do you believe that the inclusion of personality disorder has made any difference to how you yourself work with those 
with personality disorders? 
 
27. How has the inclusion of personality disorder influenced your approach to assessment and diagnosis? 
 
28. What effect has the inclusion of personality disorder had upon your approach to treatment planning? 
 
General Comments by Respondents 
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Appendix 4: Early example of analytical summaries 
 
 
Collated Analytical Summaries of Nodes - Together with Stages One and Two of the Integrated-
Analysis 
 
As of 18th November, 2009 
 
To date analytical summaries have been produced for 12 out of 56 nodes. 
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Analytical Summary - node Accepting Responsibility for the Service User: 
 
Statutory services continue to be unwilling to engage directly with those service users who have the most 
complex needs i.e. many of those who are affected by the institutional closure programmes.  The voluntary 
sector has been recruited to work with this group of people, many of whom would include those who meet the 
diagnostic criteria for a variety of personality disorders.  The voluntary sector is effectively left to get on with 
working with these people because the statutory sector argues that this is precisely what they have been 
commissioned to do. Those with personality disorders who repeatedly present to services, including crisis services 
tend to be regarded as not having a real crises and therefore are not appropriate for the service - this may 
reflect a much older bias within mental health services e.g. when crisis intervention was developed as a theory, if I 
recall correctly one of its basic ideas was that a crisis would not normally last for more than 14 days.  The idea of 
someone therefore being in almost perpetual crisis is indeed inconsistent with this fundamental approach and 
therefore at odds with services that are based on models of crisis intervention.  A process of buck-passing is 
evident in which professionals tend to be reluctant to accept responsibility for on-going work with those with 
personality disorders.  Once engaged other professionals also tend to drop out leaving social workers to carry 
on.  The tendency for workers to become frustrated with those with personality disorders also continues this is 
exemplified by the refrain "why can't you just help yourself".  It is also clear that formal patients continue 
to receive a far more adequate service than informal patients, precisely because the procedural 
requirements incorporated within the new legislation are more rigorous in respect of formal patients and 
specifically treatment plans.  Psychiatrists have increasingly moved towards a position in which personality 
disorder is seen to be inevitably an unavoidably a legitimate aspect of their work.  The current state of cultural 
change appears to be one based on practical acceptance of the inevitable and a recognition that it is not 
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unreasonable for those with personality disorders do want to gain access to psychiatric services - this is 
reminiscent of the realpolitik approach which also appears to have influenced the Millan committee in its 
deliberations concerning whether personality disorder should be formally included as a category.  This cultural 
change does appear to represent a challenge for psychiatrists however, not least in respect of their own 
confidence regarding their skills and abilities.  The arbitrary distinction between antisocial personality disorder 
and borderline personality disorder is also acknowledged by one psychiatrist who acknowledged that psychiatrists 
probably should be working with those with antisocial personality disorder also.  This position does run contrary 
however to the official stance of the Scottish government and probably psychiatry more generally within Scotland. 
 
 
Distillation and Further Reflection Upon - Analytical Summary - node Accepting Responsibility for 
the Service User:  
 
A division can be seen between the statutory and voluntary sector which is based upon the statutory sectors recruitment of the voluntary sector to 
effectively undertake some of the work that it does not wish to do.  Perhaps unsurprisingly this includes working with some of those who may 
regarded as a the most challenging and have the most complex needs.  This group is populated to quite an extent by those who have been affected 
by the institutional closure programme of recent years.  A further process is evident whereby when professionals are engaged in working with a 
person with personality disorder, they tend to try and disengage thereby leaving someone else, presumably anyone but them to take responsibility 
for the service user.  A further distinction continues to be evident between formal and informal patients with the emphasis in terms of time and 
resources being placed heavily in favour of formal patients in order to comply with the requirements of the current legislation.  Evidence of cultural 
change can be identified however; with psychiatrists increasingly accepting the inevitability if not the desirability of having to work with those with 
a diagnosis of personality disorders.  This raises a number of challenges not least relating to confidence amongst psychiatrists who do not always 
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appear to feel that they have the necessary skill set.  An arbitrary distinction continues to be evident as consistent with the Scottish consensus i.e. 
that those with antisocial personality disorder should be deemed to be undeserving and bad and those with borderline personality disorder are 
increasingly viewed as deserving and entitled to services under the broader historical category of mad. 
 
It is definitionally inherent within the concept of crisis intervention that a crisis is: “An acute disruption of 
psychological homeostasis in which one’s usual coping mechanisms fail and there exists evidence of distress and 
functional impairment” (Roberts and Ottens 2005) p 331. I.e. that it must therefore be short lived - as distinct 
from a more or less permanent pattern of behaviour. This provides some justification or at least a rationale for 
why crisis services may be reluctant to engage or take on people with personality disorders. This would 
potentially at least lend weight to those who argue in favour of specialised services - i.e. a service which is 
capable of responding in a coherent manner to a repeated pattern of crises. 
 
A number of distinct polarities have been identified above which relate to the previous polarities that I have 
identified: see my research log dated Wednesday, 21 October 2009. 
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Analytical Summary- Node Access to Assessment: 
 
Access to assessment appears to be very significantly influenced by factors concerning boundaries and values; 
rather than the actual disorder that a patient may or may not have.  Specialist services have on occasion opened 
up hitherto closed roots to assessment i.e. the Homeless Personality Disorder Team; however specialisation has 
also resulted in concerns that the boundaries around particular teams, reflected in their criteria, mean that some 
individuals may actually find it harder to be assessed in the first place.  Whether or not an individual is assessed 
as having a personality disorder, would appear to have a good deal to do with the values and beliefs of those 
charged with the responsibility for conducting the assessment; rather than being dependent upon the clinical 
factors that pertain to any given patient. The Millan committee clearly did not see any significant change to the 
entitlement to assessment, taking as they did a fairly resource led approach. 
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Analytical Summary - Nodal Analysis of Borderline Personality Disorder and Psychiatry: 
 
A clear focus can be identified upon management.  One psychiatrist suggested that psychiatrists were best 
placed to undertake this management function in respect of BPD but not with regard to antisocial or psychopathic 
personality disorder.  This was to some extent based upon the practical reality is that people with Borderline 
Personality Disorder "will always present to psychiatric services". One of the ways historically the psychiatrists 
have tried to manage this group of patients is by seeking to avoid working with them!  I.e. management by 
exclusion.  The practical reality however is that such patients do tend to be admitted and represent a significant 
demand upon in-patient beds.  One of the reasons for the reluctance to acknowledge formally working with this 
group has also been concerns about stigmatisation.  The reality however is that according to a least one survey 
one in six of inpatients were admitted because of borderline personality disorder and tended to spend "one year 
out of three, as an inpatient". A significant "financial imperative" as well as potential benefits in improving the 
quality of services are driving a move towards more coordinated approach is to working with those with Borderline 
Personality Disorder in the community in certain areas. This could perhaps be summarised as managing patients 
and amending budgets. Borderline personality disorder "has almost become synonymous with" personality 
disorder. This appears to be largely a consequence of the way in which the available research is skewed towards 
personality disorder, such that other forms of the disorder tend not to receive the attention of researchers.  There 
appear to be to drivers for this: the first that this particular group of patients are fairly high profile and therefore 
stimulate a political imperative for something to be done.  The second consideration is that because this group of 
patients do as a practical reality find their way onto the case loads of psychiatrists, because psychiatrists are in 
a position to dispense medication, this particular group also therefore gets the attention of pharmaceutical 
companies are also in a position to fund research.  This means that those with other types of personality disorder 
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e.g. anxious avoidant are still likely to be viewed as "mildly irritating" and their disorder to be viewed as a 
"therapeutic obstruction" rather than a proper focus for treatment.  This echoes the Patients That Psychiatrists I 
Dislike research paper of some years ago. This ‘medical’ orientation i.e. an emphasis upon prescribing can also be 
identified within the Integrated Care Pathway for borderline personality disorder which gives more 
consideration to medication than anything else. 
 
 
Analytical Summary - Nodal Analysis Care Pathways: 
 
A significant difference of opinion can be seen between a key government official and a key informant from the 
voluntary sector.  The first regards the inclusion of personality disorder as part of a coherent strategy of deliberate 
inclusion, which is part of a wider health care strategy (I need to see my reflective journal and go back and look at 
the policy developments in England and Wales i.e. find the parallel policy document that I discussed in 
supervision). The informant from the voluntary sector was very sceptical that the ICP would actually have any 
practical impact because it was unwieldy and because of the prevalence of hostile attitudes towards those with 
personality disorders.  The psychiatrist that-I interviewed who worked on the integrated care pathway, also 
expressed or degree of disappointment that the ICP was very minimal but balanced this by suggesting that one of 
the reasons for the minimal approach was that a number of the standards that the working group recommended 
were absorbed within the more general standards.  There was an implied regret however that the ICP as it 
currently stands focuses upon medication.  
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The fact that this node only has three respondents worth considering should not lessen its importance.  The 
respondents were a government official overseeing the whole process, a key informant from the voluntary sector 
who was an active participant in the process on behalf of their voluntary organisation together with a psychiatrist 
who was both on the MacLean committee and also helped to write the standards for the ICP. 
 
 
Analytical Summary Node - Clinical Concepts of Treatment: 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the diagnostic status of personality disorder continues to be regarded as somewhat 
contentious.  A division appears evident between newer and more established psychiatrists based on the fact that 
those that are newer to the profession tend to focus more upon treatment planning in terms of what is specifically 
deliverable.  In more general terms, in respect of personality disorder, clinicians appear to be adhering to a fairly 
traditional model of treatment rather than embracing the much broader definition contained within current 
legislation. Borderline Personality Disorder has effectively become synonymous for most practical purposes with 
the term personality disorder.  This is largely because of the growing evidence base concerning effective 
interventions for those with this diagnosis.  One of the consequences however is that other forms of personality 
disorder tend still to be regarded in negative and perhaps even hostile terms.  As anticipated, compulsory 
measures are generally seen as irrelevant to working effectively with those with personality disorders: the 
emphasis is upon co-operation with service users.  The Scottish consensus regarding the division between 
antisocial personality disorder and other forms of personality disorder has generally been maintained; however 
there is evidence that some psychiatrists are becoming increasingly open-minded about the possibility of working 
with those in the antisocial group. 
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Analytical Summary - Node Diagnosis of Exclusion:  
 
A clear policy distinction can be identified between antisocial personality disorder and borderline personality 
disorder.  The former is marked for exclusion at the policy level and the latter for inclusion.  This can be 
understood as an example of the very old division between the deserving and the undeserving and also the 
archetypal mad/bad division identified by Foucault and others.  In this case those who are perceived as deserving 
of health based interventions. Social workers identified a continuing tendency for the established practice of 
keeping the doors firmly shut to influence decision-making within CMHTs. A further distinction was also identified 
to in those who are perceived as representing a high degree of risk and therefore receive considerable attention on 
those who are perceived as representing a low-risk and therefore receive very little attention. Where interventions 
to take place, they appear to be focused on managing problematic behaviours rather than addressing the needs of 
individual concerned. The clarity within the current legislation regarding the need for treatment plans appears to 
act as a disincentive for some psychiatrist to use formal powers in respect of personality disorder; this is generally 
in keeping with the Millan Report and assumptions concerning the use of compulsory measures. Personality 
disorder still continues to be perceived as somebody else’s problem as far as CMHTs are concerned i.e. they 
appear to define their role in terms of mental illness. Psychiatrists tended to identify a shift in practice over time, 
which tends to be referred to as a cultural shift.  This amounts to a shift away from exclusionary practices towards 
a positive policy of inclusion.  Exclusionary practices are perceived as having failed because of the reality of the 
number patients admitted to hospital that have a personality disorder(s).  As part of a broader cultural shift 
personality disorders are also increasingly perceived to be a legitimate area of concern for psychiatrists. The shift 
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towards inclusion was however not without difficulties; problematic behaviour still continues to be seen as a basis 
for exclusion and rejection.  Inclusion appears to be limited to borderline personality disorder; other forms of 
personality disorder are likely to be viewed in a more traditional manner i.e. as a source of therapeutic 
obstruction.  This raises possibility that patients with these other forms of personality disorder may also come to 
be viewed as a source of irritation (see Lewis and Appleby paper). 
 
 
Analytical summary - Node Difficult to Manage and Problem Patients: 
 
At a policy level exclusionary practices in respect of antisocial personality disorder are officially endorsed.  The 
main focus of inclusion concerns borderline personality disorder. Statutory services (local authority) continue to be 
reluctant to engage with those with personality disorder, preferring to leave this to specialist providers.  One of 
the consequences of this appears to be a degree of ongoing marginalisation and exclusion, at least from 
mainstream services.  Social workers are committed to working in accordance with their value based in order to 
promote an agenda of inclusion; however this frequently results in significant levels of frustration regarding the 
difficulty of actually engaging with people with personality disorder and the general lack of services available.  
Those people who are retained on the case loads of community mental health teams, are frequently characterised 
by the so-called revolving-door syndrome, and can come to be viewed with the degree of frustration and hostility 
by staff.  The response from community mental health teams can become polarised whereby those who are 
perceived to represent a significant risk (particular forensic patients) receive a high level of intervention, where as 
those who are not perceived as representing a significant risk to others are often left to the bottom of the pile.  
Where interventions do take place the focus tends to be on the management of behaviour, rather than addressing 
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individual needs at a more fundamental level. Cultural change appears to be taking place within psychiatry; 
however as may be expected more traditional attitudes do also continue, exemplified by a fairly punitive focus 
upon boundary violations, social conformity and individual responsibility.  Continued and frequent boundary 
violations are still viewed by some staff as a basis for not working with people with personality disorders, not least 
because of the risks associated with certain behaviours, particularly those associated with self-harm. This indicates 
that a form of objectification continues whereby the individual is viewed in terms of a cluster of behavioural 
indicators, which require to a greater or lesser extent to be managed in order to maximise their social conformity 
and increase their survival chances. Where this arises the emphasis is one of management rather than addressing 
the well-being of service users at a more fundamental level.  The more progressive position is one which 
recognises that previous attempts by psychiatrists to actually exclude those with borderline personality disorder 
from mental health services, has in fact failed – as indicated by the reality on the wards. The progressive view 
unsurprisingly places an emphasis upon the person and the need to establish effective therapeutic relationships, 
whilst also at the same time recognising the need to acknowledge the significance of particular behaviours. This 
progressive approach shares with social work a belief that perseverance despite the obvious difficulties and 
challenges is necessary and appropriate. 
 
Comments: I believe that this node can be combined with another node namely; Diagnosis of Exclusion.  This is 
because, it seems to me, that to some extent this node serves the function of explaining the other i.e. Diagnosis of 
Exclusion. 
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Analytical Nodal Summary – Joined-up Services and Specialisation: 
 
Social workers perceive increasing specialisation to be problematic because it increases the possibility that those 
with personality disorders may fall through gaps in service provision.  The illusion of specialist knowledge great 
additional problems because those who may be perceived as having expertise moved fairly frequently between 
teams meaning that in fact they may not possess the knowledge or understanding that others or indeed they 
themselves may assume.  Increasing specialisation within the MHO role also means that MHOs are in danger of 
being cut off from other workers.  This has particular implications for those with personality disorders, given that 
the does not appear to be any particular emphasis within the MHO role in training regarding the development of a 
greater understanding and skill set these are the personality disorders. 
 
Psychiatrists appear to continue at least in some instances to take a fairly traditional view of their role vis-a-vis 
pharmacological interventions.  One response to this is to argue that court will change will take too long and that 
more specialised services are required in order to try and reduce the tendency for people to "bounce about" 
because they're not seen as legitimate patients not having severe enduring mental illness.  This represents a 
specific form of exclusion which is not in the spirit of the act but nevertheless represents a fairly pragmatic 
response.  Despite efforts to keep those with personality disorders out of the system, a significant number of those 
admitted i.e. one in six of all patients, according to one study had a diagnosis which included borderline 
personality disorder.  One response to this is to emphasise the potential financial savings that could be achieved 
by providing better services in the community and therefore preventing these admissions.  The law would not 
appear to have been particularly influential upon psychiatric practice largely because its focus is upon detention 
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and compulsion.  This focus, as indeed anticipated within the Millan Report, would generally not be applicable in 
Scotland for people with personality disorders. 
 
 
Analytical Summary - Node Lack of Service Provision: 
 
Differences in the provision of specialist services in Scotland and England are very evident to policymakers, 
psychiatrists and also to service users (this was not indicated however by social workers).  These differences exist 
because of the very different policy trajectories that have been adopted and pursued within these two 
jurisdictions.  The pressure to provide specialist services is likely to continue, coming from would be provided as 
and also from service users.  Access to psychological services and also to appropriate psychiatric services 
continues to be problematic and generally perceived as lacking.  Trying to access appropriate services for those 
with personality disorder continues to be an ongoing "battle". Recognition of the mortality and suicide rates 
associated with borderline personality disorder however may provide some impetus in the process of providing 
better community-based alternatives to admission.  This also has the benefit of offering significant financial 
savings. The law would appear to only have a secondary importance with regard to what services are actually 
provided. 
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Analytical Nodal Summary - Node Legislation Makes No Difference: 
 
The law itself does not appear to have had a significant part in any changes that have taken place vis-a-vis the 
services available to those with personality disorders.  Changes that have taken place have tended to be driven by 
other contingencies e.g. the hospital closure programme and are supported by a broader change in the 
relationship between doctors and patients.  An increased emphasis upon patient’s rights can be seen as influencing 
the more open attitude towards those with personality disorder and indeed appears to have influenced the drafting 
of the 2003 Act.  The shift towards a more positive attitude is however by no means universal; with a tendency by 
some medics to a dear to fairly traditional definitions and interpretations of illness and treatment - despite the fact 
that the definition of treatment is now so expensive. The competition for scarce resources seems to be much more 
significant in determining what services are provided and to whom than the law itself.  Based on this assessment, 
one would not predict a particularly positive future in terms of service provision for those with personality 
disorders. 
 
 
Analytical Summary - Node Resource Implications: 
 
At a policy level part of the rationale for taking a radically different approach to the forensic and general 
population appears to be based on cost.  The cost implications of developing specialist services for those with a 
diagnosis of ASPD, is considered to be prohibitive and to amount effectively to a moneymaking exercise for private 
companies.  The cost implications of specialist provision, although in the case referred to this was BPD, was also 
emphasised by a social work practitioner who quoted £3000 a week as an example.  The lack of resources was 
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identified as a one of the drivers behind the establishment of the personality disorder network. Interestingly 
however a leading psychiatrist took a different view, arguing that the decision to finance the establishment of a 
network was the correct way to proceed.  This was based on the belief that the alternative would be to fund 
specialist provision along similar lines to those in England and Wales.  This particular psychiatrist regarded that as 
a fruitless and ineffective pathway to follow.  The network was seen as a more effective means as well as a more 
economical means of promoting best practice.  Resources appear to be constraining the provision of DBT and 
psychological services more generally for which there are excessively long waiting lists. With the exception of one 
psychiatrist who did not appear to regard resources as a significant consideration, it appears that psychiatrists 
regard existing services as inadequate for a number of reasons.  Currently services have to be "cobbled together" 
partly because of entrenched attitudes and the fact that in the clamour for resources, more clearly recognised 
medical conditions such as schizophrenia tend to win over personality disorders.  One of the consequences of 
these entrenched attitudes and the slow pace of cultural change, was the suggestion by one psychiatrist that 
specialist dedicated resources were needed.  Clearly such an approach would have very significant resource 
implications.  One psychiatrist indicated that where better community-based provision had been provided, that this 
had a positive impact upon resources in so far as it had made bed closures possible.  This psychiatrist suggested 
that there was a "financial imperative" to provide community-based services and that his attempts to do so 
amounted to a "natural experiment" which had proved successful.  The potential demand for services in respect of 
personality disorder appears to outweigh any realistic potential for future resource provision: consequently the 
"fear of being engulfed" contributes to a situation in which the under diagnosis of personality disorder is almost 
systematically encouraged. 
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The question of resource constraints becomes even more significant bearing in mind the comments of one of the 
key informants i.e. that resource constraints were far more significant than legislation itself in determining what 
services were provided and to whom. 
 
 
Analytical Summary- Node Training: 
 
Social workers indicated that they had not received any particular training in respect of personality 
disorders to help them implement the 2003 Act.  Specific training had been provided in terms of mentally 
disordered offenders, which are increasingly influencing the case loads of some CMHTs; however this training did 
not consider personality disorder specifically. 
 
Psychiatrist indicated that they had not received any specific training concerning personality disorder in 
order to help them implement the 2003 Act.  Psychiatrists and furthermore indicated that they didn't 
necessarily feel that training was sufficient in order to allow them to communicate effectively with people with a 
diagnosis of personality disorder posts in the fact that doctors are "not necessarily trained to have that skill 
set". The efficiency of providing specific training in packages such as DBT was also called into question on the 
basis that on occasion people use this as a route to career advancement rather than putting their knowledge and 
skills into practice subsequently. The Scottish government does appear to be supporting training in respect of 
psychological interventions are to be CBT and mentalisation.  
 
 
